Walker v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 04 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | 13–14927,Nos. 13–14182,13–14624.,s. 13–14182 |
| Citation | 771 F.3d 748 |
| Parties | Darryl WALKER, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants–Appellees. Michael Weaver, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Madison City Board of Education, et al., Defendants–Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
John David Saxon, Sr., John D. Saxon, PC, Jerome Tucker, Law Office of Jerome Tucker, LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiffs–Appellants in Dockets 13–14182 and 13–14927.
Whit Colvin, Carl Johnson, Claire Hyndman Puckett, Bishop Colvin Johnson & Kent, LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendants–Appellees in Dockets 13–14182 & 13–14927, and Defendants–Appellants in Docket 13–14624.
Nathaniel S. Pollock, U.S. Department of Justice, Dennis John Dimsey and Mark L. Gross, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Appellate Section, Washington, DC, for Intervenor–Appellee in Docket 13–14624.
Edward Still, Edward Still Law Firm, LLC, Birmingham, AL, Philip A. Hostak and Alice O'Brien, National Education Association, Office of General Counsel, Washington, DC, Kathryn S. Piscitelli, Law Office of Kathryn Piscitelli, Orlando, FL, for Plaintiff–Appellee in No. 13–14624.
Jayne Harrell Williams, Hill Hill Carter Franco Cole & Black, PC, Montgomery, AL, for Amicus Curiae.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. D.C. Docket No. 5:11–cv–03558–TMP.
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, and JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
In these consolidated appeals—Walker and Weaver —the Jefferson County Board of Education and the Madison City Board of Education ask us to recede from our opinion in Stewart v. Baldwin Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 908 F.2d 1499, 1511 (11th Cir.1990), which held that school boards in Alabama are not arms of the state and therefore not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. With the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the Eleventh Amendment ruling in Stewart has not been overruled or abrogated, and therefore remains binding precedent.
We begin with a summary of the proceedings in Walker and Weaver.
In Walker , a number of so-called 240–day employees sued the Jefferson County Board of Education, alleging that the Board's practice of dividing their annual salaries by 260 days to obtain their hourly and overtime rates violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. The Walker plaintiffs sought to recover wrongfully calculated wages, withheld wages, unpaid wages, overtime compensation, and liquidated damages.
The district court in Walker granted the Jefferson County Board's motion to dismiss. It held that the Board was an arm of the state and therefore entitled to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. In so ruling, the district court concluded that Stewart did not constitute binding precedent. Relying on Versiglio v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs of Ala., 686 F.3d 1290, 1291 (11th Cir.2012) (Versiglio II ), the district court looked to decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court declaring that school boards have sovereign immunity under the Alabama Constitution from suits based on state tort and contract law. Like the panel in Versiglio II , the district court declined to interpret Alabama law in a way that it believed was diametrically opposed to the decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court. See Walker v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:13–CV–00524–RDP, 2013 WL 4056224, at *1 (N.D.Ala. Aug. 12, 2013) ; Walker v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:13–CV–00524–RDP, Order Denying Relief from Judgment [D.E. 26] at 2–5 (N.D.Ala. Oct. 4, 2013). The plaintiffs appeal from that ruling.
The plaintiff in Weaver, a member of the United States Army Reserve, sued his former employer, the Madison City Board of Education, alleging that after his nearly two-year tour of duty in Afghanistan, the Board refused to reinstate him to his prior position. He claimed that, by reducing his responsibilities, status, and salary upon his return from active duty service, the Board violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. § 4301, et seq.
The district court in Weaver denied the Madison City Board's motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds. It ruled that our decision in Stewart was binding and, alternatively, that the result would be the same even if Stewart were not controlling. See Weaver v. Madison City Bd. of Educ., 947 F.Supp.2d 1308, 1314–24 (N.D.Ala.2013). The Board appeals from that decision.
The Eleventh Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, generally provides that Article III's jurisdictional grant did not and does not limit the sovereign immunity that states enjoyed when they joined the Union. See generally Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1632, 1637, 179 L.Ed.2d 675 (2011). This immunity from suit is available “only” to states and arms of the states. See N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham Cnty., Ga., 547 U.S. 189, 193, 126 S.Ct. 1689, 164 L.Ed.2d 367 (2006) (). See also Odebrecht Const., Inc. v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268, 1289 (11th Cir.2013) (). The Boards contend that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as arms of the state of Alabama, and insist that our 1990 decision in Stewart is no longer good law.
Stewart involved a claim against an Alabama county board of education (and others) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a former employee alleging that he was fired for exercising his First Amendment rights. The district court denied the school board's motion for summary judgment, and the school board appealed, arguing that it was entitled to absolute immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 908 F.2d at 1508. We declined to address whether the denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity was immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, and instead exercised our discretion to entertain the Eleventh Amendment immunity question under the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 1509.1
Turning to the merits, we applied a three-factor test to determine whether the school board enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity under federal law. We framed the test as follows: “(1) how the state law defines the entity; (2) the degree of state control over the entity; and (3) the entity's fiscal autonomy—i.e., where the entity derives its funds and who is responsible for judgments against the entity.” Id.
That test, in conjunction with relevant Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent, led us to conclude in Stewart that the school board could not assert Eleventh Amendment immunity. First, the Supreme Court, looking in part to state law, had held in Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 280–81, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), that an Ohio school board was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, as it was more like a county or city than an arm of the state. Stewart, 908 F.2d at 1509–10. Second, we had previously denied Eleventh Amendment immunity to school boards in Florida, Mississippi, and Louisiana because those entities had a substantial amount of control over their own affairs and the means to raise funds, so that any adverse judgments could be paid out of local funds. Id. at 1510 (citing cases). Third, the fact that “Alabama state courts provide[d] county boards of education with sovereign immunity in state tort law actions d[id] not require a similar treatment under the Eleventh Amendment,” as it was improper to “conflate sovereign immunity with regard to a state-created tort with Eleventh Amendment immunity for a federal cause of action.” Id. at 1510 n. 6. Fourth, school boards in Alabama possessed a “significant amount of flexibility in raising local funding,” including the ability to raise revenues by selling interest-bearing tax anticipation warrants. Id. at 1510. As a result, “it c[ould not] be said that a judgment against a county school board w[ould] come from state funds.” Id. at 1510–11. Fifth, those school boards had the power to establish general education policy, and the authority to assign teachers and place students. Id. at 1511. Finally, at least four district courts in Alabama had denied Eleventh Amendment immunity to school boards in that state. Id.2
Once a panel of this court decides an issue, its holding on that issue is binding on all subsequent panels, “unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc.” United States v. Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326, 1332 (11th Cir.2010) (italics omitted). And that is the rule even if the prior panel failed to consider certain arguments or contentions. “[W]e have categorically rejected an overlooked reason or argument exception to the prior precedent rule.” United States v. Johnson, 528 F.3d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir.2008) (citing cases), rev'd on other grounds, 559 U.S. 133, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010).
A Supreme Court decision abrogates one of our prior cases only if it is “clearly on point.” United States v. Lawson, 686 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir.2012). The Supreme Court has not decided any cases that abrogate Stewart , and Mt. Healthy —its one decision on the Eleventh Amendment immunity of a local school board—is still good law today, as it continues to be cited favorably by the Court. See N. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 547 U.S. at 193, 126 S.Ct. 1689 ; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) ; Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 56 n. 20, 110 S.Ct. 1651, 109 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990).
Our circuit, moreover, has not overruled Stewart through an en banc decision. Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment test articulated in Stewart remains the law of the circuit, though the third Stewart factor (the entity's fiscal autonomy—i.e.,...
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