Walker v. Town of Greeneville

• Decision Date: 13 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. 2:03-CV-385.,2:03-CV-385.
• Citation: 347 F.Supp.2d 566
• Parties: Roy David WALKER, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF GREENEVILLE and Fire Chief James Bowman in his official capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

Page 566

347 F.Supp.2d 566

Roy David WALKER, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF GREENEVILLE and Fire Chief James Bowman in his official capacity, Defendants.

No. 2:03-CV-385.

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, at Greeneville.

December 13, 2004.

Judy Pinkston McCarthy, Dennis M. McCarthy, Knoxville, TN, for Plaintiff.

Thomas J. Garland, Jr., Jeffrey M. Ward, Greeneville, TN, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

VARLAN, District Judge.

This disability discrimination case presents a novel question of law under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Defendants have moved for summary judgment [Doc. 10] on the issue of whether plaintiff is "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA. The primary question presented is whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity while the individual is suffering from the effects of an intermittent, episodic impairment or whether the Court is to consider that individual's overall condition in determining if the individual is substantially limited in a major life activity. The Court notes that there is no controlling authority on this issue.

After careful consideration of the parties' briefs [Docs. 10, 12, 13] and the arguments presented by counsel on November 23, 2004, the Court will grant defendant's motion for summary judgment and this case will be dismissed.

I. Relevant Facts

Plaintiff Roy David Walker has been employed as a firefighter with the Greeneville Fire Department in Greeneville, Tennessee, for more than twenty (20) years. Approximately ten (10) years ago, plaintiff developed claustrophobia and claims the condition has become progressively worse over the ensuing years. Plaintiff states that claustrophobia affects his ability to think, to concentrate, and to perform manual tasks. When he is in a claustrophobic environment, plaintiff panics and loses his ability to think rationally. Plaintiff is often unable to perform even the simplest manual tasks and becomes consumed with the notion of getting out of the claustrophobic environment as quickly as possible. He states that claustrophobic circumstances that aggravate his condition include confined spaces, crowds, elevators, airplanes, back seats of buses and vans unless there is an adjacent door, and non-aisle seats. With respect to his duties as a firefighter, he cannot enter burning buildings or wear self-contained breathing equipment. [Doc. 1 at ¶ 7; Doc. 12, Walker Aff. at ¶¶ 2-4.]

Plaintiff's physician, Dr. Coy Stone, has submitted an affidavit stating that plaintiff's claustrophobia manifests itself through panic attacks. When plaintiff has a panic attack precipitated by being in a confined space, he is unable to think logically or rationally and has difficulty concentrating to perform even the simplest tasks. Dr. Stone states that plaintiff takes medication to relieve his symptoms, but the medication does not control the symptoms. Indeed, plaintiff still gets panic attacks when in confined spaces, even when he is medicated. Dr. Stone further opines that plaintiff's condition is ongoing and the plaintiff will likely continue to suffer from claustrophobia for the rest of his life without getting any better. Dr. Stone recommends that plaintiff not be assigned any job duties that would place him in situations that would create a sense of panic. [Doc. 12, Stone Aff. at ¶¶ 4-7.] The record contains a copy of Dr. Stone's letter of August 13, 2002, in which he advises of plaintiff's claustrophobia and that "[w]orking in enclosed spaces or in areas that would cause him to feel trapped would tend to cause a sense of panic. It is my recommendation that Mr. Walker not be assigned job duties that would place him in situations that would create a sense of panic." [Doc. 12, Ex. 1.]

Plaintiff claims that the defendants accommodated his condition prior to June 2002 by allowing him to work such jobs as driving the fire truck, operating the pumps, operating the ladder, putting out non-building fires, and fighting building fires from outside the building. [Doc. 1 at ¶ 8.] He claims that when he would not sign a statement implicating his shift captain in gambling while on duty, Fire Chief James Bowman retaliated against him by refusing to accommodate his disability. He claims the Fire Chief instituted a new policy requiring all firefighters to enter burning buildings and confined spaces. When plaintiff requested accommodation from the new policy, he was placed on leave and has not returned to work. [Id. at ¶ 9.]

The record also contains the testimony of Lanny Smith, co-owner of Pioneer Machine in Greeneville, Tennessee. Mr. Smith states that he has employed plaintiff on a part-time basis for approximately ten (10) years as a fabricator performing various welding activities. Mr. Smith also states that plaintiff is required to wear a welding helmet for safety purposes which covers the front of the face and provides protections on the sides as well. [Doc. 10b.]

Plaintiff has sued the Town of Greeneville and Fire Chief James Bowman in his official capacity for failing to accommodate his disability under the ADA and the Tennessee Handicap Act.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The burden of establishing there is no genuine issue of material fact lies upon the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The court must view the facts and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 942 (6th Cir.2002). To establish a genuine issue as to the existence of a particular element, the non-moving party must point to evidence in the record upon which a reasonable jury could find in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The genuine issue must also be material; that is, it must involve facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id.

The judge's function at the point of summary judgment is limited to determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of fact a proper jury question, and not to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine the truth of the matter. Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Thus, "[t]he inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

B. Plaintiff's Tennessee Handicap Act Claim

The first issue raised by defendants' motion is whether plaintiff's claim under the Tennessee Handicap Act, Tenn.Code Ann. § 8-50-103, is time-barred. As defendants note, the Tennessee Handicap Act incorporates certain provisions of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-21-302 — 4-21-311, including the one year limitations period of section 4-21-311.¹ Plaintiff's EEOC charge specifies that he was sent home on August 20, 2002 after requesting accommodation, and he has not been allowed to return to work. [Doc. 10.] Because this case was not filed until October 29, 2003, defendants contend that plaintiff's claim under the Tennessee Handicap Act is time-barred.

Plaintiff responds that his claim is based on a continuing violation and that the defendant's denial of his accommodation was still in existence at the time his complaint was filed. In other words, plaintiff asserts that he knew continued requests for accommodation would not be granted and that he was not obligated to continue asking. [Doc. 12 at p. 3.]

While plaintiff is correct that Tennessee law allows for the concept of a continuing violation, this case does not meet that standard. A continuing violation allows a plaintiff to recover for a time-barred act by linking a series of related acts, one or more of which falls within the limitations period. Spicer v. Beaman Bottling Co., 937 S.W.2d 884, 889 (Tenn.1996); Frazier v. Heritage Fed. Bank for Savings, 955 S.W.2d 633, 637 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997). The concept of a continuing violation applies only in limited circumstances, such as where there is some evidence of present discriminatory activity giving rise to a claim of a continuing violation or where there has been a longstanding and demonstrable policy of discrimination. Spicer, 937 S.W.2d at 889. The defendant's continued failure to bring plaintiff back to work, as he describes it, does not constitute present discriminatory activity. Indeed, whether the Court focuses on the denial of accommodation or the failure to reinstate, both acts are discrete events which must be the subject of a timely suit. Newsom v. Textron Aerostructures, 924 S.W.2d 87, 95 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995). Plaintiff's claim under the Tennessee Handicap Act is therefore time-barred, and summary judgment will be granted on this issue.

C. Plaintiff's ADA Claim

As noted initially, the primary issue presented by defendants' motion for summary judgment is whether plaintiff is "disabled" as that term is defined by the ADA. The ADA prohibits discrimination in employment against "a qualified individual with a disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Thus, if plaintiff is not "disabled," then he is not entitled to the protections of the ADA and his claim must be dismissed.

The ADA defines "disability" as:

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment; or

(C)...