Walker v. State
| Decision Date | 22 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 4946.,4946. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Joseph WALKER, Respondent, v. STATE of South Carolina, Petitioner. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Mary S. Williams, and Robert D. Corney, all of Columbia, for Petitioner.
Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of Columbia, for Respondent.
This is a post-conviction relief (PCR) action arising out of Joseph Walker's convictions for kidnapping and first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The circuit court granted Walker's PCR application based on trial counsel's failure to investigate a potential alibi witness and the cumulative prejudicial effect of three other alleged instances of deficient performance. We agree with the PCR court that trial counsel's performance regarding the alibi witness was deficient under the Sixth Amendment. However, we find the witness's testimony presented at the PCR hearing did not meet the legal definition of an alibi, and thus Walker failed to prove prejudice. We also find the PCR court erred in granting relief based on the cumulative effect of counsel's deficient performance. We reverse.
The victim testified that on March 2, 2002, she sought a man's help in fixing her broken-down car at a BP gas station in Denmark, South Carolina. The man fixed her car with a wire he purchased nearby for $30. The victim did not have enough money with her, so she told the man to follow her home so she could pay him. She said the man came into her house uninvited, blindfolded her, drove her to his house, and raped her throughout the night. Early the next morning the man blindfolded her again, drove her home, and threatened to kill her if she told anyone. The victim testified that a few hours after she got home, she drank a rum and coke to calm her nerves.
The victim identified a man in the surveillance videotape from the BP station as her assailant. The BP store manager then identified the man as Joseph Walker. Prior to this incident, the victim had never met Walker or been to his house. However, the police were able to match precisely the detailed descriptions the victim gave of her assailant's truck and house with Walker's truck and house. Walker was arrested on March 22, 2002, twenty days after the alleged crime. He submitted to a video interview with the police in which he claimed he was with his girlfriend, Robina Reed, on the night of the crime. Walker was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and kidnapping. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of twenty-four years in prison. This court affirmed the convictions and sentences. State v. Walker, Op. No. 2004–UP–618 (S.C. Ct.App. filed Dec. 9, 2004).
In January 2005, Walker filed a PCR application alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Walker argued trial counsel was ineffective because she did not (1) investigate Reed as an alibi witness, (2) ask for a continuance to await the written results of a DNA test, (3) cross-examine the victim about her alcohol use, and (4) cross-examine the victim and call other witnesses about the victim's conflicting statements as to the time of the incident.
Trial counsel testified at the PCR hearing that she watched the DVD of Walker's interview. In the interview, Walker referred to Reed numerous times and claimed he could not have committed the crimes because he spent the night with her on March 2, 2002. Specifically, Walker admitted he was at the BP station on March 2, but denied helping the victim fix her car. He said he left the BP station and went to see Reed at Hardee's, where she worked as a manager. Walker said he then stayed at a friend's house until about 10:00 p.m., when he drove to Reed's house to spend the night.
Despite watching the DVD of the interview, trial counsel did not investigate Reed as a potential witness. At the PCR hearing, she claimed she thought her investigator was following up on Reed. Walker testified he told the investigator about Reed, and the investigator wrote Reed's name in the case file. Trial counsel said she did not know what, if anything, her investigator did to investigate Reed. She also testified she “was not aware of any claim that [Walker] was with anyone on” the night of the crime. The PCR court summed up trial counsel's knowledge of Reed as a potential alibi witness in the following question:
The court: So, there is an interview tape of the defendant that says he was with ... Ms. Reed on the night of the incident. That name appears in the file, but we don't know what was done as far as finding out what Ms. Reed would or would not have said; is that correct?
[Trial counsel]: Yes, your honor.
Reed testified at the PCR hearing that Walker was her boyfriend on March 2, 2002. She said Walker had a key to her house and spent most weekend nights with her. When asked if she and Walker spent the night together on March 2, 2002, Reed answered: “I guess I did.” The judge asked Reed: “You're telling me that you spent—[Walker] was staying with you that first weekend in March of 2002.” Reed answered “Yes.” On cross-examination, however, she changed her answer as follows:
The Witness: I know we spent a lot of days together. I can't tell you no particular day.
As to Reed's testimony, the PCR court found:
[Walker] and Reed had an intimate relationship that was ongoing at the time of the alleged incident.... [Reed] further testified that [Walker] was usually with her during the time frame of [the] incident. [Walker] testified that he had been spending many nights, and most, if not all, weekends with Reed prior to, and including, the date of the alleged incident.... While Reed's memory of specific dates is not perfect since it has been approximately five years since the incident, and approximately four years since the trial, her testimony corroborated that of [Walker].
... [T]he Court finds that the testimony of Reed at the PCR hearing was credible.
The jury would have weighed the credibility of the testimony of the witness, and it is reasonable to assume that the outcome of the deliberations may have been different had this witness testified in light of the facts of this case.
The PCR court granted Walker's application on two grounds. First, the court found the failure to investigate the alibi witness was deficient and prejudiced the defense. Second, the court found Walker
independently established a second ground for prejudice with the cumulative effect of Trial Counsel's error in her failure to investigate [the victim's] alcohol use, her failure to move to continue the hearing to await the written results of the forensic testing, her failure to cross-examine the witnesses as to the discrepancy of the conflicting times of the incident, and her failure to investigate or interview Reed, the combination of which prejudiced [Walker].
The judge explained that, standing alone, none of the first three instances of deficient performance established prejudice, but when they were added together with the failure to investigate Reed as an alibi witness, “[these] failures cumulatively prejudiced” Walker. The State appeals both grounds upon which the PCR judge granted the application.1
To obtain post-conviction relief based on the alleged denial of effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, the applicant must satisfy the two-prong test set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First, the applicant must show that trial counsel's performance was deficient based on a standard of “ ‘reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’ ” Edwards v. State, 392 S.C. 449, 456, 710 S.E.2d 60, 64 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Second, the applicant “must demonstrate that this deficiency prejudiced him to the point that he was deprived of a fair trial whose result is reliable.” Id. To satisfy this second prong, the applicant “must demonstrate that his attorney's errors had an effect on the judgment against him.” 392 S.C. at 458–59, 710 S.E.2d at 65. An error will be found to affect the judgment if the applicant proves “ ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” 392 S.C. at 459, 710 S.E.2d at 66 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). “In other words, [the applicant] must show that ‘the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.’ ” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052).
An appellate court must affirm the factual findings of the PCR court if they are...
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