Walker v. Pharm. Research & Manufacturers of America

• Decision Date: 08 December 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 04–1991 (RMU).
• Parties: Barbara J. WALKER, Plaintiff, v. PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

53 Employee Benefits Cas. 1375

827 F.Supp.2d 8

Barbara J. WALKER, Plaintiff,

v.PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 04–1991 (RMU).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Dec. 8, 2011.

Barbara J. Walker, Alexandria, VA, for Plaintiff.

Frederick G. Sandstrom, Jeffrey G. Huvelle, Covington & Burling, LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Granting Defendant New York Life's Motion for Summary Judgment; Granting The Individual Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; Denying the Plaintiff's Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment

RICARDO M. URBINA, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

In the final chapter of this lengthy litigious saga, the plaintiff, a former employee of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America ¹ (“PhRMA”), seeks damages for alleged violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated ERISA's notice and disclosure requirements by failing to provide her with certain requested documents related to her retirement plan with PhRMA. Additionally, she asserts that in failing to meet their notice and disclosure obligations, the defendants also breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA § 404.

The matter is now before the court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. As elaborated below, the court concludes that the plaintiff's claims related to her August 2002 request for documents are time-barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations period. With respect to the plaintiff's claims concerning her August 2003 request for documents, the court determines that the plaintiff failed to submit evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that an ERISA violation had occurred. Finally, the court concludes that claims regarding violations of ERISA's notice and disclosure obligations are not properly brought as a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under § 404. Accordingly, the court grants the defendants' respective motions for summary judgment and denies the plaintiff's cross-motion.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

From 1977 to 1988, the plaintiff worked for PhRMA as a full-time attorney. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15–17.² In 1988, the plaintiff began working for PhRMA as an independent contractor. Id. As part of her work in PhRMA's general counsel's office, the plaintiff performed labor and employment legal work, which included reviewing employees' Retirement and Deferred Savings plans. Individual Defs.' Mot., Ex. 16 at 34–40.

To maintain her employment arrangement as an independent contractor, the plaintiff and PhRMA have entered into an identically worded one-year employment agreement every year since 1988. Am. Compl. ¶ 27. In September 2001, the plaintiff and PhRMA signed a final employment agreement that provided notice to the plaintiff of PhRMA's intention to discontinue their relationship after June 30, 2002. Mem. Op., 439 F.Supp.2d at 105–06. After this final employment agreement was signed, the plaintiff, through an attorney, requested that PhRMA provide her with an accounting of the employment benefits to which she was entitled. Am. Compl. ¶ 43. In response, PhRMA informed the plaintiff that she was not entitled to any benefits since the time that she began working as an independent contractor. Id. ¶ 44. The plaintiff appealed that determination to PhRMA without success. Id. ¶ 45.

On August 26, 2002, after completing her final one-year work agreement, the plaintiff submitted a letter to PhRMA's Retirement Committee requesting documents related to the denial of her claim for benefits. Pl.'s Mot. at 17; Individual Defs.' Mot., Ex. 3. On September 5, 2002, the Retirement Committee responded to the plaintiff's letter, stating that it would provide her with documents to which she was legally entitled. PhRMA's Mot., Ex. 5. On September 26, 2002, the Retirement Committee provided her with several documents, including the 1994 and 1999 restatements of the Retirement Plan, the 1989 restatement of the Deferred Savings Plan, the 2002 Summary Plan Description (“SPD”) for the Retirement Plan and the 1996 SPD for the Deferred Savings Plan. Id., Ex. 6.

In August 2003,³ the plaintiff emailed the Retirement Committee a request for copies of the Summary Annual Reports (“SARs”) for the 2002 Retirement Plan and Deferred Savings Plan. Pl.'s Mot. at 22. On August 27, 2003, the Retirement Committee responded by providing the plaintiff with copies of the 2001 SARs for the Retirement and Deferred Savings Plans. Id.; Individual Defs.' Mot., Ex. 7. When the plaintiff inquired as to why she had not received the 2002 documents, the Retirement Committee notified her that those documents were not yet available. Pl.'s Mot. At 22. According to PhRMA, the 2002 SARs were not prepared until December 2003. Individual Defs.' Mot., Ex. 8.

B. Procedural History ⁴

The plaintiff filed her original complaint in November 2004, seeking to recoup the retirement benefits that she claimed to be entitled to as an independent contractor. See generally Compl. The plaintiff amended her complaint in August 2005, see generally Am. Compl., and again in March 2009, see generally 2d Am. Compl. The only remaining claims at this juncture are those brought against individual members of the PhRMA Board of Directors and its Retirement Committee (“the individual defendants”) and against New York Life Investment Management, LLC (“NYLIM”), the organization that provides administrative and actuarial services for the PhRMA Retirement Committee. Am. Compl. ¶ 12.

The plaintiff's claims revolve around the defendants' alleged failure to provide her with documents as required under ERISA. Pl.'s Mot. at 15–16. More specifically, the plaintiff asserts that the defendants violated the notice and disclosure requirements outlined in ERISA by failing to provide her with the documents that she requested in 2002 and 2003. Id. at 16, 22. Such violations, she argues, entitle her to “civil penalties” under ERISA § 502(c), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c). Id. The plaintiff further alleges that the defendants' notice and disclosure violations also give rise to a breach of fiduciary duty claim under ERISA § 404, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1104. Pl.'s Mot. at 21–22, 25–27, 33.

The parties have now filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See generally Pl.'s Mot.; Individual Defs.' Mot.; NYLIM's Mot. With these motions now ripe for adjudication, the court turns to the parties' arguments and the applicable legal standards.

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Court Grants the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment

1. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and evidence show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C.Cir.1995). To determine which facts are “material,” a court must look to the substantive law on which each claim rests. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A “genuine dispute” is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor and accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of its position. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that the nonmoving party “fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. By pointing to the absence of evidence proffered by the nonmoving party, a moving party may succeed on summary judgment. Id.

The nonmoving party may defeat summary judgment through factual representations made in a sworn affidavit if he “support[s] his allegations ... with facts in the record,” Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999) (quoting Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C.Cir.1993)), or provides “direct testimonial evidence,” Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 338 (D.C.Cir.2006). Indeed, for the court to accept anything less “would defeat the central purpose of the summary judgment device, which is to weed out those cases insufficiently meritorious to warrant the expense of a jury trial.” Greene, 164 F.3d at 675.

2. The Plaintiff's Notice and Disclosure Claims

a. The Plaintiff's Claims Relating to Her August 2002 Request Are Barred by the Applicable One–Year Statute of Limitations

The plaintiff claims that she is entitled to relief under ERISA § 502(c) because the individual defendants provided an incomplete response to her August 2002 letter.2d Am. Compl. ¶ 8; Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 16. The individual defendants argue that, even if their response to the plaintiff's August 2002 request was deficient, the plaintiff's claim is barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. Individual Defs.' Mot. at 6. According to the individual defendants, the court should apply the District of Columbia's one-year statute of limitations for a civil penalty because the remedies contained within § 502(c) are penal in nature. Id. The individual defendants further argue that the plaintiff's claims related to her August 2002 request should be dismissed because they were filed more than a year after her cause of action accrued. Id. at 6–7.

In response, the plaintiff...