Walker v. Sliger

Citation405 S.W.2d 471,22 McCanless 657,218 Tenn. 657
Parties, 218 Tenn. 657 Cas WALKER, Plaintiff-in-Error, v. George C. SLIGER et al., Defendants-in-Error. Cas WALKER, Plaintiff-in-Error, v. Alex J. HARKNESS et al., Defendants-in-Error.
Decision Date12 July 1966
CourtSupreme Court of Tennessee

W. E. Badgett, Knoxville, for plaintiff in error.

S. Frank Fowler and Claude K. Robertson, Knoxville, Fowler, Rowntree & Fowler, and Earl S. Ailor, Knoxville, of counsel, for defendants in error.

OPINION

CHATTIN, Justice.

Since the appeals of the above styled actions present the same question, Counsel for the respective parties have agreed one opinion will suffice.

Defendants-in-error, George C. Sliger and Alex J. Harkness, were candidates in a primary election held in the City of Knoxville for the purpose of nominating candidates for the office of Councilman of the City on November 4, 1965. Sliger and Harkness were declared to be two of the candidates in a runoff election to be held on November 18, 1965.

As a result of the runoff election, both Sliger and Harkness were elected to the office of Councilman.

On November 22, 1965, plaintiff-in-error, Cas Walker, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, filed these separate actions in the Circuit Court for Knox County against the defendants, Sliger and Harkness. In each suit the Commissioners of Elections for Knox County were joined as parties defendant.

The petitions alleged that petitioner was a resident, citizen, taxpayer and duly registered voter of the City of Knoxville, and the suits were brought on his behalf and in behalf of all citizens similarly situated; and that Sliger and Harkness had disqualified themselves in both elections to assume and hold the office of Councilman by their failure to comply with the provisions of Section 30 of Chapter 498 of the Private Acts of 1911, namely: 'Be it further enacted, (t)hat every candidate for an elective office and every elected officer of the City of Knoxville shall, the day before the election and within three days after the election, file with the Recorder and publish at least once in a daily newspaper of daily circulation his sworn statement of all of his campaign and election expenses itemized, and by whom such funds were contributed; and any candidate for an elective office and any elective officer failing to comply with the requirements of this Act shall be disqualified from holding the office he seeks or has been elected to.'

The petition sought an adjudication and declaration of the Court that Sliger and Harkness had disqualified themselves to hold the office of Councilman because of their failure to comply with the above quoted Section of Chapter 498 of the Private Acts of 1911; that each be enjoined from receiving a certificate of election; that the Commissioners of Elections be enjoined and restrained from issuing to each of them a certificate of election; and that the election, insofar as Sliger and Harkness were concerned, be declared void.

All defendants filed demurrers to the petitions on the ground the petitions could not be maintained by a private citizen.

The trial judge sustained the demurrers and dismissed the petitions.

Petitioner has perfected appeals to this Court and assigned as error the action of the trial judge in sustaining the demurrers and dismissing the suits.

It is the insistence of petitioner the actions may be maintained by petitioner as a private citizen. He cites and relies upon Heiskell v. Lowe, 126 Tenn. 475, 153 S.W. 284 (1912); and Country Clubs, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, Tenn., 395 S.W.2d 789 (1965).

Petitioner argues the instant actions arise under Section 30 of Chapter 498 of the Private Acts of 1911; which, by its terms, applies only to the City of Knoxville; and, therefore, the case law of this State pertaining to elections under general state law is inapplicable.

It is true in the Heiskell case Lowe in his capacity as a resident, citizen, taxpayer and duly registered voter brought the suit against Heiskell to have the Court declare Heiskell had disqualified himself from holding the office of Mayor of Knoxville because he had not complied with Section 30 of Chapter 498 of the Private Acts of 1911.

Heiskell demurred to the petition on the grounds the petition presented neither an election contest nor a quo warranto proceeding and that Section 30 of Chapter 498 of the Private Acts of 1911 did not apply because that Section of the Act did not take effect until after Heiskell's election.

This Court held that since Section 30 of the Act, under the provisions of the Act, did not become effective until after Heiskell's election, the Section had no application and dismissed the suit on that ground. The Court apparently pretermitted the question raised by the first ground of the demurrer.

However, two members of the Court dissented to the majority opinion and stated in the course of the dissenting opinion:

'It is not controverted that this case presents an election contest, of which the circuit court of Knox county had jurisdiction, and which the petitioner, J. L. Lowe, as a citizen, voter, and taxpayer of the municipality of Knoxville, had the right to bring and maintain, provided his contention was supported by the facts, which are not controverted; the case being before us upon petition and demurrer, and sound in law. These propositions are abundantly established by the repeated decisions of this court.'

The petition in the case of Country Clubs, Inc. v. City of Knoxville was filed in the Chancery Court of Knox County by Country Clubs as a taxpayer and Carl E. Huskey as a citizen, resident, taxpayer and voter of the City of Knoxville and sought to have Leonard R. Rogers declared not to have qualified as the elected Mayor of the City of Knoxville because he had failed to comply with Section 92 of the Charter of that City.

Section 92 of the Charter of the City of Knoxville is identical to Section 30 of Chapter 498 of the Private Acts of 1911 above quoted.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the suit on the grounds the suit was in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding; and, not having been brought by the District Attorney or one authorized to do so in the name of the State of Tennessee, could not be maintained by the petitioners; and that the...

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6 cases
  • Handeland v. Brown
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • 27 Marzo 1974
  • State ex rel. Inman v. Brock
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Tennessee
    • 10 Abril 1981
    ...challenge the result of the election solely upon the grounds that he seeks to redress a public wrong. Thereafter, in Walker v. Sliger, 218 Tenn. 657, 405 S.W.2d 471 (1966) the court in reliance on Mr. Justice Neil's language in Skelton v. Barnett, supra, reaffirmed the principle that an ind......
  • Brackin v. Sumner County By and Through Sumner County Bd. of County Com'rs
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Tennessee
    • 8 Julio 1991
    ...no relief for himself cannot contest an election solely on the grounds he seeks to redress a public wrong. In Walker v. Sliger, 218 Tenn. 657, 405 S.W.2d 471, 474 (1966), the Court cited a number of cases to the effect that such a suit is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding and must ......
  • Hubbard v. Ammerman
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • 31 Octubre 1972
    ...contest on the pretext of "redressing a public wrong." See Butler v. Cumming, 86 S. W.2d 1090 (Tex.Civ.App., 1935) ; Walker v. Sliger, 218 Tenn. 657, 405 S.W.2d 471 (1966) ; McLavy v. Martin, 167 So. 2d 215 (La.App., 1964). The Texas Statute, Art. 13.30, provides only for contests by "any I......
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