Walker v. Martel
| Decision Date | 31 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. C 94–1997 SBA.,C 94–1997 SBA. |
| Citation | 803 F.Supp.2d 1032 |
| Parties | Marvin Pete WALKER, Petitioner, v. Michael MARTEL, Acting Warden of California State Prison at San Quentin, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Nanci L. Clarence, Nicole K. Howell, Clarence & Dyer LLP, Thomas B. Mayhew, Douglas R. Young, Farella Braun & Martel, LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART, DENYING IN PART AND DISMISSING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
DEATH PENALTY CASE
Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death for murder, assault, robbery and other crimes in August 1980. The California Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's conviction and death sentence on December 27, 1988. People v. Walker, 47 Cal.3d 605, 253 Cal.Rptr. 863, 765 P.2d 70 (1988). Petitioner's state petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied in September 1992; his petition for writ of certiorari was denied in March 1993. Walker v. California, 507 U.S. 979, 113 S.Ct. 1433, 122 L.Ed.2d 800 (1993).
Petitioner filed his first federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on May 20, 1997. This court found the petition to be unexhausted in part in April 1998, and petitioner filed a second state petition for writ of habeas corpus on June 5, 1998. The California Supreme Court denied the petition on December 22, 2004, both on the merits and on various procedural grounds.
Petitioner filed his Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this court on January 12, 2005. Per an order dated October 14, 2005, this court granted respondent's motion to dismiss Claims 9, 16, 19B(e), 19B(f), 19B(aa), 19B(cc) and 21 as procedurally defaulted. The parties subsequently brought cross-motions for summary judgment. Per an order dated September 28, 2007, this court granted summary judgment in favor of respondent as to Claims 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19A, 19B(a), 19B(b), 19B(c), 19B(d), 19B(e), 19B(g), 19B(h), 19B(bb), 19B(dd) and 19B(ee); petitioner's motion for summary judgment with respect to the same claims was denied. A decision as to Claims 2 and 22 was deferred.
Petitioner was subsequently granted leave to conduct discovery regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim (Claim 2) and his defaulted shackling claim (Claim 9). In February 2010, this court granted in part petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing as to his IAC and shackling claims. The court directed the parties, however, to first address all of petitioner's shackling-related claims 1 as they were “potentially petitioner's most viable claims and impact both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial.” 2 Order Re Evidentiary Hearing at 17.
In lieu of a live evidentiary hearing, the parties agreed to submit a stipulated set of facts and evidence, including a stipulation as to witness testimony, to be considered by the court. The parties also submitted extensive briefing. Pursuant to Civil Local Rules 7–1(b) and 7–6, the court finds that this matter is appropriate for submission on the papers without oral argument.
The following recitation of the factual background of this case is based, in relevant part, on the Supreme Court of California's opinion disposing of petitioner's direct appeal, People v. Walker, 47 Cal.3d 605, 253 Cal.Rptr. 863, 765 P.2d 70 (1988). The state court's factual findings are presumed to be correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
In 1980, a jury in the Superior Court of Santa Clara County sentenced petitioner to death following a conviction of first degree murder and other crimes stemming from two separate incidents joined for purposes of trial. Evidence at trial established that, in the first incident, which occurred on August 7, 1979, petitioner and an accomplice robbed a liquor store called Dan's Bottle Shop and shot three people. One of the shooting victims, 15 year old Joseph Vasquez, died from the gunshot wounds. In connection with this incident, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder, two counts of assault with intent to commit murder, and robbery. The jury also found that petitioner personally used a firearm in the commission of each crime, and found true the special circumstance that defendant committed the murder while engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery.
Evidence at trial also established that, in the second incident, which occurred on September 5, 1979, petitioner entered a medical building, where he robbed, sexually molested, beat and shot a young woman twice in the head. The woman, Rose Olveda, survived and identified petitioner as her assailant. In connection with this incident, petitioner was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder, robbery, and personal use of a firearm in the commission of each offense. He was also convicted of theft of Olveda's vehicle.
Petitioner's defense at the guilt phase was primarily one of mistaken identity. Petitioner testified on his own behalf. His testimony on the witness stand was impeached by earlier statements he had made.
At the penalty phase, the prosecution and defense stipulated that the evidence from the guilt phase could be considered by the jury in the penalty phase. In addition, the prosecution presented testimony from two police officers that petitioner had made threats against a police officer and a deputy district attorney. The defense presented witnesses from petitioner's family, including his sisters, who testified that petitioner had helped them financially and emotionally, and that they wanted him to live. Petitioner's mother testified that petitioner had grown up in a poor family with seven brothers and sisters. Again, petitioner testified, claiming that he was innocent of the crimes and testifying that he did not make threats to the officer and deputy district attorney.
Petitioner and respondent stipulated to certain facts and evidence regarding petitioner's shackling during trial. See Stipulated Evidence and Statement of Facts Related To Petitioner's Shackling Claims ). Thus, there is no dispute between the parties regarding the following relevant facts.
Petitioner was visibly shackled by a leg-locking brace during both the guilt and penalty phases of his capital trial. Stip. Facts 3, 12–13. He was shackled from the first day of voir dire until the conclusion of the penalty phase. Stip. Fact 3.
The brace was a solid piece of molded plastic, approximately 2 feet long and 1/8? to 1/4? thick, weighing about three pounds. It was slit open on one side and fit to his leg by pulling the open side apart and placing it around his leg from the back so that the open sides abutted his knee cap; it was secured by two large straps and was worn beneath his pants. Stip. Facts 3, 12. The shackle caused petitioner to walk with a visible limp. Stip. Facts 3–4; 12–20. Although the shackle was worn beneath petitioner's pants, it was visible throughout the trial. At least five jurors remember seeing the shackle. Stip. Fact 13. At least three jurors were aware that petitioner was shackled because of the difficulty the brace caused for him while he walked in the courtroom. Stip. Fact 16. Both the prosecutor and the trial judge noted the shackle. Stip. Fact 20.
One juror assumed petitioner was shackled “because of what he was being held for.” She stated that the restraints “seemed like a short lead on a vicious dog.” Another juror assumed petitioner was wearing “leg irons of some sort—something visible around his legs” because he had threatened a district attorney. Stip. Facts 27–28.
The trial court never determined on the record that a specific state interest justified petitioner's shackling. Stip. Facts 2, 5–7. The trial judge stated that he did not see any reason for shackling during the one record exchange regarding the issue. Stip. Fact 2. Petitioner's counsel, Dennis Kollenborn, never objected to the shackling, never asked for a hearing regarding the shackling, and never requested curative instructions regarding the shackling. Stip. Fact 8. Petitioner has stated that the shackle distracted him during the trial. Stip. Fact 3. Petitioner also stated that the shackle caused him pain and discomfort because its edge cut into his knee on both sides of his knee cap. Stip. Fact 3.
I. Legal FrameworkA. AEDPA Standard
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), this court should not grant a writ of habeas corpus with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C § 2254(d).3 A federal court must presume the correctness of the state court's factual findings, and the presumption of correctness may only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of section 2254(d) have separate and distinct meanings. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A state court's decision is “contrary to” clearly established United States Supreme Court law if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority or if it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Id. at 413–414, 120 S.Ct. 1495. A decision is an “unreasonable application” of United States Supreme Court law if “the state court identifies the correct...
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Walker v. Martel
...court unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Walker v. Martel, 803 F.Supp.2d 1032, 1044–53 (N.D.Cal.2011). The district court ruled that the only reasonable conclusion to draw from the record was that counsel was constitutiona......