Walker v. Lockhart, LR-C-81-280.
Decision Date | 02 June 1981 |
Docket Number | No. LR-C-81-280.,LR-C-81-280. |
Citation | 514 F. Supp. 1347 |
Parties | James Dean WALKER, Plaintiff, v. A. L. LOCKHART, Superintendent of the Arkansas Department of Corrections; Richard Earl Griffin, Floyd Johnson, Thomas H. Wortham, Jim Lindsey and Woodson Walker, Members of the Arkansas Board of Correction; Sergeant David Rosegrant of the Arkansas State Police; Ronald Dobbs, Warden of Cummins Prison Diagnostic Unit; Frank White, Governor of the State of Arkansas; Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of the State of California; State of Arkansas and State of California, Defendants. In the Matter of the Application of James Dean WALKER, Petitioner, for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to Inquire into the Cause of Detention of James Dean Walker v. Sergeant David ROSEGRANT of the Arkansas State Police; Ronald Dobbs, Warden of Cummins Prison Diagnostic Unit; and A. L. Lockhart, Superintendent of the Department of Correction, Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
Oscar Fendler, Blytheville, Ark., Bill W. Bristow, Jonesboro, Ark., for plaintiff.
Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., of Ark., Theodore Holder, Frederick K. Campbell, A. Carter Hardage, Asst. Attys. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., for defendants.
Upon the plaintiff-petitioner's (hereinafter plaintiff) extradition from California to Arkansas, he filed a complaint alleging that the State of Arkansas was unable to provide him with a confinement and environment in the Arkansas penal institutions free from cruel and unusual punishment as required by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Additionally, under Count I of the complaint, plaintiff alleged that the defendant, A. L. Lockhart, maliciously and intentionally placed the plaintiff in fear of his life and in doing so had violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff seeks money damages for these alleged constitutional infringements, as well as an order of this court directing that his prison sentence be served outside the State of Arkansas. Since the plaintiff's immediate safety was at issue, the Court held an expedited hearing on May 13, 1981. It was determined that, for the plaintiff's immediate safety pending final resolution of his complaint, the Pine Bluff Diagnostic Unit of the Arkansas Penal System was the only proper, safe place of detention for the plaintiff. Dr. Robert Powitzky, an Arkansas State Correction official assigned to the Pine Bluff Diagnostic Unit, testified that the plaintiff should not be returned to the general population of the Cummins Unit. Further, he testified that the Pine Bluff Diagnostic Unit was the only facility within the Arkansas Penal System wherein plaintiff could be safely incarcerated pending resolution of his complaint.
At the May 13 hearing, the Court advised the parties of a number of concerns regarding the remaining allegations of the plaintiff's complaint and directed that they submit briefs on these issues. These briefs have been submitted, and this matter has been set for trial on the merits on June 15, 1981. The subject matter of this order will be to inform the parties of the scope and boundaries of this June 15 trial.
As discussed immediately above, the May 13 hearing was designed to provide temporary relief for the plaintiff pending final resolution of his complaint. The trial on the merits will, of course, address the issue of whether or not the plaintiff's allegations under Count I can be sustained on a permanent basis. At this trial, the Court expects the State to explain the manner in which the plaintiff will be detained and whether or not the State would at any time be able to place the plaintiff in other presently existing institution other than the Pine Bluff Diagnostic Unit. The Court would, of course, caution the attorneys not to repeat testimony which was introduced at the May 13 hearing, as the Court will consider that testimony in its ruling at the June 15 hearing.
The plaintiff's second count alleges that he is the third-party beneficiary of a contract existing between the State of Arkansas and the State of California which should be specifically enforced in his favor. There has been a change in administration in the Governor's office since the alleged contract was entered into by the parties. Further, the parties presumably could mutually rescind the contract. Nevertheless while the Court has some difficulty with this theory, the plaintiff will be permitted to put on proof, if any, of this contract but directs the plaintiff to inform the court by June 8, 1981 as to whether or not this alleged contract is oral or written. If the contract is written, the June 8 communication directed above from counsel for the plaintiff to the Court should include a copy of the alleged contract.
The plaintiff's third count is in fact a petition for habeas corpus relief and seeks to have the Court grant the plaintiff a new trial. The plaintiff alleges:
It is the plaintiff's third count which caused the Court to express most of its concern at the May 13, 1981 hearing and which prompted the Court to direct the attorneys to file pre-trial briefs. Counsel for the plaintiff candidly admitted at the May 13 hearing that the factual matters underlying the plaintiff's current writ of habeas corpus are to a large extent the same factual matters asserted in the plaintiff's prior petition for writ of habeas corpus before Judge J. Smith Henley. Walker v. Bishop, 295 F.Supp. 767 (E.D.Ark.1967). However, plaintiff's counsel asserts that there has been an intervening change in the law which requires reconsideration of his previous habeas claims.
Plaintiff correctly argues that traditional notions of res judicata do not apply to habeas corpus proceedings. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963). However, this does not necessarily mean that successive habeas corpus petitions may be filed in an unbridled fashion. Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 provided some guidelines for finality determinations in habeas proceedings:
(a) No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States if it appears that the legality of such detention has been determined by a judge or court of the United States on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition presents no new ground not heretofore presented and determined, and the judge or court is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served by such inquiry.
Should controlling weight be given to the denial of the plaintiff's prior application for federal habeas corpus relief by Judge Henley, Walker v. Bishop, supra, as affirmed in an exhaustive opinion written by Judge Pat Mehaffy at 408 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1969)? In resolving this issue the Court must determine (1) whether or not the same grounds are presented in the instant application as were presented in the prior application and determined adversely to the plaintiff, (2) whether the prior determination was on the merits, and (3) whether the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the instant application for habeas corpus relief. Sanders v. U. S., supra 373 U.S. at 15, 83 S.Ct. at 1077. With the exception of paragraphs (d), (e) and (g) of Count III of the plaintiff's complaint, the underlying facts relied upon by the plaintiff in the instant application for habeas relief are the same as those asserted in his prior application. Grounds (a), (b), (c) and (f) now asserted by the plaintiff are identical to those asserted in the prior application. The prior determination was on the merits and after an exhaustive hearing determined adversely to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff places particular emphasis on alleged misconduct of the trial judge, Judge William Kirby, and further argues that there has been an intervening change in the law which, pursuant to Sanders v. United States, supra, mandates that this court reconsider plaintiff's petition for habeas relief. The principal case relied upon by plaintiff is United States v. Brown, 539 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1976). Plaintiff asserts that this case represents an intervening change in the law regarding judicial bias which should result in a reconsideration of Judge Kirby's conduct. The Court does not so construe the Brown case. The case of United States v. Brown is unique to its own set of facts. Another important distinction from the instant case is that in Brown a first...
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Walker v. Lockhart
...those asserted in the earlier petition for writ of habeas corpus determined in 1967, and should not be relitigated. Walker v. Lockhart, 514 F.Supp. 1347, 1352 (E.D.Ark.1981). These were: (1) that the presiding judge in the murder trial was biased against plaintiff, (2) that there was offici......
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Walker v. Lockhart
...had presented no new evidence, the "ends of justice" would not be served by reconsideration of the same claims. Walker v. Lockhart, 514 F.Supp. 1347, 1350-51 (E.D.Ark.1981). The trial court permitted Walker to present evidence on his newly asserted claims, but found the additional grounds t......
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...Court subsequent to the ruling of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denying him habeas relief. Walker v. Lockhart, 514 F.Supp. 1347, 1349-50 (E.D.Ark.1981). I found that grounds (a), (b), (c) and (f) had been thoroughly litigated before Judge Henley and that pursuant to 28......