Walker v. Sec'y
| Decision Date | 21 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:14-cv-2535-T-33AEP |
| Parties | ALEXANDER WALKER, JR., Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Alexander Walker, Jr., an inmate in the Florida Department of Corrections proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). He challenges his convictions for trafficking in illegal drugs entered by the Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Pinellas County. Respondent filed a response (Doc. 12), in which it concedes the timeliness of Walker's petition. Walker filed a reply (Doc. 17). Upon review, the petition must be denied.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In both case number CRC04-00285CFANO and case number CRC04-00286CFANO, Walker was charged with one count of trafficking in illegal drugs. (Doc. 14, Ex. 1.) A jury convicted him in case number CRC04-00285CFANO on August 31, 2005. (Doc. 14, Ex. 3.) The state trial court sentenced him to life in prison as a habitual felony offender ("HFO") on December 22, 2005. (Doc. 14, Ex. 4.) After a jury convicted Walker in case number CRC05-00286CFANO on October 5, 2006, he received a sentence of life in prison as a HFO. (Doc. 14, Exs. 6, 7.)
The state appellate court affirmed Walker's convictions in both cases but reversed his sentences because the State did not present sufficient proof to establish he qualified as a HFO. Walker v. State, 964 So.2d 886 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Walker v. State, 988 So.2d 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). The state appellate court remanded for resentencing under the Criminal Punishment Code. Id.1
The Florida Supreme Court quashed the state appellate court's decisions, and remanded pursuant to State v. Collins, 985 So.2d 985 (Fla. 2008), which provides that when a habitual offender sentence is reversed because of insufficient evidence, the State may present evidence of a defendant's habitual offender qualification upon resentencing. State v. Walker, 992 So.2d 232 (Fla. 2008); State v. Walker, 994 So.2d 973 (Fla. 2008). On April 24, 2009, Walker again received a life sentence as a HFO in each case. (Doc. 14, Ex. 13, pp. 88, 89.) The state appellate court per curiam affirmed both sentences on March 17, 2010. (Doc. 14, Ex. 8.)
Walker filed a postconviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, as well as supplemental pleadings. (Doc. 14, Exs. 9, 11, 12.) The state postconviction court denied Walker's motions. (Doc. 14, Exs. 13, 14.) The state appellate court per curiam affirmed the denial. (Doc. 14, Ex. 15.) Walker v. State, 151 So.3d 1253 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (table).
FACTS2
A. Background
In 2002, Theodore Little faced criminal charges. He began providing assistance as a confidential informant for the St. Petersburg Police Department to "work off" his charges, for which he ultimately received time served. Afterwards, he continued as a confidential informant and was paid for providing this subsequent assistance. Working as an informant, Little was the buyer in drug transactions relevant to Walker's cases.
Detective Robert Mailhiot explained that prior to such transactions on July 15, 2003, and July 24, 2003, he placed on Little a digital recording device to record the transactions. Mailhiot also gave Little money to make the purchases. Mailhiot then followed Little to the location where he anticipated meeting Walker and conducted surveillance. Following the transactions, Little provided Mailhiot with the drugs he purchased. Subsequent testing showed the drugs to be heroin.
B. Events Of July 15, 2003: Case Number CRC04-00286CFANO3
On July 15, 2003, Little was directed to the home of Carrie Roberson, Walker's mother-in-law, to make contact with Walker. Little asked Walker for a "ball," which Little explained is 3.5 grams of cocaine or heroin. Walker left and proceeded to a differentlocation, where he provided an item to his niece, Nicole Roberson.4 He directed her to give it to Little, and told her that Little would give her $1,000.
Nicole Roberson returned to Carrie Roberson's house, where Little was waiting. When Little got in her car, Nicole Roberson gave the item5 to him, and he gave her cash. While still in the car, Little counted forty-five small bags of drugs. After Little exited the car, Nicole Roberson stated, she made contact with Walker down the street and gave him the money. The State played the audiotape from the recording device that was placed on Little. Mailhiot stated that he recognized the voices of Walker and Little on the recording. Forensic chemist Diane Davis later determined that the substance inside the small bags was heroin, and that the total weight of the heroin was 4.6 grams.
Detective Anthony Harris was the "close cover" unit officer during this transaction. He went to the area of Carrie Roberson's house prior to Little's arrival and observed the activity there. After Nicole Roberson left the house, Harris followed her. He saw Nicole Roberson's car and a car he previously had observed Walker driving stopped side by side in the middle of a street. Harris was in a position to see any exchange between the drivers of the cars, but did not see such activity. He also did not observe whether Walker was driving the car.
C. Events Of July 24, 2003: Case Number CRC04-00285CFANO
On July 24, 2003, Little again went to Carrie Roberson's house. Once inside, Littlespoke with Juanita Walker, who was Walker's wife, Precious Nelson, who was Walker's niece, and others. After some time, Walker and an unknown man referred to as Deemo6 arrived. Walker proceeded into the kitchen. In the living room, by the television, Deemo handed Little the drugs. In Deemo's presence, Little counted fifty-six small bags of heroin. The State played an audio tape from the recording device Walker wore, and Mailhiot identified one of the voices on the tape as Walker's. Chief forensic chemist Michael Gilbert testified that the substance in the fifty-six small bags tested positive for heroin and had a total weight of 4.6 grams.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000). Habeas relief can only be granted if a petitioner is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d), which sets forth a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states:
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this deferential standard:
In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied-the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
"The focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Accord Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (). The phrase "clearly established Federal law" encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.
The purpose of federal review is not to re-try the case. "The [AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Cone, 535 U.S. at 693. In other words, "AEDPA prevents defendants-and federal courts-from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). See also Cullen v. Pinholst...
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