Walker v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 06 July 1929
• Docket Number: 5316
• Citation: 279 P. 293,48 Idaho 18
• Parties: SARAH E. WALKER, Widow, A. T. DISHMAN and ANNIE B. DISHMAN, Husband and Wife, Appellants, v. WILLIAM CRAWFORD JACKSON, ABBIE S. ANDERSON, VESTA FREEMAN, CARLTON JACKSON, and GRACE E. WATSON et al., Respondents
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

279 P. 293

48 Idaho 18

SARAH E. WALKER, Widow, A. T. DISHMAN and ANNIE B. DISHMAN, Husband and Wife, Appellants, v. WILLIAM CRAWFORD JACKSON, ABBIE S. ANDERSON, VESTA FREEMAN, CARLTON JACKSON, and GRACE E. WATSON et al., Respondents

No. 5316

Supreme Court of Idaho

July 6, 1929

APPEAL AND ERROR-SERVICE OF NOTICE OF APPEAL-ADVERSE PARTIES - MINES AND MINERALS - GRUBSTAKE AGREEMENT - RESULTING TRUST - PAROL EVIDENCE - SUFFICIENCY - LACHES - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

1. Where complaint in action to establish a trust in mining property under a grubstake agreement alleged that certain defendants who were served with process and defaulted had contracted to purchase mining claims in controversy from administratrix of deceased, who had located claims in his own name, and which had been confirmed by probate court, and claimed two-thirds of proceeds thereof for plaintiffs, or, if contract should not be fulfilled, a like interest in mining claims, held, that defaulting defendants were not "adverse parties" within C. S., sec. 7153, so as to require service of notice of appeal on them.

2. Defendants who were never served with process, and who never appeared nor were brought into trial court, were not "adverse parties," required to be served with notice of appeal under C. S., sec. 7153, since, not being parties to action, they could not be affected by the proceedings or by any reversal or modifications of judgment on appeal.

3. In action to establish a trust in mining property under a grubstake agreement alleged to have been made between plaintiffs and deceased, who located claims in his own name evidence, including letters written by deceased, held insufficient to establish the oral contract sued on.

4. Where plaintiffs, who received prompt notice of death of deceased after he located mining claims in his own name, made no formal claims against deceased's estate to establish trust in claims under alleged oral grubstake agreement until demand was served on administratrix more than four years after location of claims and nearly four years after deceased's death, and did not commence action to establish alleged trust for more than five years after location and record of mining claims and over four years after locator's decease, trial court would have been justified in finding that plaintiffs were barred by laches.

5. Defense of laches in equity, even in those code states where there is but one form of action, may be invoked, irrespective of running of statute of limitations, application of doctrine being dependent on circumstances of each particular case.

6. Lapse of time is one of chief ingredients of laches, but there are others of almost equal importance, including change in value of property between time when cause of action arose and time bill was filed, complainant's knowledge or ignorance of the facts constituting cause of action, and his diligence in availing himself of means of knowledge within his control.

7. In action to establish trust in mining property under an alleged oral grubstake agreement between plaintiffs and deceased, who located claims in his own name, it was primarily for trial judge to decide whether testimony for plaintiffs had clearly and satisfactorily overcome presumption of title in decedent raised by his location and record of notices of location.

8. When trial court has not substantially departed from rules governing such cases in arriving at his decision in action to establish trust in mining property under a grubstake agreement, his findings will not be disturbed on appeal.

APPEAL from the District Court of the First Judicial District, for Shoshone County. Hon. Albert H. Featherstone, Judge.

Action to establish a trust in mining property under a grubstake agreement, etc. Judgment for defendants, from which plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. Costs to respondents.

J. Ward Arney, for Appellants.

The Idaho court has repudiated the doctrine of Rice v Rigley, 7 Idaho 115, 61 P. 290, to the effect that plaintiffs must establish a grubstake agreement beyond all reasonable doubt. Preponderance of the evidence alone is sufficient, or at least only clear, convincing evidence. (Morrow v. Matthew, 10 Idaho 423, 79 P. 196; White v. Smith, 43 Idaho 354, 253 P. 849, 850.)

Findings of fact are only conclusive when the evidence is conflicting; and a trial court should be reversed where there is no evidence to support the findings or decree. (Rivers v. Rivers, 33 Idaho 349, 194 P. 94; Van Meter v. Zumwalt, 35 Idaho 235, 206 P. 507; Keltner v. Bundy, 40 Idaho 402, 233 P. 516.)

Limitations and laches commence to run from repudiation, and the burden is on the party asserting the defenses to prove that the periods have run after repudiation (C. S., sec. 6713). Respondents did not prove the date of repudiation, and consequently the defenses of limitations or laches are not applicable.

J. E. Gyde, for Respondent Mather, Admx.

It is the established law of this state that in cases of this kind where it is sought to enforce a trust, under a grubstake contract, against an estate of a deceased person: "The evidence must be so clear and certain as to leave no well-founded doubt upon the subject." (Rice v. Rigley, 7 Idaho 115, 61 P. 290.)

The facts in the Rice case just cited are identical with the facts in the instant case. There, as here, the action was brought to establish a resulting trust in mining claims alleged to have been located under a grubstake contract, and to obtain a decree for the specific performance of the alleged contract. There, as here, the action was against the estate of the deceased locator of the claims. The doctrine laid down in that case has never been overruled. The case of Morrow v. Matthew, 10 Idaho 423, 79 P. 196, is distinguishable from Rice v. Rigley, supra, and the instant case, in that the Morrow case was not against an administrator, and it is especially stated in the opinion of Judge Ailshie on page 432: "The case of Rice v. Rigley, decided by this court is so materially different from this case in the facts stated upon which it rests, that we do not consider it decisive of the case under consideration."

The doctrine laid down in Rice v. Rigley has been quoted with approval in numerous decisions, in numerous other states and federal courts, and the annotator has collated these numerous decisions of the different courts in a note found in 23 A. L. R., on pages 1502 to 1550.

Franklin Pfirman, for Respondent Deer Creek Mining Co., files no brief.

VARIAN, J. Budge, C. J., and Givens, T. Bailey Lee and Wm. E. Lee, JJ., concur.

OPINION

VARIAN, J.

Plaintiffs bring this action upon a grubstake contract to establish in them a two-thirds interest in the Ruth, Emerson and Essex lode mining claims situate in Beaver Mining District, Shoshone county, Idaho, claiming the right to possession thereof, subject to a lease of said mining claims to the defendant Deer Creek Mining Company. The amended complaint alleges that the plaintiffs' interests are derived from the location of said mining claims in the name of Darius W. Jackson, now deceased, who located and perfected said claims under the express written and verbal agreement that they were to belong jointly to decedent and plaintiffs, decedent to own one-third, plaintiff Sarah E. Walker one-third and plaintiff A. T. Dishman one-third; that from on or about the year 1921, decedent Jackson and plaintiffs were operating under a written agreement by the terms of which Jackson was to locate and hold said three mining claims in the name of decedent Jackson in the ownership as aforesaid, the plaintiffs to furnish Jackson with the necessary supplies and moneys to locate and perfect title to said mining claims, and Jackson to perform the location work and perfect the title to said claims and hold the same in his own name to expedite the handling, transfer and sale of said mining claims on behalf of said decedent and plaintiffs; that all of the parties to said agreement performed the same according to the terms thereof. Plaintiffs rely upon oral statements and upon letters written by deceased, to establish the contract. The court found against the plaintiffs, and that there was no contract; that there had been no furnishing of supplies as plead; and, in effect, that plaintiffs were guilty of laches in the prosecution of the present suit.

Mrs. Bishop, a daughter of Mrs. Walker, testified that she was present at a conversation at her mother's home in Spokane early in 1922 (couldn't remember the date) at which plaintiffs Dishman, Walker and Mr. Trunk, her brother, and decedent Jackson were also present; that the talk was between Mrs. Walker, Dishman and Jackson. "They" asked deceased to locate the claims to be named the Ruth, Emerson and Essex, the interest to be equal between Mrs. Walker, Dishman and Jackson. "They" (presumably Mrs. Walker and Dishman) were to send Jackson food and grubstake him. The claims were to be "taken" in Jackson's name so that he might handle the property in case of a sale. She further testified that Mrs. Walker sent Jackson clothes, foodstuffs and medicine, both before and after the said conference. Mrs. Walker's son, Trunk, testified to the same parties being present at Mrs. Walker's home at Spokane some time in June, 1921-22; that the Banner-Belmont had been in the family about fifty years and had "gone broke"; that they wanted to relocate these claims, which was the object of the meeting; each was to be equally interested in them, and Mrs. Walker and Dishman were to finance Jackson in the expenses of location, and paid his carfare and location expenses to come to Spokane. Mrs. Bishop also testified that at the time of the conference Dishman gave Jackson twelve or fifteen dollars.

Plaintiffs rely upon...