Walker v. St. Anthony's Medical Center

• Decision Date: 04 August 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-2143,88-2143
• Citation: 881 F.2d 554
• Parties: 50 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 845, 51 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,231, 58 USLW 2162 Rose M. WALKER, Appellant, v. ST. ANTHONY'S MEDICAL CENTER, a not-for-profit corporation, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 554

881 F.2d 554

50 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 845,

51 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,231, 58 USLW 2162

Rose M. WALKER, Appellant, v. ST. ANTHONY'S MEDICAL CENTER, a not-for-profit corporation, Appellee.

No. 88-2143.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted April 13, 1989.

Decided Aug. 4, 1989.

Todd J. Aschbacher, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.

Gerald Tockman, St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.

Before BOWMAN and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges, and HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

Rose M. Walker appeals from an adverse judgment in this employment discrimination action commenced by Walker under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 621 et seq. Walker alleged that she was discharged from her employment at St. Anthony's Medical Center because of her age and sex. ¹ A jury found that she had not proved her age discrimination claim, and the district court ² ruled against her in the sex discrimination portion of the case. For reversal, Walker argues that (1) the district court erred in concluding that the statute of limitations on her Title VII claim was not equitably tolled; (2) the district court's finding against her on the merits of her sex discrimination claim is clearly erroneous; and (3) the district court erred in refusing to submit certain proposed instructions in the age discrimination portion of the case. We affirm.

Walker is a registered nurse with a bachelor of science degree and a master's degree in business administration. In 1975 she was hired by St. Anthony's where she occupied various positions. In July of 1984, at the time of her discharge, Walker served as Coordinator of Nursing for Anthony House, a skilled nursing facility at St. Anthony's specializing in geriatric rehabilitation. Walker had served in this position since 1979. She was fifty-one years old at the time of her discharge. Walker was told that her discharge had nothing to do with her performance, but that her position was being eliminated for budgetary reasons.

Apparently Walker's responsibilities, at least initially, were assumed by Shirley Herr, the Administrator of Anthony House and Walker's former supervisor. Herr is approximately ten years younger than Walker. Herr resigned from Anthony House in the summer of 1985. Although the record is in dispute on this point, it appears that Michael Hartigan, Head Nurse under Walker, also assumed some of Walker's duties. Hartigan was promoted to a newly-created position, Director of Nursing for Anthony House, after Herr's resignation. Walker alleges that this position is substantially the same as that which she formerly occupied.

Walker contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) immediately after her discharge and was advised that she did not have a claim unless and until her former position was filled. Walker did not discover that Hartigan had been promoted to the Director of Nursing position until July, 1985 when she read about his promotion in a hospital newsletter. Thereafter, Walker notified the EEOC, and on October 21, 1985 filed charges of age and sex discrimination with the Commission. In response, St. Anthony's filed a motion to dismiss in which it raised a statute of limitations defense on the ground that the charges were not filed within 180 days from the date of Walker's discharge. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(d)(1) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e) (Title VII). Walker responded by asserting that the 180-day period for filing charges with the EEOC should be equitably tolled until July, 1985, the publication date of the hospital newsletter, because prior thereto St. Anthony's had deliberately concealed the fact that Hartigan had filled Walker's former position. ³ The jury agreed with Walker and found that the filing requirement had been tolled on her ADEA claim; the district court, however, rejected this finding and held that Walker's Title VII claim was not timely filed. As indicated, the jury returned a verdict in favor of St. Anthony's on the merits of the age discrimination claim. The district court proceeded to consider the merits of the sex di crimination claim, and held for St. Anthony's. This appeal followed.

As mentioned, Walker first argues that the district court erred by refusing in the sex discrimination portion of the case to give reference to the jury's finding of equitable tolling. Specifically, Walker insists that the jury's view of the evidence governed the district court in its determination of the factual issues common to both claims, and that the court's refusal to give preclusive effect to the jury's finding of equitable tolling was clearly erroneous.

As a general rule, a charge of discrimination brought under Title VII or the ADEA must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days from the date of the alleged unlawful employment practice. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(d)(1); 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e); Cobb v. Stringer, 850 F.2d 356, 358 (8th Cir.1988). Compliance with this time requirement is ordinarily a prerequisite to the maintenance of a civil employment discrimination action in federal court. Cobb, 850 F.2d at 358. However, the timely filing of a charge with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional requirement and is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1132, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982); DeBrunner v. Midway Equip. Co., 803 F.2d 950, 952 (8th Cir.1986); Kriegesmann v. Barry-Wehmiller Co., 739 F.2d 357, 360 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036, 105 S.Ct. 512, 83 L.Ed.2d 402 (1984). In this circuit, the time limitations contained in Title VII and the ADEA

will not be tolled on the basis of equitable estoppel unless the employee's failure to file in a timely fashion is the consequence either of a deliberate design by the employer or of actions that the employer should unmistakably have understood would cause the employee to delay filing his charge.

Kriegesmann, 739 F.2d at 358-59 (quoting Price v. Litton Business Sys., Inc., 694 F.2d 963, 965 (4th Cir.1982)).

In the ADEA portion of the case at hand, the jury answered in the affirmative interrogatories asking (1) whether St. Anthony's had "engaged in conduct which equitably tolled the time in which plaintiff could file her claim"; and (2) therefore, whether Walker "filed her charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the date that she gained actual knowledge of the facts which would support her charge of discrimination." The district court acknowledged that the jury's finding of equitable tolling was entitled to "great deference," but refused in the sex discrimination portion of the case to abide by the jury's determination because of the court's finding "that [Walker] failed to establish ... that the Title VII 180-day statute of limitations was equitably tolled by defendant's conduct." In particular, the court concluded that Walker "failed to establish that [St. Anthony's] unmistakably should have understood that its conduct after [Walker's] termination would cause [Walker] to be deprived of facts which would support a charge of discrimination."

Although the parties argue at length anent the propriety of the district court's refusal to apply the jury's finding of equitable tolling, we find it unnecessary to pass upon this issue. The district court reached the merits of Walker's sex discrimination claim and we believe that the court properly granted judgment in favor of St. Anthony's. In light of the fact that, as discussed infra, we affirm the district court's decision on the merits, we need not decide whether Walker's sex discrimination claim was time-barred or whether the facts required that the claim be equitably tolled. See Boddy v. Dean, 821 F.2d 346, 350 (6th Cir.1987) (appellate court declined to address issue of equitable tolling in sex discrimination case where district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant); see also Hutchinson Utils. Comm'n v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 775 F.2d 231, 238 (8th Cir.1985) (it is established appellate procedure to refrain from addressing questions unnecessary to decision on appeal).

In ruling upon the merits of Walker's gender discrimination claim, the district court employed the traditional Title VII order and allocation of proof. Under this analysis, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged conduct. If the employer satisfies this burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's stated justification is merely a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Griffin v. City of Omaha, 785 F.2d 620, 625 (8th Cir.1986).

Relying upon this court's decision in LeGrand v. Trustees of Univ. of Arkansas, 821 F.2d 478, 480 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1592, 99 L.Ed.2d 907 (1988), the district court required Walker to establish the following elements in satisfaction of her burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination: (1) that she was a member of a protected group; (2) that she was qualified for her position and satisfied its normal requirements; (3) that she was discharged; and (4) that after her discharge, St. Anthony's replaced her with, or assigned her duties to, a person outside the protected group. The district court concluded that Walker failed to establish a prima facie case because she "was replaced by, or almost all of her job duties were assigned to, Ms. Herr, a female." In addition, the district court held that St. Anthony's had "established a legitimate reason for terminating [Walker]: it decided to eliminate [her] position because the responsibilities of Ms. Herr's job could be...