Walker v. Spina
| Decision Date | 28 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV 17-0991 JB/SCY,CIV 17-0991 JB/SCY |
| Citation | 347 F.Supp.3d 868 |
| Parties | Shirley J. WALKER, Plaintiff, v. Gregory J. SPINA; Valley Express, Inc. and Dixon Insurance Company, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
Shavon M. Ayala, Ayala P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico and Anthony James Ayala, Law Offices of Anthony James Ayala, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorneys for the Plaintiff.
Raul Sedillo, Alison Beaulieu, Butt Thornton & Baehr PC, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorneys for the Defendants.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint for Personal Injuries and Damages, filed February 3, 2018 (Doc. 23)("Motion"). The Court held a hearing on June 20, 2018. The primary issue is whether Plaintiff Shirley Walker may sue Great West Casualty Company as an injurer's insurer under Raskob v. Sanchez, 1998-NMSC-045, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 394, 970 P.2d 580, 581-82 ("Raskob"), when the injurer is an out-of-state resident. The Court concludes that a Raskob action lies, even against an out-of-state resident, so long as: (i) the law mandates the insurance coverage; (ii) the law is meant to benefit the public; and (iii) the law does not express an intent to deny joinder. See Raskob, 1998-NMSC-045, ¶ 3, 126 N.M. 394, 970 P.2d at 581. Because both the New Mexico Financial Responsibility Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 66-5-201 to -239 ("NMFRA") and North Dakota law (i) mandate that the out-of-state resident have insurance coverage; (ii) were meant to benefit the public; and (iii) the laws do not express an intent to deny joinder, the Court concludes that a Raskob action lies. Accordingly, the Court grants the Motion, and Walker may amend her complaint to add Great West as a defendant.
The Court takes its facts from Walker's Complaint for Personal Injuries and Damages (First Judicial District Court, County of Santa Fe, State of New Mexico), filed December 23, 2016, filed in federal court September 29, 2017 (Doc. 1-1)("Complaint"). The Court provides these facts for background. It does not adopt them as the truth, and it recognizes that the facts are largely Walker's version of events.
On July 23, 2015, Defendant Gregory J. Spina was speeding on U.S. Highway 84/285 in a commercial vehicle that Defendant Valley Express, Inc. owned. See Complaint ¶¶ 6-7, at 2. As Spina approached a red light, he realized that he was going too fast to brake, so, instead of hitting the vehicles stopped side by side in front of him, he attempted to slip between them. See Complaint ¶ 7, at 2. Rather than avoiding the stopped vehicles, however, he sideswiped both of them, causing both cars to roll into the intersection. See Complaint ¶ 7, at 2-3. Walker was driving one of the sideswiped vehicles and, as a result of Spina's actions, suffered physical and emotional injuries. See Complaint ¶¶ 7, 11, at 2-4.
Walker sues Spina and Valley Express, asserting negligence,1 and sues Defendant Dixon Insurance Company, asserting that she has a claim for benefits against it under the NMFRA and Raskob for injuries that Spina's negligence caused. See Complaint ¶¶ 8-13, at 3-5. Spina and Valley Express removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico at 1, filed September 29, 2017 (Doc. 1)("Notice of Removal").2 Dixon Insurance has not yet been served with the Complaint. See Draft Transcript of Motion Proceedings at 6:1-2 (taken June 20, 2018)(Beaulieu)("Tr.").3
Walker moves to amend the Complaint so she can substitute Great West for Dixon Insurance. See Motion at 1. She argues that, based on recent disclosures from Spina and Valley Express, she learned that Great West and not Dixon Insurance issued the relevant insurance policy. See Motion ¶ 2, at 2. She argues, thus, that, under rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court should grant the amendment, because there is no evidence of "undue delay, bad faith, dilatory tactics," or prejudice to Spina and Valley Express. Motion ¶¶ 5-7, at 2-3.
Spina and Valley Express respond. See Defendants' Gregory J. Spina and Valley Express, Inc.'s Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend at 1, filed February 16, 2018 (Doc. 25)("Response"). They argue that the Court should not allow the amendment, because commercial motor carriers, such as Great West, are exempt from the NMFRA, so, according to Spina and Valley Express, there is no basis to hold Great West liable. See Response at 1-2. Spina and Valley Express contend that the NMFRA does not apply to Great West, because the NMFRA's purpose applies to New Mexico residents, which Spina, Valley Express, and Great West are not. See Response at 3. They also assert that the NMFRA does not apply to commercial motor vehicles, so the NMFRA would not apply here, because the car at issue is a commercial motor vehicle. See Response at 3-4 (citing N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-5-207(D) ). Finally, Spina and Valley Express argue that Raskob is inapplicable, because, according to them, the Supreme Court of New Mexico held there that an insurer could be held liable if they issued a policy in accordance with the NMFRA, but here, the policy was not issued in accordance with the NMFRA. See Response at 4.
Walker replies. See Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants Gregory J. Spina's and Valley Express, Inc.'s Response to Her Motion to Amend Her Complaint, filed February 20, 2018 (Doc. 26)("Reply"). She asserts that Raskob allows Great West's joinder, notwithstanding the NMFRA, because " ‘where the insurance coverage is mandated by law for the benefit of the public, generally the insurance company is a proper party.’ " Reply at 1-2 (quoting Raskob, 1998-NMSC-045, ¶ 3, 126 N.M. 394, 970 P.2d at 581 ). She argues that, because the rights of persons injured in automobile accidents are determined under the law where the accident happened, New Mexico law applies. See Reply at 2. Thus, according to Walker, "if insurance coverage for the Valley vehicle Spina was driving is mandated by law, benefits the public and no language of the law expresses an intent to deny joinder, Walker may join Great West as a defendant." Reply at 2. She concludes that, even if the NMFRA does not apply, North Dakota and federal law require insurance to cover the vehicle driven, so Raskob applies and Great West is a proper defendant. See Reply at 3.
The Court held a hearing. See Tr. at 1:5-6 (Court). Walker argued that Raskob is on all fours, so Great West's joinder is proper and the Court should grant leave to amend. See Tr. at 2:19-4:2 (Ayala). Spina and Valley Express countered that Raskob cannot cover this case, because Raskob analyzes the NMFRA, which, according to Spina and Valley Express, does not apply here, because the NMFRA targets New Mexico residents, whereas Spina and Valley Express are North Dakota residents. See Tr. at 6:13-17 (Beaulieu); id. at 11:11-13 (); id. at 15:17-16:16 (Beaulieu, Court). They also argue that Great West is not a proper party, because Walker is not in privity with Great West. See Tr. at 7:1-2 (Beaulieu). Spina and Valley Express conceded, however, that both New Mexico and North Dakota law mandate insurance coverage. See Tr. at 9:2-4 (Beaulieu, Court). The Court commented that Raskob appears to be saying that, "if the insurance coverage is mandated, then the insurance company is a proper party." Tr. at 9:19-21 (Court). The Court noted that there might be good reasons to create exceptions to the Raskob rule, but that the Supreme Court of New Mexico, not a federal court sitting in diversity, ought to address those reasons in the first instance. See Tr. at 10:18-21 (Court).
Spina and Valley Express contended that, should the Court allow the amendment, it would request a bifurcation, separating Great West from the rest of the matter, because there is not a direct cause of action. See Tr. at 12:24-13:4 (Beaulieu). Should the Court determine that there is a direct cause of action here, Spina and Valley Express argued that a bifurcation would still be proper, because they would be prejudiced. See Tr. at 13:11-19 (Beaulieu). Walker agreed that there should be bifurcation. See Tr. at 14:4-7 (Ayala).
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "The nature of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint after taking those allegations as true." Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994). The Complaint's sufficiency is a question of law, and, when considering a rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint, view those allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007) (); Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009) ()(citing Moore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036, 1039 (10th Cir. 2006) ).
A complaint need not make detailed factual allegations, yet a "pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" is...
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