Walker v. Keenan

• Decision Date: 04 May 1896
• Parties: WALKER et al. v. KEENAN et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

73 F. 755

WALKER et al. v. KEENAN et al.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

May 4, 1896

On the showing of the record, the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad, commencing, it may be assumed, at some point west or southwest of the state of Missouri, passes through Kansas City, in that state, to its terminal station or freight depot on or near the corner of Twelfth and State streets, Chicago. About 10 miles back from this terminal station, a switch track runs from the main line of the road some 6 miles to a point of junction with the track of the Union Stock-Yards &amp Transit Company. This latter track extends from said point of junction to the cattle yards of the last-named company, the place at which cattle are usually unloaded from the cars into such yards being about one-half mile from the point of junction. This track of access to the cattle yards is part of a system of railroad tracks aggregating some 246 miles, which the Union Stock Yards & Transit Company (incorporated) was authorized by its charter to construct in and about its cattle yards, and connecting therewith, and to charge for the use of. Said yards, commonly called the 'Union Stock Yards,' are the market place and ordinary place of delivery for cattle shipped by the car load to Chicago. A car laden with cattle sent from Kansas City to Chicago will ordinarily be moved by the route described from the main line of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad to the Union Stock Yards, and there unloaded and delivered, rather than to the terminal station of the road, at State and Twelfth streets; and, for this reason, cattle yards and appliances for unloading such cars have not been provided at such terminal station. Cattle cars aggregating many thousand per year, hauled to Chicago over said road, are so taken to, and unloaded at, the Union Stock Yards. In December, 1893, as stated in the printed argument for appellants, the Union Trust Company of New York commenced a suit in the circuit court of the United States for the Northern district of Illinois to foreclose a mortgage upon the railroad property of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company and for the appointment of receivers to take possession of the property, collect the tolls, and operate the railroad pending the litigation. These appellants were appointed receivers. The suit is still pending. They are in possession of said railroad, and its traffic as a common carrier is now conducted by them. On November 2, 1894, appellee Keenan filed in the cause his intervening petition, making the receivers parties defendant thereto. He commences his petition, with the statement: 'That he resides in and is a citizen of the city of Chicago, state of Illinois, and is, and has been for about twenty-nine years, engaged in the business of receiving for sale on commission, buying, selling, and shipping live stock at the Union Stock Yards, heretofore adjoining, and now within, the corporate limits of said city ' He goes on to say that on the 30th and 31st days of October, 1894, four car loads of cattle were shipped to him from Kansas City, over the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad; that the cars containing his cattle were hauled over the road to Chicago, and there taken to the Union Stock Yards, and unloaded; that he has paid the freight from Kansas City to Chicago, but the receivers refuse to allow the cattle to pass into his custody without an additional payment of eight dollars, or two dollars for each of the four cars. He shows, also that the waybill for two of the cars, which document was subscribed by the shippers and by an agent of appellants, contains the specification, 'To be delivered at Chicago station at rate of trff;' that on the other two cars the shipper did not advance the freight, and as to them no written contract was subscribed by himself, or any person on his behalf; and that appellants have provided no means for unloading and delivering cattle at their said 'Chicago station.' Upon the theory that the two dollars per car is a charge made by appellants for moving such cars from the main line of their road to the Union Stock Yards, and for there unloading the same, and for the use of the inclosures and appliances there provided in that behalf, and upon the theory that appellants are bound by law to provide at their said Chicago station, or at some point on their line in Chicago 'platforms, chutes, yards, stations, and cattle pens,' suitable and appropriate for the unloading and delivery of cattle, Keenan insists that the delivery station at the Union Stock Yards must be deemed their Chicago station; wherefore he asked the court to order that his cattle be turned over to him without payment of the eight dollars, and that appellants be required to provide such appliances for the delivery of cattle at some point on their road in Chicago, or, in default thereof, that they in future transfer to, and unload and deliver at, said Union Stock Yards, without any charge for so doing, all cattle consigned to him. At the time of the filing of Keenan's intervening petition, other persons, firms, and corporations, to the number of 36, all cattle dealers doing business at the Union Stock Yards, joined in a similar intervening petition, but without specification of particular shipments of cattle. They also, and on the theory advanced in the petition of Keenan, asked that applicants be ordered, in default of appropriate delivery appliances on their line of road in Chicago, to move cars containing cattle consigned to any one of the several petitioners, to the Union Stock Yards, and there unload and deliver the same, without extra charge for so doing. Appellants answered each petition, and, from such answers and a stipulations made by the parties, the facts appear substantially as herein above given.

Section 6 of the interstate commerce law, enacted February 4, 1887, as amended March 2, 1889, contains the following provisions:

'Sec. 6. That every common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall print and keep open to public inspection schedules showing the rates and fares and charges for the transportation of passengers and property which any such common carrier has established and which are in force at the time upon its route.

'The schedules printed as aforesaid by any such common carrier shall plainly state the places upon its railroad between which property and passengers will be carried, and shall contain the classification of freight in force, and shall also state separately the terminal charges and any rules or regulations which in any wise change, affect, or determine any part or the agreement of such aforesaid rates and fares and charges.

'Such schedules shall be plainly printed in large type, and copies for the use of the public shall be posted in two public and conspicuous places, in every depot, station, or office of such carrier where passengers or freight, respectively, are received, for transportation in such form that they shall be accessible to the public and can be conveniently inspected.'

In the month of June, 1894, appellants duly published and posted, in a connection with their schedule of rates (which up to that time showed 23 1/2 cents per hundredweight to be the freight charge on cattle from Kansas City to Chicago), the following 'On and after July 9, 1894, a terminal charge of $2.00 per car will be made in addition to the Chicago rates, as shown in the tariffs of the Western Freight Association, on live stock and other freight received from or delivered to the stock yards or industries located on the tracks of the Union Stock Yards Railway, the Indiana State Line Railway; and $3.00 per car on shipments received from or delivered to the Northern Indiana Railroad at Hammond. ' Pursuant to this announcement (and no question seems to be made of the default in complying with the statute, or any want of knowledge of the foregoing announcement on the part of any petitioner), appellants exacted the two dollar charge in question. It may be here added that prior to June 1, 1894, the Union Stock Yards & Transit Company permitted appellants and other carriers of cattle by rail to move cars over...