Walker v. General American Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 June 1940
• Docket Number: No. 36604.,36604.
• Citation: 141 S.W.2d 785
• Parties: WALKER v. GENERAL AMERICAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

141 S.W.2d 785

WALKER v. GENERAL AMERICAN LIFE INS. CO.

No. 36604.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

June 28, 1940.

Appeal from the St. Louis Circuit Court; Frank O'Malley, Judge.

Action by Margaret W. Walker against the General American Life Insurance Company, a corporation, on two life policies. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Frank C. Boland and John Grossman, both of St. Louis, for appellant.

Williams, Nelson & English and R. F. O'Bryen, all of St. Louis, for respondent.

DALTON, Commissioner.

Plaintiff sued upon two policies of life insurance. Judgment was asked for $12,750, including penalties and attorneys' fees. The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer to each count of the amended petition. Plaintiff refused to plead further, the cause was dismissed and judgment entered against plaintiff. Plaintiff has appealed from the judgment of dismissal.

The petition alleged that each policy was issued by the Missouri State Life Insurance Company and later assumed by the defendant; that the policies were issued on the life of one, "John Parker," whose true name was William Sheridan Walker, and who, at the time the policies were issued, was the husband of plaintiff; that death benefits were payable under the policy to "Elizabeth Parker, wife of John Parker"; that plaintiff, Margaret W. Walker, was the lawful wife and is now the widow of William Sheridan Walker, alias "John Parker"; that the insured died May 26, 1931, while the policies were in force and effect; that the insured complied with the terms and conditions of the policies and paid the premiums thereon; that proof of death has been made; and that demand has been made for payment of the policies and payment thereof refused to plaintiff.

Appellant states, and respondent concedes, that "the question before the court is whether or not a policy of insurance should be paid to a person who is described as `wife' when in truth and in fact the person named is not the wife." We think the question is whether or not the widow of an insured, who is not specifically named as beneficiary in a policy of life insurance, but who fits the description "wife," may recover from the insurance company the amount payable under a policy when the person, who is in fact specifically named in the policy as beneficiary and described as "wife," is in truth and in fact not the wife of the insured.

Appellant admits "that the overwhelming weight of authority, * * * under the Missouri decisions, as well as the decisions of nearly every state of the Union," is to the effect that "the appellant, under the facts and circumstances here appearing, is not entitled to recover." Almost all of appellant's argument is based upon the proposition that it is against public policy and good morals "to encourage immoral and illicit relationships, by promises of financial reward to those who are morally guilty." Appellant contends that a woman who lives with a man as his wife, without being married to him, should not be permitted to collect insurance on the man's life even when made payable to her. Appellant says: "Cannot this court set a precedent to all, proclaiming that our courts will not tolerate, let alone encourage, the indiscriminate license of adultery, nor, in effect, openly confess a glaring weakness in our law which, up to the present time has openly and with its protection permitted the issuance and payment of policies of insurance to paramours, even in derogation of the rights of widows and orphans." Appellant argues that "where the word `wife' is used, then that designation, even though it may be descriptio personae, should prevail and should be indicative of the intent of the deceased * * *. In other words, conceding * * * that the specific designation by the use of the name of the paramour indicated the intent of the deceased, * * * it is our contention that that designation be disregarded in favor of the descriptio personae designation."

In support of appellant's position counsel cite the dissenting opinion in Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company v. Cummings, 66 Or. 272, 126 P. 982, 133 P. 1169, 47 L.R.A.,N.S., 252, Ann.Cas.1915B, 535, and refer to Wilke v. Finn, Tex.Com.App., 39 S.W.2d 836, and Rice v. Rice, 63 S.W. 586, 23 Ky.Law Rep. 635. The Wilke case merely holds, in accordance with Texas law, that one who has no insurable interest in the life of the insured may not recover on a policy of life insurance even though he be named as beneficiary therein. The Rice case is cited to show the natural inclination of courts to favor the lawful wife and prevent recovery of insurance by a paramour where that can be done. Appellant concedes that there are no precedents in her favor but insists that we should make one since the conservation of public morals requires it.

The matter argued by appellant is not before us. We are here concerned only with the allegations of fact as set out in the petition and the right of appellant to recover under the facts there stated. The person specifically named as beneficiary in the policies is not a party to this proceeding. The facts concerning her true relationship to the insured are not alleged, but the "wife" relationship is denied. There is no allegation that "Elizabeth Parker" named in the policy is a fictitious or non-existent person, or even that the name is fictitious. It is not contended that plaintiff was named in the policy or intended to be designated by the use of the words "Elizabeth Parker." Mistake is not pleaded. No ambiguity is suggested. Appellant merely alleges that she, Margaret W. Walker, was the wife and is now the widow of William Sheridan Walker, alias "John Parker," and that respondent refuses to pay the insurance to her. She seeks to recover by reason of the use of the word "wife" in the designation of the beneficiary in the policies, "Elizabeth Parker, wife of John Parker."

The rule is that: "In determining who is the beneficiary under the terms of a policy of life insurance, the courts are governed by the intention of the parties, or at least the intention of insured, as indicated by the surrounding circumstances and conditions at the time the contract was made as applied to the language of the instrument." 37 C.J. 410, § 89; Sims v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 223 Mo.App. 1150, 23 S.W.2d 1075, 1077. (Citing cases).

This court is without authority to re-write the contracts of insurance. Prange v. International Life Ins., Co., 329 Mo. 651, 46 S.W.2d 523, 526, 80 A.L.R. 950. The contracts provide for the payment of the insurance to "Elizabeth Parker, wife of John Parker." If the language used is unambiguous and the intent clear, it must be given effect unless contrary to public policy or positive law. In this proceeding we are only called upon to determine appellant's rights in view of the terms of the insurance contracts as set out in the petition.

"There can be no doubt that every person has an insurable interest in his own life and that he may insure it for the benefit of any person whom he sees fit to name as beneficiary." 14 R.C.L. 920, § 97; 37 C.J. 389, § 53; Masonic Benevolent Ass'n v. Bunch, 109 Mo. 560, 578, 19 S.W. 25; Tinsley v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., Mo.App., 97 S.W.2d 874, 876, (citing cases); Allen v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 228 Mo.App. 18...