Walker v. Richmond

• Citation: 362 Ga.App. 803,870 S.E.2d 229
• Decision Date: 01 March 2022
• Docket Number: A21A1277
• Parties: WALKER v. RICHMOND et al.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

362 Ga.App. 803

870 S.E.2d 229

WALKER

v.RICHMOND et al.

A21A1277

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 1, 2022

Christopher Wells Timmons, Jon David Worth Huffman, Decatur, for Appellant.

Eric N. Welch, for Appellee.

Barnes, Presiding Judge.

This appeal arises from estate litigation in Tennessee and involves issues related to property located in Cobb County, Georgia. The parties are residents of Tennessee. We granted Gloria Walker's application for discretionary review of the trial court's order denying her motion to set aside default judgment. In this ensuing appeal, Walker contends that the trial court erred in failing to set aside the default judgment as it granted declaratory relief that was based on future contingencies, and that the trial court's default judgment exceeded the relief requested in the complaint.¹ Upon our review, and finding that the default judgment was entered on an improper basis such that there was a nonamendable defect on the face of the record, we reverse the trial court's denial of Walker's motion to set aside the judgment.

"On appeal from a trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d), this Court is limited to a consideration of only whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment under the limited statutory criteria." Fred Jones Enterprises v. Williams , 331 Ga. App. 481, 485 (2), 771 S.E.2d 163 (2015). "Where it is apparent that a trial court's judgment rests on an erroneous legal theory, an appellate court cannot affirm. When the issue is a question of law, we owe no deference to the trial court's ruling and apply the plain legal error standard of review." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Laurel Baye Healthcare of Macon, LLC v. Neubauer , 315 Ga. App. 474, 475, 726 S.E.2d 670 (2012).

Patricia Richmond, the only biological child of the deceased, Alfonso Patton, obtained a power of attorney before Patton's death and transferred his assets into joint accounts. She used funds from the accounts to purchase two homes, including one in Cobb County (the "Cobb County property"). Richmond sold the Cobb County property to Charles and Tonya Lowe (her daughter), who then made mortgage payments to Richmond.

The Tennessee Proceedings

Prior to Patton's death, the conservators of Patton's "person and property" filed a petition in Tennessee alleging, among other things, that Richmond had breached her fiduciary duties, and sought to recover property and damages from Richmond and her husband, Ronnie Richmond. The conservators prevailed on summary judgment, and the Richmonds were found liable in the amount of $916,616 (the "Tennessee judgment"). The ruling was affirmed on appeal. See In re Conservatorship of Patton , No. M2012-01078-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 4803146 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2014).

Patton died in 2013 and, although Richmond sought to have a new will probated naming her as Patton's beneficiary, the will was invalidated and found to be the result of undue influence. Patton's prior will naming Walker as the beneficiary was admitted to probate.

In May 2014, the Tennessee probate court entered an interlocutory order finding that the "mortgage payments on the [Cobb County] property being paid by [the Lowes] constitute an asset of the estate of [Patton]" (the "Tennessee 2014 probate order"). The probate court instructed that the mortgage payments be made to the temporary administrator of Patton's estate (a court designee, not Walker), until ordered otherwise. The probate court further ruled that "the mortgage note and Georgia security agreement are properly in the possession of the Temporary Administrator as an asset of the estate." The final Tennessee probate order was entered in January 2019, and the order "transferred and assigned" the judgment in the breach of fiduciary duty action to Walker for execution as the "residual beneficiary" of Patton's estate.

Cobb County Proceedings

In October 2017 – while the probate matter remained pending in Tennessee – the Richmonds filed a "Complaint for Foreclosure and Declaratory Judgment to Quiet Title" in the Superior Court of Cobb County against Walker and the Lowes.² Seeking to have the 2014 Tennessee probate order set aside, the Richmonds asserted that the Tennessee court did "not have the authority under the laws of any jurisdiction to resolve legal questions of title upon real property located within the jurisdiction of Georgia." The Richmonds also noted that the 2014 Tennessee probate order had not been domesticated in Georgia. The Richmonds thus requested "a declaratory judgment voiding the operation of the [2014 Tennessee probate] order issued in the State of Georgia and barring its domestication in the State of Georgia."

On November 27, 2017, a nonlawyer, Akeem Jacob-Bey,³ responded on Walker's behalf, purporting to act under a power of attorney. But see generally In re Estate Wheeler , 349 Ga. App. 716, 717 (1), 824 S.E.2d 715 (2019) (noting that power of attorney does not permit a layperson to represent another in a court of law). The response, styled as a "Judicial Notice," asserted, among other things, that the trial court lacked "subject matter" jurisdiction over Walker, and that Walker was a "secured party creditor" against Richmond with "first in line, first in time" status because of the Tennessee judgment.

On January 12, 2018, the Richmonds filed a motion for default judgment against Walker, asserting that Walker had failed to timely file an answer to their complaint, that the 15-day period to open the default had passed, and that Walker had "not entered any appearance in this case or otherwise responded to the complaint." A hearing was set on the motion, and Jacob-Bey appeared at the subsequent June 18, 2018 hearing where he again asserted that he represented Walker by virtue of a power of attorney, although he could not produce a power of attorney executed by Walker or any "legally enforceable document."⁴

On July 2, 2018, the trial court entered default judgment against Walker. While noting Jacob-Bey's various filings and attempts to appear in Walker's stead, the trial court ultimately ruled that Jacob-Bey "was a non-party to the suit and that ... Walker was in default, having failed to answer the Complaint and Summons filed against her .... and failed to open the default as a matter of right." Pertinently, the order further provided as follows:

The Court finds Defendant Walker has no valid legal interest in the [Cobb County] property[.] ... Moreover, any filings made into the Clerk of Court's record and DEED BOOK by Defendant Walker or purportedly on behalf of Defendant Walker by her attorney-in-fact are null and void. The Court hereby terminates any and all interest asserted by Defendant Walker, her spouse, heirs, devisees, successors, assigns and anyone or anything in the whole world claiming under her, irrespective of the nature of such claim, in and to the [Cobb County] property[.] ... Any future claims of Defendant Walker, her spouse, heirs, devisees, successors, assigns and anyone or anything in the whole world claiming under her, irrespective of the nature of such claims, in and to the above described named real property are barred.

Walker subsequently obtained counsel and, in September 2020, she filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. Walker maintained that the trial court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over her through her interest in the property because she did not receive an interest in the Cobb County property until January 2019, when the Tennessee probate court entered its final order. Walker also argued that the default judgment was void "because declaratory relief may only address the respective parties’ legal rights at the time of the controversy[.]" According to Walker, her legal rights at that time the default judgment was entered in 2018 were contingent on two future events – the entry of the 2019 Tennessee final probate order, naming her the beneficiary and assignee of the Tennessee judgment, and the domestication of the Tennessee judgment. Walker further asserted that the trial court exceeded its authority in forever barring any future claim Walker might have to the Cobb County property, and that the trial court's ruling exceeded the relief requested in the declaratory judgment petition. Walker maintained that the Richmonds’ complaint only sought relief from the 2014 Tennessee probate order's direction as to the mortgage payments rather than the establishment of ownership of the Cobb County property, much less barring Walker from forever asserting a claim to that property.

Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court rejected these arguments.⁵ Noting Walker's contacts with the trial court, including the filing of "voluminous documents," a personally signed judicial complaint, and her appearance in court, the court held that Walker had "waive[d] any defense of [the] Court's lacking personal jurisdiction over her." The trial court also discounted as meritless Walker's assertions related to the propriety of the declaratory judgment, reasoning that they were based on

the premise that it is possible for Defendant Walker to obtain legal title over Georgia real property through a foreign Tennessee court. While the state gives full faith and credit to the judgment of its sister courts in neighboring jurisdictions, this does not extend to judgments regarding title to land within its own boundaries. The Georgia Supreme Court has noted courts of other states cannot grant relief in proceedings concerning Georgia real property. See Schuehler v. Pait , 238 S.E.2d 65, 68 (1977) .... Actions respecting title to land must be brought in the county where the land lies. Id. at 67.... Therefore, it is impossible for Defendant Walker to gain legal title to Georgia real property through a Tennesse order. As such it was proper for the court to forever bar Defendant's Walker's claims on the [Cobb County] property[.]

1. Walker first...