Walker v. Jones
| Decision Date | 01 May 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-1425,83-1425 |
| Citation | 236 U.S.App.D.C. 92,733 F.2d 923 |
| Parties | 34 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1097, 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,427, 236 U.S.App.D.C. 92 Anne W. WALKER, Appellant v. Honorable Ed JONES, Congressman of the United States, et al. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil Action No. 82-02723).
John J. Gilece, Jr., Washington, D.C., with whom William Harry Garber, Washington, D.C., was on brief, for appellant.
Stanley M. Brand, Gen. Counsel to the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., with whom Steven R. Ross, Deputy Counsel to the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, and Michael L. Murray, Asst. Counsel to the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., were on brief, for appellees.
Before WILKEY and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges, and MacKINNON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.
This case concerns the discharge of a woman who managed the House of Representatives' restaurants; it presents an unsettled issue relating to the Constitution's command that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [Members of Congress] shall not be questioned in any other Place." U.S. CONST. art. I, Sec. 6, cl. 1.
Plaintiff-appellant Anne W. Walker alleged in her complaint that, because she is a woman, and in violation of her fifth amendment rights to due process and the equal protection of the laws, she was discharged from her employment, of approximately ten years' duration, as general manager of the House of Representatives Restaurant System. She asserted that the discharge was effected by defendant-appellee Ed Jones, then Chairman of the Subcommittee on Services of the House of Representatives Committee on House Administration, acting in concert with defendant-appellee Thomas B. Marshall, then Staff Director of the Subcommittee. The District Court dismissed the complaint at the threshold in response to defendant-appellees' motion, which cited Rules 12(b)(1), (2), and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Walker's discharge was a personnel action "within the 'legislative sphere,' " the District Court concluded; it therefore held that the Speech or Debate Clause wholly immunized the termination of her employment from judicial inquiry. Walker v. Jones, 557 F.Supp. 366, 368 (D.D.C.1983).
We reverse the judgment to the extent that it dismisses the case against Jones and Marshall, 1 and remand for further proceedings. The Speech or Debate Clause, we hold, does not impregnably shield from court consideration allegedly unconstitutional personnel actions taken in the course of managing congressional food service facilities.
The District Court dismissed Walker's action with only her complaint and the Rule 12(b) motion before it. We must therefore assume the truth of Walker's allegations. As the Supreme Court has instructed lower federal courts: "[I]n passing on a motion The Subcommittee on Services of the House of Representatives Committee on House Administration (hereafter, Subcommittee) operates congressionally-owned food services; other auxiliary facilities within the Administration Committee's province include barber shops, beauty shops, and parking facilities. See Joint Appendix (J.A.) 70, 71. In December 1970, Walker alleges, the Subcommittee engaged her to manage Longworth Cafeteria and shortly thereafter appointed her general manager of the entire House of Representatives Restaurant System (hereafter, HRRS). HRRS emcompasses three cafeterias, four carryouts, two catering operations, and one full-service restaurant. Walker had authority to take actions necessary and proper for the efficient operation and sound management of HRRS. Her work, she asserts, entailed no functions relating to the process of lawmaking. Nor does restaurant management involve "other matters" of state "which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House," Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2627, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972), such as impeachments and advice and consent to treaties and appointments. Walker states that she expected to retain her position so long as her performance was satisfactory. She attributes this expectation primarily to communications she had with Subcommittee members when she was hired and throughout her employment.
to dismiss, whether on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for failure to state a cause of action, the allegations of the complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (citing as applicable to a motion to dismiss grounded on asserted eleventh amendment and executive immunity barriers to suit the standard set out in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). 2 We summarize first Walker's salient assertions along with related undisputed facts; we next indicate the bases on which defendant-appellees seek affirmance of the District Court's judgment; we then describe the main lines of the District Court's opinion
During Walker's tenure as HRRS general manager, defendant-appellee Ed Jones became Chairman of the Subcommittee and defendant-appellee Thomas B. Marshall became its Staff Director. Pursuant to Subcommittee authorization, Jones and Marshall exercised managerial and control functions over HRRS employees, including Walker. In 1980, Walker alleges, Jones indicated approval of her work and informed her he was increasing her salary by $8,000 per annum because of her efficiency in operating HRRS. She further asserts that, until June 1982, Marshall permitted her to run HRRS without intervention. Walker alleges, however, that her situation at work changed around that time. She claims that Jones stated to others, and Marshall repeated to staff members, that because of Walker's sex, she was overpaid; specifically, Walker recites Jones's alleged statement that her salary ($45,000, according to Walker) was "ridiculous for a woman."
At a May 1982 meeting with Jones and Marshall, Walker allegedly detailed HRRS's operations and profit structure. Her accounting, she asserts, elicited no comment; the meeting concluded, she states, without any expression by Jones or Marshall of dissatisfaction with her performance. By letter dated June 22, 1982, however, Jones advised Walker that he was terminating her employment effective June 30, 1982; 3 and on June 25, 1982, Marshall After Walker's discharge, Jones made public statements, which Walker alleges he knew to be untrue, charging Walker with inefficiency, improper bookkeeping practices, misappropriation, and "skimming" funds from HRRS. Walker asserts that, in addition to loss of her House employment and attendant benefits, the discharge and accusations relating to it caused her to suffer physical and emotional distress, permanently damaged her reputation, and left her unable to obtain employment comparable in nature and salary.
circulated a memorandum to "All Managers and Department Heads" announcing that, effective June 26, "the office of General Manager of the House Restaurant System will be vacated." In July 1982, Jones and Marshall engaged a man to occupy the general manager's position formerly held by Walker. 4
Jones and Marshall claim that the Speech or Debate Clause entirely shields the discharge of Walker from judicial inquiry. Appellees' presentation blends the bases for this claim of blanket legislative immunity. We detect, however, two principal strains in appellees' argument, and an overarching position. Appellees contend in one prominent theme that Walker's high post as manager of a "multimillion dollar food service" organization made her a "ranking aide[ ]" or "alter-ego" of the Subcommittee. See Brief for Appellees at 11, 19-20. They also assert repeatedly that the discharge decision qualifies as a legislative act because it was reached and effected "in committee." See id. at 10, 15-16, 25. 5 Throughout, they observe that food service caters to a need essential to the chamber's internal functioning. Personnel management for such an essential service, they urge, merits Speech or Debate coverage as fully as passage of a bill. See id. at 10, 17, 20, 22.
In addition to Speech or Debate shelter, Jones and Walker assert that members of Congress have absolute or at least qualified official immunity with respect to legislative branch personnel decisions, 6 and that It is the high purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause to secure against executive or judicial interference the processes of the nation's elected representatives leading up to the formulation of legislative policy and the enactment of laws. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 126-27, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 2683-84, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979). For the reasons set out below, however, we believe that personnel actions regarding the management of congressional food services are too remote from the business of legislating to rank "within the legislative sphere."
in any event Walker has stated no claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 38-44. The District Court did not address these alternatively alleged grounds for dismissal. Nor did it refer to appellees' "alter-ego" and "in committee" arguments. It simply reasoned that internal arrangements Congress makes for its own necessities are "within the 'legislative sphere' "; that food service qualifies as such an arrangement; and that discharging Walker, as an action relating to the internal administration of Congress, is brigaded by Speech or Debate protection in light of precedent instructing broad interpretation of the Clause "to effectuate its purposes." 557 F.Supp. at 367-68 (quoting Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund,...To continue reading
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