Walker v. Ergon Trucking, Inc.
| Decision Date | 18 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-14743 |
| Parties | ALVIN WALKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ERGON TRUCKING, INC., RICHARD MCGINNIS, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
DO NOT PUBLISH
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-00594-ACA
Before MARTIN, JORDAN, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
Alvin Walker appeals the district court's decision to exclude his expert's opinion as well as its grant of summary judgment to Richard McGinnis and Ergon Trucking, Inc. After careful consideration, we affirm both rulings.
This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident between Walker's car and a commercial tractor-trailer truck driven by McGinnis. The accident occurred on the evening of February 13, 2017, at the intersection of U.S. Highway 280 and Coosa Street in Sylacauga, Alabama. Right before the accident, McGinnis was driving in the right-hand lane on Highway 280 towards Coosa Street. He was driving right around 59 miles per hour, just over the posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour. McGinnis had a green traffic light as well as the right of way at the intersection. The parties dispute whether McGinnis looked around and saw any potential hazard as he approached the intersection.
As McGinnis drove through the intersection, Walker turned right off of Coosa Street to merge onto Highway 280. Highway 280 has a designated lane for merging onto the highway from Coosa Street. However, instead of using the designated lane, Walker immediately entered McGinnis's lane, and the two vehicles collided less than a second later. Walker did not use his turn signal or otherwise indicate he might enter McGinnis's lane. Walker looked "straight ahead" and did not look for approaching traffic on Highway 280, even though he knew he was required to yield to the right of way. McGinnis's dash cam recorded the accident.
In March 2018, Walker and his wife Bobbie Jo[1] sued McGinnis and his employer, Ergon Trucking (collectively "Defendants"), in Alabama state court. Defendants removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. In the operative complaint, Walker brought claims of negligence, subsequent negligence, and wantonness against McGinnis and sought to hold Ergon Trucking vicariously liable for McGinnis's conduct. Walker alleged McGinnis failed to keep a proper lookout, maintained an unreasonable and imprudent speed, failed to warn Walker with his horn, did not keep his truck under control, and failed to brake or change lanes. Walker also alleged McGinnis's conduct caused various injuries and sought damages for medical expenses and emotional distress, among other things.
During discovery, Walker disclosed safety consultant Whitney Morgan as an expert witness. Defendants ultimately moved to exclude Morgan's opinion under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993). The district court granted Defendants' motion finding Morgan's opinion inadmissible under Daubert for three reasons. First, the court found Morgan was not "qualified to offer an opinion on the proper operation of a tractor-trailer," the issue on which he was to testify. Second, the court found that the methodology Morgan used to reach his opinion, which included relying on a commercial driver's license manual, was not reliable because there was no indication other experts in the field would also use that methodology. Finally, the court found Morgan's opinion did "not offer any insights beyond the understanding of the average lay person and would not be helpful to the factfinder." Separately, the court stated, even assuming Morgan's opinion was admissible under Daubert, it was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because the opinion's risk of confusion or misleading the jury substantially outweighed its probative value. Specifically, the court noted Alabama law says a driver may presume others will obey traffic laws and contrary to that rule, Morgan's opinion created the impression that McGinnis had an affirmative duty to anticipate Walker's failure to use the designated lane for merging.
In addition to their challenge to Walker's expert Defendants also moved for summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted that motion as well. For Walker's negligence claim, the district court found McGinnis did not breach any duty. Alternatively, the court found that even if McGinnis had breached a duty, Walker's own negligence contributed to his injuries, which is a complete defense to negligence under Alabama law. And while noting that subsequent negligence by a defendant allows a negligent plaintiff to avoid a contributory negligence defense, the court found that rule did not apply here because the accident occurred "within the same second" that it became apparent Walker was entering McGinnis's lane. Finally, the court found Walker's wantonness claim failed because there was no evidence McGinnis acted with the requisite consciousness.
Walker thereafter appealed the district court's decisions excluding Morgan's expert opinion and granting summary judgment to Defendants.
We review evidentiary rulings, including Daubert rulings, for abuse of discretion. United States v. Pon, 963 F.3d 1207, 1219 (11th Cir. 2020). We review de novo a district court's decision granting summary judgment, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Belcher Pharms., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 1 F.4th 1374, 1379 (11th Cir. 2021). Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
We start with the district court's decision to exclude Morgan's expert opinion. We then turn to the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
Walker argues the district court abused its discretion in excluding Morgan's expert opinion under Daubert. According to Walker, Daubert does not apply to non-scientific experts like Morgan. He also argues Morgan was qualified, relied on various pieces of information for his opinion, and provided an opinion helpful to the trier of fact.
As an initial matter, we need not decide whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding Morgan's expert opinion under Daubert because Walker does not challenge the district court's other independent ground for excluding the opinion. Namely, after addressing Daubert, the district court found, even if Morgan's opinion was admissible under Daubert, it would still be properly excluded under Rule 403. Walker's failure to challenge this independent ground on appeal means he has "abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed." Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014).
But even if we were to reach the question of whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding Morgan's expert opinion under Daubert, we would affirm on that basis as well. Contrary to Walker's assertion, it is well established that Daubert applies to non-scientific experts. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1171 (1999). And under Daubert, this Court applies a "rigorous three-part inquiry" that considers whether:
(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1194 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). The party putting forward the expert testimony "bears the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the testimony satisfies each prong." Id.
Walker has not carried his burden. Assuming Morgan was qualified and his opinion was helpful to the trier of fact, Walker has not shown Morgan's methodology was reliable in this case. When considering the reliability of an expert's methodology, we look to several factors, including: "(1) whether the methodology can be and has been tested, (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review, (3) the known or potential rate of error of the methodology employed, and (4) whether the methodology is generally accepted." Hughes v. Kia Motors Corp., 766 F.3d 1317, 1329 (11th Cir. 2014).
In his expert report, Morgan repeatedly quoted various instructions from the commercial driver's license manual and then discussed whether McGinnis followed each instruction based on deposition testimony from McGinnis and Ergon Trucking's director of safety and compliance. Based on this analysis, Morgan opined that "McGinnis'[s] actions and/or inactions, as well as his lack of knowledge and skill in the safe operation of [commercial motor vehicles], demonstrated a conscious disregard for the safety of other motorists." Morgan never addressed, and Walker does not discuss on appeal, whether Morgan's methodology was tested, whether it was subject to peer review, whether it was generally accepted, or how it was otherwise reliable. See id. (listing the relevant factors for considering the reliability of a methodology). On this record, Walker has not shown Morgan's methodology was reliable under Daubert, and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert opinion.
Walker next argues the district court erred in...
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