Walker v. State

• Decision Date: 06 December 1977
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 168
• Citation: 356 So.2d 674
• Parties: Claudia Mae WALKER v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 674

356 So.2d 674

Claudia Mae WALKER v. STATE.

6 Div. 168.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Dec. 6, 1977.

After Remandment from Supreme Court of Alabama.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 24, 1978.

George W. Nichols, Jr., and Sam L. Webb, Jr., of Callahan & Nichols, Tuscaloosa, for appellant.

William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen. and Ellis D. Hanan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BOWEN, Judge.

In an opinion written by the Honorable Bowen W. Simmons, a retired circuit judge, this court affirmed the conviction of the appellant for the illegal possession of heroin. (Ms. January 4, 1977). The Supreme Court of Alabama, in an opinion issued September 23, 1977, reversed this court and remanded the cause to us on that portion of the opinion which held that knowledge is not an essential element of the offense of possession. (See the extended opinion on rehearing issued February 1, 1977). In reversing, the Supreme Court specifically held that knowledge is an essential element of the offense of illegal possession of a controlled substance under the Alabama Controlled Substance Act. Ex parte Walker, Ala., 356 So.2d 672.

From our review of the evidence and the instructions given by the trial judge, this case is still due to be affirmed. Our extended opinion exerted no influence upon the findings of fact by the jury or upon the application of the proper law by the trial judge.

While in a prosecution for the possession of illegal drugs there must be evidence from which the jury may conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew of the presence of the drugs, such guilty knowledge may be established by circumstantial evidence. Parks v. State, 46 Ala.App. 722, 248 So.2d 761 (1971); Knox v. State, 50 Ala.App. 494, 280 So.2d 200 (1973); Daniels v. State, 49 Ala.App. 654, 275 So.2d 169 (1973); Fields v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 333 So.2d 861 (1976); New v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 337 So.2d 1355 (1976).

The evidence clearly shows that the appellant was in actual possession of a package containing heroin. The only disputed fact is whether or not she knew that the sealed package did contain heroin.

The fact that the accused is named as the addressee of a parcel containing a controlled substance is insufficient to show that his possession and control was accomplished by knowledge on his part that the parcel contained narcotics. Rutskin v. State, Fla.App., 260 So.2d 525 (1972); People v. Ackerman, 2 Ill.App.3d 903, 274 N.E.2d 125 (1971). "The fact that he happened to be the addressee of the parcel obviously does not supply the evidence that he knew that the parcel contained marijuana or any other contraband. If this were not so, any innocent person could be convicted of possession of marijuana just because he happens to be the recipient of a package containing marijuana." Rutskin, at 260 So.2d 526.

Likewise the fact that the accused picked up a parcel for the addressee is insufficient to show that the accused had knowledge of the illegal contents of the package. See Schaufele v. State, Fla.App., 269 So.2d 400 (1972), where the evidence showed that the accused claimed to be the addressee but when asked to produce identification stated that the addressee had lived with him. He then produced his correct identification and signed the receipt with his proper name. It was held that this was insufficient to show his knowledge that the package contained a narcotic drug.

Because the element of knowledge is seldom susceptible to direct proof, it may be proved by evidence of acts or conduct of the accused from which it may fairly be inferred that he knew of the existence of the narcotics at the place where they were found. See authorities cited at 28 C.J.S.Supp. Drugs & Narcotics § 204, p. 300, fn. 87.

"The requisite knowledge may also be proved by the physical appearance of the accused, and his declarations, or admissions, and contradictory statements, and explanations made by him."

28 C.J.S.Supp. § 204.

Although the mere fact that the accused received a package addressed to him, or another, in the course of normal mail or parcel delivery does not, standing alone, suffice to show knowledge of any contraband contained in the package, the fact of receipt when coupled with additional facts and factors may produce circumstances from which it may be fairly inferred that the requisite knowledge was present. The inference may arise where there is an attempt by the addressee to secrete the package after accepting delivery, State v. Doerge, 11 Or.App. 602, 504 P.2d 766 (1972), or that a note to the addressee found inside the package indicated that code words should be used in future conversations and in the billfold of the addressee was found a card bearing the name and address of the sender, State v. Collins, 186 Neb. 50, 180 N.W.2d 687 (1970).

Puckett v. State, Ind.App., 322 N.E.2d 716 (1975), involved a prosecution for the possession of marijuana wherein the defendant contended that he had been asked by a friend to accept a trunk for a man named Bruce Street who would be in the area soon and claim the trunk. The reviewing court found that the defendant's knowledge of the contents of the trunk, in which marijuana was found, was warranted by the defendant's misrepresentation that his name was Bruce Street, his signing such name...