Walker v. State

• Decision Date: 27 February 2004
• Citation: 895 So.2d 366
• Parties: Eddrett Demond WALKER v. STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

895 So.2d 366

Eddrett Demond WALKER v. STATE of Alabama.

CR-02-0949.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

February 27, 2004.

Rehearing Denied April 23, 2004.

Certiorari Denied August 13, 2004

Shane Cooper, Atmore, for appellant.

Troy King and William H. Pryor, Jr., attys. gen., and Beth Slate Poe, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

Alabama Supreme Court 1031233.

SHAW, Judge.

The appellant, Eddrett Demond Walker, pleaded guilty to the unlawful possession of cocaine, a violation of § 13A-12-212(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975. He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. Before pleading guilty, Walker expressly reserved the right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence of the cocaine found in a motel room.

At the suppression hearing, Chris Murray, a sergeant with the Auburn Police Department, testified that in September 2001, pursuant to numerous complaints regarding the sale of cocaine, he and several other officers began a surveillance operation around the Plaza Motel. Sgt. Murray said that on September 7, 2001, he sent a confidential informant to the motel to purchase cocaine. Sgt. Murray testified that before the purchase he searched the informant and determined that the informant did not have any money or drugs on his person. He then gave the informant a $20 bill which had been photocopied to record the serial numbers and put a body transmitter on the informant. The informant then went to the motel to make the purchase, while Sgt. Murray and the other officers hid in the woods near the motel. Sgt. Murray testified that over the body transmitter the informant indicated that he had met with a person he knew only as "Ed" and that he and "Ed" had entered room 24 of the motel, where other people were already present. (R. 10.) After the informant entered room 24, Sgt. Murray said, he heard over the body transmitter what sounded like "a drug transaction." (R. 11.) Sgt. Murray testified that the informant stayed in the motel room for approximately two minutes, and then returned to a prearranged meeting location, where he gave the officers a rock-like substance that was later determined to be crack cocaine.

Sgt. Murray testified that after the purchase two of the officers at the scene indicated that they had seen the man whom the informant had met near the motel, i.e., "Ed," and had recognized him as Walker. They then checked to see if Walker had any outstanding arrest warrants and learned that he had two outstanding warrants from Auburn Municipal Court.¹ After they observed Walker leave room 24 of the motel and enter room 20 of the motel, they decided to take Walker into custody on the outstanding warrants. Sgt. Murray testified that he and the other officers went to room 20 of the motel, knocked on the door and announced "police, open the door," several times, but received no response.² (R. 20.) They then kicked in the door and entered room 20, where they found Walker sitting in a chair, wearing earphones and listening to music. Walker was arrested and searched, and the $20 bill the informant had used to purchase the cocaine was found on Walker's person. In addition, cocaine and other drug paraphernalia were found in the room.³

Walker contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence of the cocaine found in the motel room because, he says, the officers failed to comply with the "knock-and-announce" statute before they entered the motel room. Specifically, he argues that although the officers knocked and identified themselves as police officers, they failed to announce their purpose before entering the room, i.e., that they were there to arrest Walker on two outstanding warrants.

Initially, we note that we apply a de novo standard of review in this case because the evidence presented at the suppression hearing was undisputed. See State v. Hill, 690 So.2d 1201 (Ala.1996), and Barnes v. State, 704 So.2d 487 (Ala.Crim.App.1997).

Section 15-10-3, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in relevant part:

"(a) An officer may arrest a person without a warrant, on any day and at any time in any of the following instances:

"....

"(6) When the officer has actual knowledge that a warrant for the person's arrest for the commission of a felony or misdemeanor has been issued, provided the warrant was issued in accordance with this chapter. However, upon request the officer shall show the warrant to the arrested person as soon as possible. If the officer does not have the warrant in his or her possession at the time of arrest the officer shall inform the defendant of the offense charged and of the fact that a warrant has been issued."

Section 15-10-4, Ala.Code 1975,⁴ provides:

"When arresting a person without a warrant, the officer must inform of his authority and the cause of the arrest, except when the person is arrested in the actual commission of a public offense or on pursuit. In making a warrantless arrest, an officer has authority to break open an outer or inner door or window of a dwelling house if, after notice of his office and purpose, he is refused admittance."

(Emphasis added.)

As Walker correctly asserts, and as the record indicates, although the officers knocked and announced their identity, they failed to announce their purpose before entering the motel room. However, we hold, based on the circumstances of this case, that the officers' failure to announce their purpose before entering the room did not violate § 15-10-4 and does not require reversal.

As a threshold matter, we hold that the Legislature intended for § 15-10-4 to codify the general knock-and-announce principle and its recognized common-law exceptions. In Weaver v. Hollis, 247 Ala. 57, 22 So.2d 525 (1945), the Alabama Supreme Court held that § 12, Title 16, Code of Alabama 1940, which on its face contained no exceptions to a husband's right to inherit from his deceased wife, who died intestate, had to be read in light of the common-law rule that a man who feloniously killed his wife could not share in her estate. Recognizing that the Legislature had incorporated the common-law exception, the Court noted:

"Alabama is a common-law state, — section 3, Title 1, Code of 1940 [now § 1-3-1, Ala.Code 1975]. The common law is the base upon which all of the laws of this State have been constructed, and when our courts are called upon to construe a statute, — when they are called upon to ascertain and declare the legal effect and meaning of a legislative enactment, — they must read the statute in the light of the common law. Cloverdale Homes v. Town of Cloverdale, 182 Ala. 419, 62 So. 712, 47 L.R.A., N.S., 607 [(1913), overruled on other grounds, City of Orange Beach v. Benjamin, 821 So.2d 193 (Ala.2001)]. `The presumption is that the legislature does not intend to make any alteration in the law beyond what it explicitly declares, either in express terms or by unmistakable implication, and that it does not intend to overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from a general system of law without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness.' Duncan v. Rudulph, 245 Ala. 175, 16 So.2d 313, 314 [(1943)].

"....

"... [W]e are not grafting an exception onto the statute by construction, but are construing the statute according to the obvious intent of the Legislature, who, we know, never intended that a husband who feloniously killed his wife should inherit a part of her separate estate."

247 Ala. at 60-61, 22 So.2d at 528-29.

The exceptions to the knock-and-announce principle are so deeply rooted in the common law and so grounded in common sense and logic that we cannot, as Walker suggests, disregard the obvious latent ambiguity resulting from the omission in the statute to any reference to them. Therefore, we read § 15-10-4 as an affirmation of the common-law knock-and-announce principle. In doing so, we find support in caselaw from both the Alabama Supreme Court and this Court. We see no reason to distinguish our reasoning here from that used by the Supreme Court in Daniels v. State, 391 So.2d 1021 (Ala.1980). In Daniels, the Court, construing the knock-and-announce requirement of § 15-5-9, Ala.Code 1975,⁵ stated:

"The constitutional requirement of announcement serves basically three purposes: (1) the prevention of violence or physical injury to the police and to innocent persons who may also be present on the premises, (2) avoidance of unexpected exposure of the occupant's private activities, and (3) prevention of property damage resulting from a forced entry. 1 W. Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 6.3 (2d ed.1979); 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.8 (1978). Yet, at the same time, there exists the countervailing concern to preserve surprise, and thereby prevent escape and the possible destruction of evidence. As a result, both state and federal courts have held that the exigencies of any given situation must be considered in balancing the individual's right to privacy and the public's corresponding interest in the prevention of crime and apprehension of criminals. 68 Am.Jur.2d Searches and Seizures § 91 (1973). In executing a search warrant, circumstances may exist which justify an unannounced and immediate entry. See e.g., United States v. Singleton, 439 F.2d 381 (3rd Cir.1971); United States v. Garcia, 437 F.2d 85 (5th Cir.1971); Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923 (9th Cir.1966); see generally Annot., 21 A.L.R.Fed. 820 (1974). Likewise, exigencies may justify a forcible entry after waiting only a brief time after announcement. See e.g., United States v. Allende, 486 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir.1973); United States v. Cruz, 265 F.Supp. 15 (W.D.Tex.1967); United States v. Poppit[t], 227 F.Supp. 73 (D.Del.1964). Therefore, what constitutes a sufficient compliance with the announcement statute is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances confronting the executing officer. Laffitte v. State, 370 So.2d 1108 (Ala.Cr.App

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