Walker v. J.P. Thomas & Co., 1:14CV738
| Decision Date | 29 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | 1:14CV738 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
| Parties | RUSSELL F. WALKER, Plaintiff, v. J.P. THOMAS & CO., INC., et al., Defendants. |
This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff Russell F. Walker's motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry 29), motion to compel discovery (Docket Entry 35), motion to supplement the complaint (Docket Entry 37), motion to compel witness fees (Docket Entry 42), and Defendants Town of Aberdeen, North Carolina and Officer J.J. Smith's motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry 45). All motions are ripe for disposition.1 For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment and deny the remaining motions.
Plaintiff, pro se, filed this action against Defendants J.P. Thomas & Company, Inc. ("Thomas Tire"), the Town of Aberdeen, North Carolina, and Officer J.J. Smith ("Officer Smith") alleging a violation of his civil rights due to the wrongful issuance of citations.(Complaint, Docket Entry 2.) According to the Complaint, on May 23, 2014, Plaintiff backed his vehicle into a parked vehicle in the parking lot of Thomas Tire. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff inspected the other vehicle, did not notice any other damage, and left the scene. (Id.) An employee of Thomas Tire called the Aberdeen Police Department "in an attempt to insure that Thomas's customer was paid for any damage to its customer's car." (Id. ¶ 9.) After Plaintiff arrived home, he received a phone call from Officer Smith who informed Plaintiff that he would be charged for violation of the "Hit-and-Run" statute after leaving the scene of an accident without notifying the owner of the other vehicle. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff immediately returned to Thomas Tire and gave Officer Smith his information, including Plaintiff's "driver's license number, date of birth, [and] insurance details . . . ." (Id. ¶ 11.) Officer Smith charged Plaintiff with two misdemeanors: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166 and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-154. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that "[t]he issuing of citation was a violation of the Civil Rights of the plaintiff as there was no conduct which could be a violation of North Carolina law as there was no willfulness nor mens rea on [Plaintiff s] part." (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, seeks to enjoin the Aberdeen Police Department from issuing any further citations under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166, and seeks to declare this statute unconstitutional as a violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Id. ¶¶ 17-19.) He also requests that the Court exercise pendant jurisdiction over his state law claims. (Id. ¶ 20.)
On December 8, 2014, Thomas Tire filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket Entry 17.) The Court thereafter granted Thomas Tire's motion dismissing Plaintiff's claims against it. (SeeOrder dated Jan. 8, 2015, Docket Entry 26.) On January 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed the pending motion for summary judgment. (Docket Entry 29.) Plaintiff later filed the pending motions to compel discovery, to supplement the complaint, and to compel witness fees. (Docket Entries 35, 37, 42.) On July 15, 2015, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (Docket Entry 45.)
Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Zahodnick v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 135 F.3d 911, 913 (4th Cir. 1997). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of coming forward and demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must then affirmatively demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact which requires trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a fact finder to return a verdict for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 817 (4th Cir. 1995). Thus, the moving party can bear his burden either by presenting affirmative evidence or by demonstrating that the non-moving party's evidence is insufficient to establish his claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, dissenting). When making the summary judgment determination, the court must view the evidence, and all justifiable inferences from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the non-movingparty. Zahodnick, 135 F.3d at 913; Ralperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 196 (4th Cir. 1997).
Moreover, "once the moving party has met his burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with some evidence beyond the mere allegations contained in the pleadings to show there is a genuine issue for trial." Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992). The non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. The non-movant's proof must meet the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits. Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1993), modified on other grounds, Stokes v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 420, 429-30 (4th Cir. 2000); DeLeon v. St. Joseph Hosp., Inc., 871 F.2d 1229, 1233 n.7 (4th Cir. 1989).
Defendant Smith first asserts that he is entitled to summary judgment in his individual capacity based upon qualified immunity. The Court must consider two questions when ruling on qualified immunity: "(1) whether a constitutional or statutory right would have been violated on the facts alleged by the plaintiff, and (2) whether the right asserted was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Anderson v. Caldwell Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 524 F. App'x 854, 860 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001)). The Supreme Court has held that qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Thus, if an official's conduct is "objectionably reasonable," qualified immunityapplies. Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1991). Moreover, the Fourth Circuit in Gomez v. Atkins states that "qualified immunity protects law officers from 'bad guesses in gray areas,' and it ensures that they may be held personally liable only 'for transgressing bright lines.'" Gomez v. Atkins, 296 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir.1992)). The burden of proof and persuasion lies with the defendant official under a claim of qualified immunity. Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2003).
Defendant Smith asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity based upon the existence of probable cause at the time the citation was issued. Under North Carolina law, "[p]robable cause is defined as the existence of facts and circumstances known to the decision maker which would induce a reasonable person to commence a prosecution." Martin v. Parker, 150 N.C. App. 179, 182, 563 S.E.2d 216, 218 (2002) (citation omitted). Smith issued Plaintiff a citation under North Carolina's hit-and-run statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166, which provides in part:
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166(c). Additionally, for damaged property to a parked or unattended vehicle, "the driver shall furnish the [listed] information . . . to the nearest available peace officer, or, in the alternative, . . . shall immediately place a paper-writing containing the information in a conspicuous place upon or in the damaged vehicle." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166(d). Based upon the uncontroverted evidence in the record, the Court concludes that Smith had probable cause to issue the citation to Plaintiff, and his actions were, at minimum, objectionably reasonable under the circumstances. Plaintiff admits that he backed into a parked vehicle which caused damage to the vehicle, and he left the scene of the incident without reporting it to law enforcement or leaving a note on the vehicle. Thus, Smith's issuance of a citation was based upon probable cause, and his actions were objectionably reasonable entitling him to qualified immunity.
Plaintiff also asserts state law claims for abuse of process, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotion distress, and outrage.2 Smith contends that Plaintiff's claims should be barred under the doctrine of public immunity. Under this doctrine, "a public official is [generally] immune from personal liability for mere negligence in the performance of his duties, but he is not shielded from liability if his alleged actions were corrupt or malicious or if he acted outside and beyond the scope of his duties." Schlossberg v. Goins, 141 N.C. App. 436, 445, 540 S.E.2d 49, 56 (2000) (...
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