Walker v. Schult

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
• Writing for the Court: CHIN
• Citation: Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 2013)
• Decision Date: 23 May 2013
• Docket Number: Docket No. 12–1806–cv.
• Parties: Ellis WALKER, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Deborah G. SCHULT, Warden, FCI Ray Brook, Russell Perdue, Warden, FCI Ray Brook, David Salamy, Unit Manager, FCI Ray Brook, Sepanek, Counselor, FCI Ray Brook, David Porter, Associate Warden, FCI Ray Brook, Anne Mary Carter, Associate Warden, FCI Ray Brook, Steven Wagner, Associate Warden, FCI Ray Brook, J.L. Norwood, Regional Director, Harley Lappin, Director, Bureau of Prisons, Defendants–Appellees.

717 F.3d 119

Ellis WALKER, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Deborah G. SCHULT, Warden, FCI Ray Brook, Russell Perdue, Warden, FCI Ray Brook, David Salamy, Unit Manager, FCI Ray Brook, Sepanek, Counselor, FCI Ray Brook, David Porter, Associate Warden, FCI Ray Brook, Anne Mary Carter, Associate Warden, FCI Ray Brook, Steven Wagner, Associate Warden, FCI Ray Brook, J.L. Norwood, Regional Director, Harley Lappin, Director, Bureau of Prisons, Defendants–Appellees.

Docket No. 12–1806–cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: Jan. 30, 2013.

Decided: May 23, 2013.

John D. Castiglione (Kyle L. Wallace, Noreen A. Kelly–Dynega, Natalie M. Georges, on the brief), Latham & Watkins LLP, New York, New York, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Paula Ryan Conan, Assistant United States Attorney (Charles E. Roberts, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Richard S. Hartunian, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Syracuse, New York, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before: WESLEY and CHIN, Circuit Judges, and LARIMER, District Judge.^*

CHIN, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-appellant Ellis Walker brought this action below pro se, alleging that the conditions of his confinement in the Federal Correctional Institution in Ray Brook, New York (“FCI Ray Brook”) amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Kahn, J.) granted defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Walker appeals.

We conclude that Walker's complaint plausibly alleged violations of his constitutional rights, except as to two defendants. We therefore affirm in part and vacate in part and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

The following facts are drawn from Walker's pro se complaint, and we assume them to be true for purposes of this appeal. On November 18, 2008, while Walker was an inmate at FCI Ray Brook, he was placed in a six-man cell. Compl. ¶ 1. The cell was approximately 170 to 174 square feet in size, providing each prisoner with 28 to 29 square feet of total space, and “less than 6–square feet moving space,” which was not enough space “to even turn or move in the 6–man cell.” Id. ¶ 4 & n. 3. In addition to the six prisoners, the cell contained their bunk beds, their belongings, two toilets, and two sinks. Id. ¶¶ 4, 8, 19. The prisoners were required to be in their cells each day from approximately 9:15 p.m. to 7:00 a.m., and for 45–minute periods each mid-morning and mid-afternoon. Id. ¶ 23.

Walker, who is 6'4? tall and weighs 255 pounds, was assigned to one of the top bunk beds for four months. Id. ¶ 4 n. 3. The bed itself was only twenty-eight inches wide—four inches narrower than what guards told Walker was the required width of beds—which forced Walker “to sleep on his side; rotating back and forth.” Id. ¶ 7 & n. 4. There were no ladders to climb up to the top bunks; Walker had to climb onto a chair and then onto another inmate's locker to reach his bed. Id. ¶ 8. Once, when climbing up to his bed, Walker fell onto the chair, which “broke [his] fall to the floor.” Id. ¶ 9. If, when climbing up to his bed, he knocked another inmate's property off a locker, it “would lead to arguments and possibly fights.” Id. ¶ 8.

Walker's cellmates included gang members, non-gang members, and men of different races. Id. ¶¶ 5, 6, 11, 12. Mixing inmates from different backgrounds caused “insurmountable problems,” including fights, friction, and violence throughout the prison. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5, 6, 11, 12. The “overcrowding, gang activities, violence ... [and] fights” in the cell placed Walker “in a situation to kill or be killed.” Id. ¶ 12. Further, because the cell was so crowded and noisy, the prison guards would not know when prisoners were fighting unless another prisoner alerted them. Id. ¶ 13.

Walker's five cellmates stayed up all night watching television and playing games, which led to “hollering, screaming and sometimes fights.” Id. ¶ 15. In addition, his cellmates “constantly” had other prisoners running into the cell “using the toilet/sink and making noise.” Id. ¶ 22. Walker got “almost no sleep” and was “tired most of the time,” because “[t]he noise inside the cell [was] constant and loud.” Id. ¶ 14. Walker got so little sleep that there was “no way [he] could work on a job 8 hours/day without hurting himself or someone else.” Id. ¶ 16.

Walker's cell was also unsanitary, with so much “urine ... on the floor and sometimes ... on the toilet” that the toilet required cleaning “[a]t least 15–20 times per day.” Id. ¶¶ 19, 20. Walker's cellmates warned him that “urin [e] or defecat[ion] would splatter to the floor.” Id. ¶ 19. The inmates were not provided sufficient cleaning supplies or equipment to keep the toilet and surrounding area clean. Id. ¶¶ 18, 20. Thus, Walker had to use his personal soap and dishwashing liquid to clean the toilets and cell. Id. ¶¶ 18–20 & n. 5.

Finally, Walker's cell was inadequately ventilated, such that “during the winter the cell [was] cold and [during the] summer months extremely hot and quite difficult to breathe.” Id. ¶ 21.¹

Walker still resided in the six-man cell when he filed his complaint on March 16, 2011—nearly twenty-eight months after having been placed there on November 18, 2008.² For Walker, the experience of beingin the six-man cell was “horrifying.” Id. ¶ 23.

According to Walker, defendants were aware of and did nothing to remedy the conditions in his cell. FCI Ray Brook wardens Deborah G. Schult and Russell Perdue,³ associate wardens David Porter, Anne Mary Carter, and Steven Wagner, unit manager David Salamy, and counselor Sepanek each “knew of the overcrowding, gang activities, [and] violence in the cells” and the physical danger that Walker faced.⁴Id. ¶ 12. Walker informed Schult, Sepanek, Salamy, Porter, and Carter that his bed was too narrow for him, but he received no response. Id. ¶ 7. Further, defendants were “fully aware that the noise in the unit [was] so loud and constant,” id. ¶ 13, and that the cell was inadequately ventilated, id. ¶ 21. Finally, Sepanek, whose job it was to issue cleaning supplies, failed to do so. Id. ¶ 18 n. 5.

Walker pursued his administrative remedies, but alleged that defendants interfered with and obstructed his efforts to obtain relief. Id. ¶¶ 24–27.

B. Procedural History

On March 16, 2011, Walker, proceeding pro se, filed the instant action alleging that defendants violated his constitutional rights while he was imprisoned at FCI Ray Brook.⁵

On August 25, 2011, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on (1) Walker's failure to exhaust administrative remedies; (2) Walker's failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; (3) Walker's failure to allege defendants' personal involvement in the constitutional violations; and (4) qualified immunity.

By report and recommendation filed on January 20, 2012, Magistrate Judge Randolph F. Treece recommended dismissing Walker's complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Magistrate Judge noted that he was unable to properly assess whether Walker fully exhausted his available administrative remedies or whether defendants should be estopped from asserting failure to exhaust as an affirmative defense. With respect to Walker's allegation that his cell lacked a ladder to access his top bunk bed, the Magistrate Judge recommended in the alternative granting the motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. The Magistrate Judge also recommended dismissing the claims against Sepanek and Lappin for failure to serve them. ⁶

Finally, the Magistrate Judge declined to address defendants' argument that all of Walker's claims should be dismissed for failure to allege that defendants were personally involved in the constitutional violations.

On March 27, 2012, the district court adopted the report and recommendation in full and dismissed the case.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law

1. Motions To Dismiss

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In exercising this review, our “task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); accord DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir.2010) (“In ruling on a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the duty of a court is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Where, as here, the complaint was filed pro se, it must be construed liberally “to raise the strongest arguments [it] suggest[s].” Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). Nonetheless, a pro se complaint must state a plausible claim for relief. See Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir.2009).

We review de novo a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See...