Walker v. New York
| Citation | 345 F.Supp.2d 283 |
| Decision Date | 22 November 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-CV-4490 (DRH)(ETB).,03-CV-4490 (DRH)(ETB). |
| Parties | Stephen J. WALKER, Plaintiff, v. State of NEW YORK, New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, Sandra C. Walker, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Michael Varble, Shoreham, NY, for Plaintiff.
Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General for the State of New York, by Susan M. Connolly, Assistant Attorney General, Happauge, NY, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Stephen J. Walker challenges the constitutionality of a New York law allowing the issuance of pendente lite awards of child support and spousal maintenance in divorce proceedings. The defendants (collectively, "the State") have moved to dismiss the complaint. As explained more fully herein, because the "Rooker-Feldman Doctrine" bars jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims, the Defendants' request is GRANTED.
Under Section 236(b)(6) of the New York Domestic Relations Law, during a pending matrimonial action the court may order temporary maintenance, based on a variety of considerations, "as justice requires."1 Such an order is "effective as of the date of the application therefor," and the court may order payment of any retroactive amount of maintenance due. Similarly, under Section 236(b)(7) of the DRL, during a pending matrimonial action the court may order either parent to pay temporary child support "without requiring a showing of immediate or emergency need," and "notwithstanding that information with respect to income and assets of either or both parents may be unavailable." This order is likewise effective "as of the date of its application therefor," and any retroactive amount of child support due is "enforceable in any manner provided by law."
Under Section 244 of the DRL, where a divorcing or divorced spouse defaults on a required payment (including temporary child or spousal support), the court may enter judgment for the amount of arrears, with costs and disbursements, plus interest on the amount of any arrears if the default was willful. This judgment is enforceable in any manner provided by law for the collection of money judgments. Where a defaulting spouse accumulates support arrears equal to or greater than four months' total support obligations, Section 244-b authorizes the court to order the department of motor vehicles to suspend the spouse's driving privileges; Section 244-c authorizes the court to order any board, department, authority or office under whom the spouse is professionally affiliated to suspend any "license, permit, registration, or authority to practice"; and Section 244-d authorizes the court to "order any agency responsible for the issuance of a recreational license to suspend or refuse to reissue a license" to the spouse, or to deny his application for such a license.
According to the complaint, this scheme for ordering and enforcing payment of pendente lite (temporary) support "fails to require a constitutionally mandated due process hearing before granting relief." Complaint at ¶ 1. As a result, "[t]he amounts awarded are purely arbitrary and not based upon any findings of fact whatsoever, and, in the case of excessive or grossly excessive awards, there is absolutely no recourse whatsoever to an aggrieved party." Id. The statutes therefore, both facially and as applied, violate the constitutional due process right of "non-custodial parents and/or payor spouses."
The complaint also alleges that the above statutes "intentionally invidiously discriminate, without a compelling state interest, against a defined and identifiable `class' of people, to wit: `familial obligors' who are non-custodial parents and/or spouses." Complaint at ¶ 2. Further, according to the complaint, this scheme affects "most if not all" New York citizens involved in divorce or support proceedings, and results in "`temporary' awards [that] are, in fact, `permanent.'" Complaint at ¶ 4. This is because the excessive temporary awards inevitably lead to inflated arrears, and the harsh statutory enforcement scheme, in turn, then traps and stigmatizes the payor parent or spouse under a "growing mountain of unconstitutional prejudice." Id. Finally, according to the complaint, the excessive temporary awards also incentivize dilatory conduct by, and amount to "unjust enrichment" of, the obligee spouse or parent, and can "become an obligee parent's nefarious vehicle for parental alienation and the breakdown of the non-custodial parent-child relationship." Id.
The factual background of this case is less than fully clear from the record. At some point in the late 1980's, divorce proceedings were initiated between Stephen and Sandra Walker. Complaint at ¶ 5. In 1991, with the proceedings apparently still pending, the New York Supreme Court granted Sandra Walker's requested award of $150 per week in pendente lite spousal maintenance, and $150 per week in child support for each of the couple's three children. Walker v. Walker, 193 A.D.2d 730, 597 N.Y.S.2d 710 (N.Y.App.Div.1993). Plaintiff appealed these awards as excessive. The Appellate Division affirmed, refusing to substitute its discretion for the trial court's on the conflicting affidavits in the record. Id. The court found that the Supreme Court had "considered all of the relevant factors, and the award, given the parties' standard of living is not excessive." Id. The court noted that "[t]emporary maintenance and child support are designed to insure that a needy spouse is provided with funds for his or her support and reasonable needs pending trial, and a speedy trial is the best remedy for perceived inequities in such awards." Id. Plaintiff sought a "downward modification" of the pendente lite support award in 1995, which the Supreme Court denied. The Appellate Division affirmed, on essentially the same grounds as its prior decision. Walker v. Walker, 227 A.D.2d 469, 642 N.Y.S.2d 703 (N.Y.App.Div.1996).
Following a non-jury trial, in September 1999 the Supreme Court entered a divorce decree for the Walkers, which included a refusal to retroactively reduce Plaintiff's pendente lite maintenance and child support obligations. Walker v. Walker, 289 A.D.2d 225, 734 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y.App.Div.2001). On appeal, the Appellate Division again refused to reduce Plaintiff's allegedly excessive pendente lite obligations. Id. at 226, 734 N.Y.S.2d 470. The court noted that the Supreme Court had properly denied Stephen Walker's motion to suspend support payments (based on Sandra Walker's alleged interference with his visitation rights); properly imputed his income for child support purposes; and properly refused to impose a constructive trust on certain properties conveyed from Stephen to Sandra during their marriage, in light of Stephen's testimony that he "conveyed the properties as part of a fraudulent scheme to hide them from his creditors." Id. Finally, the Appellate Division noted without elaboration that Stephen's "remaining contentions are without merit." Id. Plaintiff apparently appealed this ruling to the New York Court of Appeals "on constitutional grounds," but the Court dismissed his appeal without explanation. Walker v. Walker, 98 N.Y.2d 646, 745 N.Y.S.2d 503, 772 N.E.2d 606 (2002).
On or about September 9, 2003, Plaintiff filed the present federal lawsuit, claiming that his pendente lite award was unsupported by "one scintilla of evidence," and "grossly excessive by more than 400 percent." Complaint at ¶ 45-r. Plaintiff also claims that he had "accumulated arrears of pendente lite support in the amount of more than $167,000.00" at the time of trial, id., and that the application of the pendente lite scheme has caused him permanent prejudice by depriving him of numerous liberty, property, and familial rights. Complaint at ¶¶ 61, 70. On March 4, 2004, the State moved to dismiss his complaint. In his opposition memorandum of March 31, 2004, Plaintiff offered to amend his complaint to include other similarly situated individuals, and to seek certification for a class action.
The State's Motion to Dismiss is brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See State's Notice of Motion. But Plaintiff suggests that because the State's memorandum deals with jurisdictional issues, the State's motion should more properly be considered a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Pltf. Memo at 1. The issue is academic, since motions to dismiss for subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) are reviewed under the same standards as motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Gambino v. Rubenfeld, 179 F.Supp.2d 62, 67 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (). Specifically, the court must "review the allegations in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor." Id. If, despite this review, a plaintiff fails to demonstrate a basis for federal jurisdiction, or if it appears beyond doubt that he can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that entitle him to relief, the case must be dismissed. Integrated Tech. & Dev., Inc. v. Rosenfield, 103 F.Supp.2d 574, 577-78 (E.D.N.Y.2000) ().
The State argues that the "Rooker-Feldman Doctrine" deprives this Court of subject-matter...
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