Walker v. Thielen Motors, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-5593,89-5593
• Citation: 916 F.2d 450
• Parties: Winnie H. WALKER, Appellant, v. THIELEN MOTORS, INCORPORATED, Ted Thielen, individually, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 450

916 F.2d 450

17 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1177

Winnie H. WALKER, Appellant, v. THIELEN MOTORS, INCORPORATED, Ted Thielen, individually, Appellees.

No. 89-5593.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Sept. 11, 1990.

Decided Oct. 10, 1990.

John W. Getsinger, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellant.

James L. Haigh, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellees.

Before WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

This case raises the question whether federal or state procedural rules should govern the time an action is deemed commenced for purposes of the statute of limitations in a diversity action. The plaintiff, Winnie Walker, is a Tennessee resident, who was injured in an April 14, 1983, automobile accident in Marion County, Tennessee. The defendants, Ted Thielen and Thielen Motors, are Minnesota residents. On April 11, 1989, Walker filed a complaint with the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, charging Thielen with negligence. On April 15, 1989, six years and one day after the accident, defendants were personally served with a copy of the summons and complaint. Under Minnesota law, a negligence action involving personal injury must be commenced within six years of the accrual of the cause of action. Minn.Stat. Sec. 541.05 subd. 1(5).

Walker's cause of action accrued at the time of the accident on April 14, 1983. The issue on appeal is whether Walker's action commenced when she filed her complaint or when the defendants were served. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 3. If this rule applies, Walker's lawsuit was timely commenced. Under Minnesota rules, however, an action commences when the summons is served upon the defendant or delivered to the sheriff who then must serve the summons upon the defendant within sixty days. Minn.R.Civ.P. 3.01. Neither of these events occurred before the six-year statute of limitations expired. Thus, if the Minnesota commencement rule governs this suit, Walker's action is time barred. The district court reached this conclusion on summary judgment.

The Supreme Court's decision in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 100 S.Ct. 1978, 64 L.Ed.2d 659 (1980), suggests, and three decisions by this court confirm, that the Minnesota rule governs. Walker explored whether a state rule or Federal Rule 3 governs the commencement of a suit for statute of limitations purposes in a diversity context. On at least two occasions, this court has elucidated Walker's resolution of this issue, once explaining, "Walker v. Armco Steel has laid to rest the notion that [Federal] Rule 3 can ever be used to toll a state statute of limitations in a diversity case arising under state law." Fischer v. Iowa Mold Tooling Co., 690 F.2d 155, 157 (8th Cir.1982). In Sieg v. Karnes, 693 F.2d 803, 805 (8th Cir.1982) (citation omitted), this court reiterated that, "Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. held that a federal district court must apply state law that, for statute of limitations purposes, deems an action commenced only when service is made."

Both Fischer and Sieg direct us to adopt the Minnesota ...