Walker v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 19 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 2:10cv548 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | CHAUNCEY LAURENT WALKER (#1142632), Petitioner, v. GENE M. JOHNSON, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections Respondent. |
This matter was initiated by petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B) and (C) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the petition is time-barred, the undersigned recommends it be dismissed.
On February 26, 2003, in the Circuit Court for the City of Alexandria, petitioner Chauncey Laurent Walker ("petitioner" or "Walker") was found guilty by a jury of rape, five counts of forcible sodomy, statutory burglary while armed, and two counts of abduction with intent to defile. Commonwealth v. Walker, No. CF020611, (Va. Cir. Ct. Alexandria Feb. 26, 2003). During the trial, Walker's attorney objected that the fingerprint analyst who testified for the government was not the same analyst who prepared an identification report submitted to the defense during discovery. (ECF No. 1-2, Trial Transcript Excerpt, p. 32). The analyst who testified had reviewed and confirmed the written report, but had not completed a written report of his own. (Id. at 35-36). While arguing the objection, Walker's attorney ultimately conceded that the testifying analyst could make a visual fingerprint comparison on the stand, and withdrew his request that the analyst who prepared the report appear. (Id. at 36). Before the case was submitted to the jury, the trial judge determined that the written report, although referred to during the analyst's testimony, could not be entered as evidence because the preparer of the report had not testified. (Id. at 26). Without the written report, the jury nonetheless convicted Walker.
On April 10, 2003, Walker was sentenced to life imprisonment plus an additional thirty-eight years. (ECF No. 1, at 1). He appealed his conviction directly to the Virginia Court of Appeals on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, and that his sentence was unconstitutionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 1, at 2). The Virginia Court of Appeals denied Walker's petition on both grounds. Walker v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0999-03-4 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2003). A subsequent appeal wasrefused by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Walker v. Commonwealth, Record No. 040483 (Va. Sept. 7, 2004).
In 2005, Walker a filed state habeas corpus petition in the Circuit Court for Alexandria alleging ineffective assistance at trial, prosecutorial misconduct, and a Confrontation Clause violation. (ECF No. 1, at 4). The petition was denied by the Circuit Court as procedurally defaulted, and a petition to appeal that decision was subsequently refused by the Virginia Supreme Court. A petition for a rehearing filed with the Virginia Supreme Court was refused on January 24, 2006. Walker v. Young, Record No. 050988 (Va. Jan. 24, 2006).
In April 2009, Walker filed a motion to vacate the original judgment in the Circuit Court for the City of Alexandria, alleging a violation of his right to confront witnesses, the same claim underlying this federal habeas petition. (ECF No. 1, at 5). That motion was denied on April 24, 2009. Commonwealth v. Walker, No. CF020611 (Va. Cir. Ct. Alexandria April 24, 2009). The Virginia Supreme Court denied Walker's appeal, Walker v. Commonwealth, Record No. 091486 (Va. Dec. 11, 2009), and his petition for rehearing. Walker v. Commonwealth, Record No. 091486 (Va. March 3, 2010).
On November 2, 2010, Walker, proceeding pro se, filed this federal petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Walker's petition alleges that his right to confrontwitnesses under the Sixth Amendment was violated when, at trial, the analyst who prepared the written report regarding fingerprint identification did not testify. (ECF No. 1 at 6-7). Although the report was never admitted into evidence, it was discussed at trial by the testifying analyst who had verified the report's findings, and who identified the fingerprints in question during his live testimony. (ECF No. 1 - 2, Trial Transcript Excerpt, p. 4, pp. 22-26).
Walker seeks to avoid the statute of limitations applicable to his claim by relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) and a subsequent Court decision, Briscoe v. Virginia, 559 U.S.___, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010), that applied Melendez-Diaz to a Virginia statute regarding the admissibility of certificates of analysis. Because Melendez-Diaz does not apply retroactively on collateral appeal, and because it's holding is not implicated by the trial court record in Walker's case, Walker's petition is barred by the statute of limitations.
An individual in custody pursuant to a state court judgment has one year, following conviction, to file a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year limitation period generally begins on the date the state conviction becomes final—that is, after all avenues for directreview are foreclosed either by conclusion of the direct review process, or by the expiration of the time for seeking direct review. 28 U.S.C. § 2444(d)(1)(A); Crawley v. Catoe, 257 F.3d 395, 398 (4th Cir. 2001). The one-year limitation period may begin running at a later date, however, if the filing of a habeas petition was prevented by some unlawful or unconstitutional state action; if a new, relevant constitutional right is recognized by the Supreme Court; or if the factual predicate of the habeas claim was previously unknown to the defendant. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). The one-year period is tolled during any period when collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2444(d)(2).
Walker's direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia was denied on September 7, 2004, after which he had ninety days-until December 7, 2004—to file a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. When the period for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari expired, Walker's conviction became final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2444(d)(1)(A). See Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2000) (). Walker alleges that he filed a state habeas corpus petition on May 3, 2005. Thus, the statute of limitations ran from December 7, 2004until that date, accruing 147 days. While it is unclear from the record precisely when subsequent appeals were pending, the last of Walker's pleadings collaterally attacking his state conviction-a petition for rehearing with the Virginia Supreme Court-was dismissed as untimely on January 24, 2006. Walker v. Young, Record No. 050988 (Va. Jan. 24, 2006). If properly filed, the one-year period during which Walker could file a federal habeas corpus petition would have been tolled during the pendency of his motions seeking collateral review. 28 U.S.C. § 2444(d)(2). Therefore, on January 24, 2006 at the latest, the limitation period began again, and the period expired 218 days later, on August 30, 2006.1 Thus, absent a showing that equitable tolling is warranted, or that the limitation period began at a later date, Walker's petition is time-barred.
While not making the argument explicitly, Walker suggests that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the Confrontation Clause triggered a new one-year limitation period for his claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). Under the statute, if a constitutional right asserted in the federal habeas petition "has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review," the limitation period runs from the date on which thatright was initially recognized by the Court. Id.; see also In re Wilson, 442 F.3d 872, 873-74 (5th Cir. 2006) (). Walker appears to argue that the trial court's rulings regarding the written fingerprint identification report violated constitutional rights recognized by Briscoe and Melendez-Diaz. (ECF No. 1, at 5).
In Melendez-Diaz, the Court ruled that certificates of analysis of physical evidence were testimonial by nature therefore the government was required under the Confrontation Clause to produce, for cross-examination, the expert who prepared any certificate offered as evidence. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at ___, 129 S. Ct. at 2532. The Court emphasized that merely giving a defendant the right to subpoena the expert who prepared the certificate was insufficient. Id. at 2540. In light of Melendez-Diaz, the petitioners in Briscoe challenged a Virginia statute2 which allowed the government to enter certificates of analysis as affidavits, but which gave defendants the opportunity to call the preparer of the certificate as a defense witness. In a one-sentence opinion, the Court in Briscoe vacated a Virginia Supreme Court ruling upholding the statute, and remanded for further proceedingsconsistent with Melendez-Diaz. Briscoe, 559 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. 1316.
Walker contends that, because the effect of Briscoe and Melendez-Diaz is to invalidate the Virginia statute, he should be permitted to retroactively assert that his constitutional rights were violated by the trial judge's rulings on the written fingerprint report. While he does not make this argument expressly, Walker appears to argue that a new, relevant constitutional right was recognized by Briscoe and that the one-year limitation period should...
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