Walker v. the City of Springfield.
| Decision Date | 31 January 1880 |
| Citation | 1880 WL 9956,94 Ill. 364 |
| Parties | EDWIN S. WALKERv.THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the Third District.
This was an action by the City of Springfield against Edwin S. Walker, in the Sangamon circuit court, to recover a penalty for the violation of an ordinance of the city.
Messrs. STUART, EDWARDS & BROWN, for the appellant:
By sec. 30, ch. 73, R. S. 1874, p. 603, every agent of foreign insurance companies is required to report to the proper officer of the county, town, etc., in which the agency is established, in the month of May, annually, the amount of net receipts of such agency, which shall be entered on the tax books and be subject to the same rate of taxation for all purposes as other property; said tax to be in lieu of all town and municipal licenses.
But the section has this proviso: “That the provisions of this section shall not be construed to prohibit cities having an organized fire department from levying a tax or license fee not exceeding two per cent in accordance with their respective charters, on said gross receipts, to be applied exclusively to the support of the fire department of such city.”
By this section the company pays on its property as other property owners, and if the ordinance is valid a further sum of two per cent on the same property can be exacted, and thus double taxation is enforced.
The phrase, “said gross receipts,” as applied to receipts, in the section, is repugnant to the previous phraseology, “amount of the net receipts,” etc. Whether, however, the tax is upon the net or gross receipts, it is to be on said receipts, and is to be on the amount reported in the month of May. The ordinance requires two returns to be made, viz: in January and July, and the penalty is for not making the returns on those days. The proviso does not authorize the cities to require returns on any other day than in May.
It was decided, in Van Inwagen v. Chicago, 61 Ill. 31, that the provisions as to the time of return and the differences as to gross and net returns, make the repugnancy. Section 30 operates to repeal the express provision in the charter of the city of Chicago.
The power to impose this tax or license fee is not conferred by the proviso, because it is unconstitutional. The constitution authorizes the taxation of insurance business, but this can only be done by a general law uniform as to the class on which it operates. Mr. CHARLES P. KANE, and Mr. ROBERT HAZLETT, for the appellee:
If the authority to pass the ordinance is clear, considerations of equity will not justify the court in declaring it void from the fact that State and municipal authorities may have the additional right to tax the net receipts of the same agencies for other purposes. Peoria v. Calhoun, 29 Ill. 317; 1 Dill. Mun. Cor. sec. 262.
Section 1, article 9 of the constitution of 1870, has no reference to taxation by cities, etc., for municipal purposes, but is intended to govern the taxing power of the State for State purposes. The license fee, imposed by the ordinance, is not the imposition of a tax.
This record presents the single question, whether an ordinance of the city imposing a license or tax of two per cent on the premiums received, or contracted to be received, on all foreign insurance companies doing business in the city, is valid, and legally authorized. The charter is special, and contains this provision:
“The city council shall have power, within the jurisdiction of the city, by ordinance, to license, tax and regulate merchants, commission merchants, inn keepers, bankers, money brokers, insurance brokers, and auctioneers,” etc. Also, by section 5 of the amendment to the charter of 1859 it is provided: “That in addition to the powers conferred by the charter of said city the city council shall have power, within the jurisdiction of said city, by ordinance, first, to regulate agencies of all insurance companies, and to license, tax and regulate agents of all such insurance companies doing business in said city,” etc. Private Laws p. 269.
The ordinance adopted under these provisions, of which complaint is made, provides that all corporations, companies or associations not incorporated under the laws of this State, engaged in the city in effecting life or fire insurance, shall pay to the city treasurer the sum of $2 upon the $100, and at that rate upon the amount of all premiums during the half year ending on the first days of January and July, which shall be received or agreed to be paid for insurance effected in the city, which rates, when collected, shall be set apart for the support and maintenance of the fire department of the city; that every acting agent of such incorporations, etc., shall, on or before the 15th day of February, 1875, and on the 15th days of January and July thereafter, render to the city comptroller a full, true and just account, verified by his oath, of all premiums which, during the half year ending on such days preceding such report, shall have been received for premiums, or which have been agreed to be paid for or on behalf of such corporation, etc. And such agent shall pay to the city treasurer the amount with which such company shall be so chargeable under the ordinance; and if such agent shall fail, as required by the ordinance, to make such report, or, if the sum shall remain unpaid after the date it is required to be paid, the agent is rendered liable to a penalty of $200, which may be enforced by fine or imprisonment, by suit, etc.
A suit was brought before a justice of the peace against appellant, to recover the penalty for refusing to make the report and pay the percentage on policies, as required by the ordinance. The justice of the peace rendered a judgment in favor of the city for $200 and costs. Defendant perfected an appeal to the circuit court, where, on a trial de novo, a like judgment was rendered. Defendant appealed from that judgment to the Appellate Court, where the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed, and the case comes to this court on appeal, by a certificate under the statute by a majority of the judges of that court, and a reversal is asked.
It is urged that the 30th section of chapter 73, Rev. Stat. 1874, controls this power of charging a license fee to foreign insurance companies; that it is repugnant to and repeals the provisions of the charter authorizing a tax or fee for a license. It provides that their net income shall be returned to the assessor for general taxation, and at the same rate as other property, and to be in lieu of all town and municipal licenses; and it repeals all laws inconsistent therewith. But it contains this proviso:
“That the provisions of this section shall not be construed to prohibit cities having an organized fire department from levying a tax or license fee, not exceeding two per cent, in accordance with the provisions of their respective charters, on said gross receipts, to be applied exclusively to the support of the fire department of such city.”
Independent of this provision of the Insurance law, there would be no limit to the power of the city to impose fees for a license on insurance companies, unless it might be the ordinance imposing the same should be reasonable, but that question is not before us for discussion. But this section operates as a limitation on the power of the city to impose more than two per cent on the receipts of their agents.
It is urged that as this section requires all such companies to make a net return of their receipts for taxation, in the same manner and at the same rate that other personal property is subject, that if this two per cent is allowed to be collected it would be double taxation. We fail to see that such is the fact. A person who for a large sum procures a license to sell liquors, and also pays a tax on his stock of liquors and furniture, is not doubly taxed. He pays for the privilege of carrying on his business, and then pays a tax on his property. So of a person keeping a billiard saloon, an auctioneer, a peddler, and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Watson
...Inst. v. Massachusetts. Id. 611; Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts, Id. 632. [O2] Erie R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 21 Wall. 492. See Walker v. Springfield, 94 Ill. 364; People Naglee, 1 Cal. 232; Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta, 93 U.S. 116. [P2] Singer Manuf'g Co. v. Graham, 8 Or. 17. [Q2] West U. Tel. C......
-
Hanover Fire Ins Co v. Carr Harding
...The Supreme Court of Illinois for many years held the payment of a tax on the net receipts was a tax on personal property. Walker v. Springfield, 94 Ill. 364; City of Chicago v. James, 114 Ill. 479, 2 N. E. 475; 264 Ill. 11, 105 N. E. 704, decided in 1914, the 276, 18 N. E. 668; National Fi......
-
Bacon v. Ranson
...Aulanier v. Governor, 1 Tex. 655; Tex. Bank. Ins. Co. v. State, 42 Tex. 636; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. E. St. Louis, 102 Ill. 560; Walker v. Springfield, 94 Ill. 364; Ex Parte Robinson, 12 Nev. 263; Gatlin v. Tarboro, 78 N.C. 119; Boye v. Giradly, 28 La. Ann. 717; Walters v. Duke, 31 La. Ann. 66......
-
Bacon v. Ranson
...Aulanier v. Governor, 1 Tex. 655; Tex. Bank. Ins. Co. v. State, 42 Tex. 636; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. E. St. Louis, 102 Ill. 560; Walker v. Springfield, 94 Ill. 364; Ex Robinson, 12 Nev. 263; Gatlin v. Tarboro, 78 N.C. 119; Boye v. Giradly, 28 La. Ann. 717; Walters v. Duke, 31 La. Ann. 668; W. ......