Walker v. Price

• Decision Date: 20 August 2018
• Docket Number: No. 17-1345,17-1345
• Citation: 900 F.3d 933
• Parties: Fredrick WALKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Timothy PRICE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

900 F.3d 933

Fredrick WALKER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Timothy PRICE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-1345

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued May 24, 2018
Decided August 20, 2018

Sarah O'Rourke Schrup, Attorney, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Frank Henry Bieszczat, Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before Manion and Barrett, Circuit Judges, and Gettleman, District Judge.^*

Barrett, Circuit Judge.

900 F.3d 935

A litigant in a civil case has neither a statutory nor a constitutional right to counsel. He can, however, ask the court to recruit counsel to represent him on a pro bono basis. When the court receives such a request from an indigent plaintiff, it must determine whether the plaintiff has made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel on his own and whether, given the difficulty of the case, the plaintiff is competent to litigate it himself. Pruitt v. Mote , 503 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). If the answer to the first question is yes and the answer to the second is no, then the court must seek counsel to represent the plaintiff.

This case involves the district court’s assessment of the second question. Fredrick Walker, an inmate, brought a civil-rights suit against several prison officers. Over the course of the litigation, Walker asked the court six times to recruit a volunteer lawyer to represent him. The court acted within its discretion when it denied his initial motions. But it abused its discretion when it denied the sixth. At that point, Walker was facing not only a jury trial, but a jury trial by videoconference. That substantially increased the difficulty of his case, despite the simplicity of his claims. Moreover, the basic competence that Walker had demonstrated during the pretrial phase did not necessarily reflect his ability to handle a video trial entirely on his own. Trying a case requires additional skills, and Walker had managed the pretrial phase with the help of a jailhouse lawyer who had since been transferred to another prison. Because the landscape had changed at this late stage of the litigation, the court should have granted Walker’s motion to recruit counsel.

I.

Fredrick Walker is a prisoner at the Pontiac Correctional Center, a maximum-security prison in Pontiac, Illinois. On August 21, 2013, Timothy Price, the prison officer in charge of delivering the inmates’ breakfast, brought Walker his meal. The parties dispute what happened next.

By Walker’s account, Price tried to give him a breakfast tray that had fallen on the floor. When Walker requested a fresh meal, Price refused. Walker complained loudly, and in response, two other prison officers, Jeffrey Stahl and Glendal French, moved him from his cell to a more restrictive floor. Walker claims that Stahl and French brutally assaulted him during the move, seriously injuring his face and foot. John Hudson and Marlon Minter, two of his fellow inmates, testified that they could see Walker’s swollen face as he was escorted to his new cell. According to Walker, his repeated requests for medical care went unanswered until Mark Spencer, a paralegal at Pontiac, finally relayed his request to the medical unit. Walker was prescribed Motrin for his injuries.

The prison officers give a different account. Price does not remember the alleged breakfast tray incident. And Stahl and French claim they moved Walker to a more restrictive cell because he began kicking his cell door. They say that the transfer was uneventful, and prison officers present at the time of the alleged assault testified that neither Stahl nor French used excessive force. All three defendants deny knowing that Walker had asked for medical care.

A year later, with the help of Marlon Minter—a fellow inmate who acted as his "jailhouse lawyer"—Walker filed a pro se complaint in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that Officers Price, French, and Stahl violated his Eighth Amendment rights by using excessive force, failing to intervene to stop the use of excessive force, and exhibiting deliberate indifference to Walker’s need for

900 F.3d 936

medical attention. When he filed his complaint, Walker asked the court to recruit a volunteer lawyer to represent him. Walker stated that his own attempts to recruit pro bono counsel had failed and that he needed volunteer counsel because he had "numerous mental health issues," limited access to the law library, and no money to hire counsel. He also claimed that his reliance on Minter demonstrated his need for representation. The magistrate judge assigned to the case denied Walker’s motion because the case was simple and Walker had personal knowledge of the events. In addition, Walker had prior litigation experience, and his complaint reflected both competent writing skills and knowledge of the relevant law and procedure.

After the defendants had answered the complaint, Walker filed a second motion to recruit counsel. Like the first, it was drafted with Minter’s help. Walker repeated the reasons identified in his first motion: his limited mental capacity, lack of access to legal resources, and reliance on Minter. He added that his case was legally and factually complex, that it presented nuanced credibility issues, and that his deliberate indifference claim might require expert medical testimony. Walker’s motion also included evidence of his cognitive limitations—he noted that he had an IQ of 76 and a grade-school level of comprehension. In response to this new information, the magistrate judge ordered the defendants to file Walker’s Adult Basic Education scores. They never did.

A little over two months later, Walker filed his third request for recruited counsel. He complained that the defendants had not responded to his discovery requests. Their failure to comply, he argued, was yet another reason why he needed the court to help him find a lawyer. The magistrate judge denied Walker’s second and third motions on the same day. He recognized Walker’s "cognitive deficits," but they did not change his conclusion that Walker was competent to continue pro se. He reiterated that Walker’s claims were simple and that his filings had been "relatively well written, demonstrating knowledge of the law and the relevant facts." And while he acknowledged Walker’s reliance on Minter’s help in drafting his filings, he concluded: "that alone does not necessarily mean Plaintiff is unable to proceed pro se." The magistrate judge directed the defendants to respond to Walker’s discovery requests, which they finally did.

Walker filed his fourth request to recruit counsel several months later. He asked the district judge to reconsider the earlier motions that the magistrate judge had denied. He restated his earlier points and added more emphasis to the claim that his dependence on Minter showed his inability to litigate without assistance. Two days after the motion was filed, the district judge denied his motion for reconsideration "for the reasons stated" in the magistrate judge’s earlier order denying Walker’s second and third motions to recruit counsel. To these reasons, the district judge added a list of six earlier pro se cases filed by Walker as examples of his competence to litigate pro se.

A month later, Walker filed his fifth motion to recruit counsel. In this one, Walker complained that his earlier arguments were being "overlooked by the court." He underscored his cognitive limitations and the complexity of his case. In her response, the judge again agreed with the magistrate judge’s assessment of Walker’s ability. She noted that Walker "appear[ed] competent to proceed pro se" because he had performed well so far, had some prior federal civil litigation experience, and was litigating straightforward claims. But because the case was going to trial, the judge said that she would nonetheless "attempt to recruit pro bono counsel

900 F.3d 937

to represent Plaintiff at trial." She warned him, however, that searching for pro bono counsel was "becoming increasingly difficult."

In the summer of 2016, Walker—through his own efforts—found a lawyer willing to represent him pro bono. That representation, however, didn’t last long. Citing irreconcilable differences, his lawyer withdrew within minutes of his appointment.

Walker’s case was now approaching trial, and the court ordered the parties to submit briefs discussing whether the trial should be held over videoconference. All of the defendants supported holding the trial by videoconference because transporting Walker to the courthouse would be costly and a potential security risk. They noted that Walker was serving a life sentence for murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault with a weapon, and home invasion; on top of that, he had racked up an extensive prison disciplinary record during his incarceration at Pontiac. Walker objected that trying the case by video would impede his access to the court. But given the security risks posed by Walker’s "classification as a high escape risk, high aggression, and maximum security level," the court decided to hold the trial by video. The court opined that the simplicity of Walker’s claims and the presence of a large video screen would minimize any...