Walker v. Kauffman

• Decision Date: 06 January 2023
• Docket Number: 1161 C.D. 2021
• Parties: Lydell Walker, Appellant v. Superintendent Kevin Kauffman, Deputy Superintendent W.S. Walters; Activities Manager C. Frailey; Maintenance Manager C. Stone, Activities Specialist John Doe #1, and Maintenance Technician John Doe #2
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Lydell Walker, Appellant v. Superintendent Kevin Kauffman, Deputy Superintendent W.S. Walters; Activities Manager C. Frailey; Maintenance Manager C. Stone, Activities Specialist John Doe #1, and Maintenance Technician John Doe #2

No. 1161 C.D. 2021

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

January 6, 2023

OPINION NOT REPORTED

Submitted: July 29, 2022.

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge, HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge, HONORABLE LORI A DUMAS, Judge.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge.

Lydell Walker (Walker) appeals, pro se, from the Huntingdon County Common Pleas Court's (trial court) September 20, 2021 order dismissing his pro se complaint against State Correctional Institution (SCI)-Huntingdon Superintendent Kevin Kauffman (Kauffman), Deputy Superintendent W.S. Walters (Walters), Activities Manager C. Frailey (Frailey) Maintenance Manager C. Stone (Stone),^[1]Activities Specialist John Doe #1, and Maintenance Technician John Doe #2 (collectively, Appellees) (Complaint) as frivolous pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 240(j)(1), Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1). Essentially, the issue before this Court is whether Walker's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and, thus, is wholly frivolous. After review, this Court affirms in part, and vacates and remands in part.

Background

Until January 21, 2022, Walker was incarcerated at SCI-Huntingdon.^[2]Walker mailed a Praecipe for Issuance of Writ of Summons (Praecipe) to the trial court to initiate a civil action against Appellees on or about January 6, 2021.^[3] See Original Record (O.R.) Item 4, Petition for Relief from Judgment of Non Pros (Petition), Ex. A. On January 11, 2021, the trial court notified Walker that in order to initiate his action, he must file a civil cover sheet and send a filing fee or an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (IFP Application). See Petition Ex. B. On January 17, 2021, Walker sent a civil cover sheet and his IFP Application to the trial court. See Petition Ex. C. The trial court docketed the Praecipe and IFP Application on January 25, 2021, and returned time-stamped copies thereof to Walker, which he received on January 28, 2021. See Petition Ex. D. On April 30, 2021, the trial court dismissed Walker's action pursuant to Rule 240(j)(2), because Walker failed to file a complaint within 90 days of filing the Praecipe.^[4] See Petition Ex. E.

On July 26, 2021, Walker filed the Petition, therein explaining that he never received an order disposing of the IFP Application or notice that the trial court issued a writ of summons, and describing his limited law library access, technical difficulties and the COVID-19 pandemic that critically impeded his ability to timely file the Complaint. See Petition at 2-6; see also Petition Ex. F, Correspondence History Log. Walker appended the Complaint to the Petition. See Petition Ex. G, Complaint.

Walker declared in the Complaint that while using the lateral pull-down machine in SCI-Huntingdon's covered yard weightlifting area on January 3, 2019, he sustained a serious injury to his lumbar spine when the metal cable suddenly detached from the lateral pull-down machine and the lateral bar struck him in the chest, causing him to lose his balance, and land forcefully on the concrete floor in a seated position. See Petition Ex. G, Complaint. Walker sought monetary damages pursuant to Section 1983 of the United States Code, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983), from all of the Appellees for violating his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States (U.S.) Constitution (Eighth Amendment), U.S. Const. amend. VIII, based on their deliberate indifference to his health and safety (Counts I and II), and from Kauffman, Walters, Frailey, and Stone based on their negligence (Count III).^[5] See id.

On September 20, 2021, the trial court granted the Petition,^[6] and simultaneously dismissed the Complaint as frivolous pursuant to Rule 240(j)(1), effectively dismissing Walker's Section 1983 claim and his negligence claim. See O.R. Item 5. Walker appealed to this Court.^[7]

By May 27, 2022 letter, the Department of Corrections' Office of General Counsel (DOC) notified this Court that although Kauffman, Walters, Frailey, and Stone are Appellees, they "will not participate in this appeal as the matter was dismissed by the [trial court] prior to service." May 27, 2022 Non-Participation Notice Letter at 1. On December 17, 2021, the trial court filed its opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) (1925(a) Opinion), wherein the trial court declared: "[T]he [trial c]ourt rests upon [its September 20, 2021] order and the reasoning set forth therein, and incorporates it by reference herein." O.R. Item 8, 1925(a) Op., at 1.

Discussion

Initially Rule 240(j)(1) provides, in relevant part:

If, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or proceeding or the taking of an appeal, a party has filed a petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the action, proceeding or appeal if the allegation of poverty is untrue or if it is satisfied that the action, proceeding or appeal is frivolous.

Note: A frivolous action or proceeding has been defined as one that "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, [326] . . . (1989).

Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1) (italics omitted). "An action is frivolous under [Rule 240(j)] if, on its face, it does not set forth a valid cause of action[.]" Bennett v. Beard, 919 A.2d 365, 367 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (quoting McGriff v. Vidovich, 699 A.2d 797, 799 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997)). "As we review [Walker's C]omplaint for validity under Rule 240[(j)(1)], we are mindful that a pro se complaint should not be dismissed simply because it is not artfully drafted." Ocasio v. Prison Health Servs., 979 A.2d 352, 354 (Pa. Super. 2009) (italics omitted); see also Garcia v. Howell (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 800 C.D. 2018, filed Aug. 23, 2019).

Section 1983 Action - Eighth Amendment

In the Complaint Counts I and II, Walker

contends that he has stated a claim for a violation of [Section] 1983. See Owens v. Shannon, 808 A.2d 607 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must: (1) allege a violation of rights secured under the [U.S.] Constitution or [U.S.] law[;] and (2) show that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law).

Bundy v. Beard, 924 A.2d 723, 727 (Pa. Cmwlth.), aff'd, 941 A.2d 646 (Pa. 2007).

Specifically, Walker claims that Appellees violated his Eighth Amendment rights. "The Eighth Amendment, which applies to the [s]tates through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [to the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. XIV], prohibits the infliction of 'cruel and unusual punishments' on those convicted of crimes." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1991) (citation omitted). Thus, despite that prisoners surrender numerous rights upon conviction and incarceration, they remain entitled to be free from the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. Accordingly,

the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example, use excessive physical force against prisoners. The [Eighth] Amendment also imposes duties on these officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must "take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates[.]" Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-[]27 . . . (1984).

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citation omitted).

Not every governmental action affecting the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny, however. "After incarceration, only the '"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain"' . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment." Ingraham v. Wright, [] 430 U.S. [651,] 670 . . . [(1977)] (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, [] 429 U.S. [97,] 103 . . . [(1976)] (citations omitted). To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all[,] must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety. . . . It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the [Eighth Amendment.]

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).

In Wilson, the U.S. Supreme Court declared:

[O]nly the "'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'" implicates the Eighth Amendment, [Estelle, 429 U.S.] at 104 . . . (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 . . . (1976) (joint opinion) (emphasis added))[;] a prisoner advancing such a claim must, at a minimum, allege "deliberate indifference" . . . . [Estelle,] 429 U.S.[] at 106 . . . . "It is only such indifference" that can violate the Eighth Amendment, []id. (emphasis added); allegations of "inadvertent failure . . .," id.[] at 105 . . ., or of [] "negligen[ce] . . .," id.[] at 106 . . ., simply fail to establish the requisite culpable state of mind.

Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297.

This Court has observed:

In Farmer . . . , the [U.S.] Supreme Court concluded that the inquiry into whether a prison official was deliberately indifferent is a subjective one, requiring the demonstration of a state of mind akin to criminal recklessness,^[8] and held that a prisoner must establish that: (i) the prison official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; (ii) the prison official was aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists; and (iii) the prison official drew the inference. [Id.] at 837,

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