Walker v. Mummert

• Decision Date: 25 November 1958
• Citation: 394 Pa. 146,146 A.2d 289
• Parties: Dewey S. WALKER, Appellant, v. Lester R. MUMMERT, Sr., and Lester R. Mummert, Jr.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

146 A.2d 289

394 Pa. 146

Dewey S. WALKER, Appellant, v. Lester R. MUMMERT, Sr., and Lester R. Mummert, Jr.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 25, 1958.

David Freeman, Philadelphia, Wilson H. Oldhouser, York, for appellant.

William W. Hafer, Hanover, for appellees.

Before CHARLES ALVIN JONES, C. J., and BELL, MUSMANNO, ARNOLD BENJAMIN R. JONES, and COHEN, JJ.

COHEN Justice.

Did the incapacity of a plaintiff who was non compos mentis at the time he was injured toll the running of the statute of limitations applicable to his action for personal injuries?

On June 29, 1953, plaintiff was struck and injured by an automobile which was operated by the defendant Mummert, Jr in an allegedly negligent manner. At the time of the accident the plaintiff was non compos mentis and confined to the Harrisburg State Hospital. His incompetency continued until December 17, 1955, on which date he was paroled from the hospital. Thereafter, on December 21, 1956, he instituted the present suit in trespass for the personal injuries suffered in the automobile accident. Judgment on the pleadings was entered in favor of the defendants on the ground that the action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and this appeal followed.

For over one hundred and seventy five years the colonial statute of limitations, Act of March 27, 1713 (1 Sm.L. 76, § 1), 12 P.S. § 31, governed all actions brought in the courts of this Commonwealth. That act provided, inter alia, that all actions of trespass 'shall be commenced and sued within the time and limitation hereafter expressed, and not after; that is to say * * * within six years next after the cause of such actions * * *.' However, section five of the act contained exceptions tolling the statute on behalf of persons under a disability: 'If any person * * * who is or shall be entitled to any such action of trespass * * * be, or, at the time of any cause of such action given or accrued, fallen * * * non compos mentis * * * then such person * * * shall be at liberty to bring the same actions, so as they take the same within such times as are hereby before limited, after their * * * being of * * * sound memory * * *.' Act of March 27, 1713 (1 Sm.L. 76, § 5), 12 p.S. § 35.

Then in 1895 the legislature passed the Act of June 24, 1895, P.L. 236, § 2, 12 P.S. § 34, which reduced the period during which actions for personal injuries could be brought from six years to two. 'Every suit hereafter brought to recover damages for injury wrongfully done to the person * * * must be brought within two years from the time when the injury was done and not afterwards * * *'. Although the Act of 1895 made no reference to the Act of 1713, this Court held in the case of Peterson v. Delaware River Ferry Co., 1899, 190 Pa. 364, 42 A. 955, that insofar as relevant it impliedly repealed the earlier enactment.

In the Peterson case plaintiff was injured while a minor and five years later an action for personal injuries was brought in her behalf. It was agrued that the suit was timely because the Act of 1895 affected only section one of the 1713 statute (which permitted actions for personal injuries to be brought within six years after the date of the occurrence of the injury), and left in full force and effect section five of that act (which tolled the statute for incompetents). In rejecting this argument the Court stated: 'The act of 1895 * * * is a general act in the nature of a statute of limitations. Its terms are general, and make no exceptions in favor of persons under disability. The settled rule is that infants, as well as all others, are bound by the provisions of such statutes. 'A saving from the operation of statutes for disabilities must be expressed, or it does not exist.' Warfield v. Fox, 53 Pa. 382. 'There is no limitation in the act which excludes persons under disabilities. 'Any person' means every person.'' 190 Pa. at page 365, 42 A. at page 955, supra.

For purposes of tolling the statute of limitations, the disability of one who is non compos mentis cannot be distinguished from the disabilty of one who is a minor, and accordingly, the Peterson ruling would control our disposition of the present case. However, it is the position of the plaintiff herein that the Peterson decision was an unfortunate one which created anomalous situations in the law. As an aftermath of that case, counsel cogently observes that every action except for personal injuries survives the period of a minor's disability. 'If a minor's property is damaged, his minority tolls the Statute. If he is falsely imprisoned, his minority tolls the Statute, but if his head is broken and his legs are cut off, someone must * * * [bring suit] for him within two years or his rights are lost.' Counsel therefore asks us to limit the Peterson case to its own facts and not to carry forward the result reached therein to a case involving another class of disabilities--insanity. 'It is absurd that an insane person's property * * * [should be] protected during the period of his disability, but his person which is much more precious and necessary to him, * * * [should not].'

But if this Court in the Peterson case was correct in assessing the legislative intent as expressed in the Act of 1895, and the failure of the legislature in the ensuing sixty years to amend the act suggests that the Court was, then we are not at liberty to disregard the legislative will in order to obviate anomalies created by the act.

Of course, it is always unfortunate when an innocent injured party, through no fault of his own, is denied deserved compensation from a wrongdoer. On the other hand, however, the very reasons which support the establishment of a statute of limitations also militate against exceptions thereto. Thus, permitting the deferment of the institution of a personal injury claim until the end of a prospective plaintiff's period of disability seriously prejudices the person against whom suit is eventually brought. With the passage of time a defendant may be hard pressed to assert his innocence of wrongdoing, for, his evidence may disappear or become unavailable, his witnesses scatter and die, and their memories dim. Furthermore, it is unfair to subject a defendant for an indefinite period to the threat of litigation and the fear that his plans for the future will be interfered with by liability to pay a judgment entered against him.

On balance, we believe that the established procedures for the appointment of guardians afford sufficient protection to individuals who are non compos mentis that their claims will be instituted within the permissible period and thereby diminishes the risk that the rights of incompetents will be impaired by our holding that their disability does not toll the running of the statute of limitations applicable to actions for personal injury.

Judgment affirmed.

CHARLES ALVIN JONES, Chief Justice (concurring).

The rationale of the decision in Peterson v. Delaware River Ferry Co., 190 Pa. 364, 42 A. 955, is equally applicable to the question presented by the present case. The fact that Peterson v. Delaware River Ferry Co. was concerned with the delayed suit of a person who had been under the disability of non-age, whereas the instant case involves a belated suit in behalf of a formerly non compos mentis person, points a factual difference which is of no presently pertinent distinguishing legal significance.

The statute of limitations of March 27, 1713, 1 Sm.L. 76, which applied to actions of trespass for injuries to the person, contained a proviso 'That if any person or persons, who is or shall be entitled to any such action of trespass, * * * shall be within the age of twenty-one years, feme covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned, or beyond sea, that then such person or persons shall be at liberty to bring the same actions, so as they take the same within such times as are hereby before limited, after their coming to or being of full age, discoverture, of sound memory, at large, or returning into this province, as other persons.'

The legislature, by Section 2 of the Act of June 24, 1895, P.L. 236, prescribed that 'Every suit hereafter brought to recover damages for injury wrongfully done to the person, in case where the injury does not result in death, must be brought within two years from the time when the injury was done and not afterwards; in cases where the injury does result in death the limitation of action shall remain as now established by law' and made no provision that persons under disability should be excluded from the limitation.

In the Peterson case, supra, Mr. Justice Mitchell, speaking for a unanimous court, declared, with respect to the later statute 'Its terms are general, and make no exceptions in favor of persons under disability. * * * 'A saving from the operation of statutes for disabilities must be expressed, or it does not exist.' Warfield v. Fox, 53 Pa. 382. 'There is no limitation in the act which excludes persons under...