Walker v. Sec'y
| Decision Date | 07 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:13-cv-3034-T-36JSS |
| Parties | ROMERIO LA'TEE WALKER, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Romerio La'Tee Walker, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Dkt. 1.) He also filed a memorandum of law with an appendix. (Dkts. 3, 4.) Walker challenges convictions entered by the Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, Florida. Respondent filed a response (Dkt. 27), in which it concedes the petition's timeliness. Petitioner filed a reply with an appendix. (Dkts. 31, 32.) Upon review, the petition must be denied.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Walker was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to sell (count one) and possession of drug paraphernalia (count two). (Dkt. 29, Ex. 1.) In August 2008, he entered a plea of no contest in exchange for a sentence of eight years in prison on count one, to be suspended on the condition that he complete ten years of probation. (Dkt. 29, Ex. 4.) He was sentenced to time served on count two. (Dkt. 29, Ex. 83, Vol. VII, p. 1183.) Walker voluntarily dismissed his direct appeal. (Dkt. 29, Ex. 18.) Walker's probation officer filed several affidavits alleging violations of probation. (Dkt. 29, Exs. 5, 7, 9, 10, 17.) At a June 2010 hearing, upon finding that Walker violated his probation, the court revoked probation and sentenced Walker to serve the eight year term that was previously suspended. (Dkt. 29, Ex. 31.) Walker appealed, but voluntarily dismissed his appeal. (Dkt. 29, Ex. 37.)
Walker filed numerous postconviction motions challenging his convictions and sentences. His pleadings included several motions for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and a motion to correct illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). (Dkt. 29, Exs. 43, 54, 69.) The state court summarily denied these motions. (Dkt. 29, Exs. 56, 67, 70, 72.) In a consolidated appeal, the state appellate court per curiam affirmed the orders of denial. (Dkt. 29, Ex. 88.)1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000). Habeas relief can only be granted if a petitioner is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d), which sets forth a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states:
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this deferential standard:
In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied-the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
"The focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Accord Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (). Thephrase "clearly established Federal law" encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.
The purpose of federal review is not to re-try the case. "The [AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Cone, 535 U.S. at 693. In other words, "AEDPA prevents defendants-and federal courts-from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) () (citations omitted).
The state appellate court affirmed the denial of Walker's postconviction motion in a per curiam decision without a written opinion. This decision warrants deference under Section 2254(d)(1) because "the summary nature of a state court's decision does not lessen the deference that it is due." Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 278 F.3d 1245 (2002), cert. denied sub nom. Wright v. Crosby, 538 U.S. 906 (2003). See also Richter, 562 U.S. at 99 ().
Review of the state court decision is limited to the record that was before the statecourt:
We now hold that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Section 2254(d)(1) refers, in the past tense, to a state-court adjudication that "resulted in" a decision that was contrary to, or "involved" an unreasonable application of, established law. This backward-looking language requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made. It follows that the record under review is limited to the record in existence at that same time, i.e., the record before the state court.
Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181-82. Walker bears the burden of overcoming by clear and convincing evidence a state court factual determination. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption of correctness applies to a finding of fact but not to a mixed determination of law and fact. Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 836 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1046 (2001).
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed under the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984):
The law regarding ineffective assistance of counsel claims is well settled and well documented. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims. According to Strickland, first, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052.
Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1305 (11th Cir. 1998). Demonstrating deficientperformance "requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Deficient performance is established if, "in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id. at 690. However, "counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. Additionally, "a court deciding an...
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