Walker v. Trinity Oil & Gas Co., Civil Action No. 7:16-cv-00098-O-BP
| Decision Date | 12 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 7:16-cv-00098-O-BP |
| Parties | DERRICK ANTHONY WALKER, Plaintiff, v. TRINITY OIL AND GAS CO., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
United States District Judge Reed O'Connor referred this case to the undersigned for pretrial management by Order entered on August 9, 2016. ECF No. 5. Before the Court are Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 21) and Brief in Support (ECF No. 22), both filed on November 23, 2016; Plaintiff's Motion in Opposition to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24), filed on November 28, 2016; Plaintiff's Supplemental Motion in Opposition to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 25), filed on December 1, 2016; and Plaintiff's Motion for Jury Trial Setting (ECF No. 26), filed on December 1, 2016. A motion to dismiss is an enumerated dispositive motion to which the undersigned may only make a recommendation to the District Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
After considering the pleadings and applicable legal authorities, the Court RECOMMENDS that Judge O'Connor GRANT in part and DENY in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 21), thereby DISMISSING Plaintiff's claims brought under federal law with prejudice, DISMISSING Plaintiff's claims brought under state law without prejudice, and DISMISSING Plaintiff's Motion for Jury Trial Setting as Moot.
Plaintiff Derrick Anthony Walker, a resident of Texas, originally filed suit against Trinity Oil and Gas Co. on August 3, 2016, alleging federal question jurisdiction for claims arising from the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution. ECF No. 1 at 3. In his Complaint, Plaintiff claimed that he was the rightful heir to his mother's estate and had not received an accounting of the money that Trinity Oil and Gas Co. allegedly placed in a suspense account. Id. The Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. ECF No. 4. Thereafter, the Court ordered Plaintiff to replead and show in an amended complaint why the Court had subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 6. Plaintiff did so by filing his First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 12) on October 3, 2016, in which he contends that Defendant is discriminating against him concerning his property rights, is intentionally operating without his authority, is withholding funds that rightfully belong to him, and is engaging in deceptive practices. ECF No. 12 at 3. Plaintiff alleges jurisdiction on both federal question and diversity grounds and alleges a variety of state and federal law violations. ECF No. 12. Plaintiff ultimately seeks compensatory damages of $50,000,000, punitive damages of $100,000,000, an injunction to prevent Trinity from continuing to operate on the property at issue, and declaratory relief. Id. at 3-4.
After filing his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Nunc Pro Tunc on October 3, 2016 requesting to change the named Defendant to Trinity River Energy ("Trinity"). ECF No. 13. To clarify Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and the intended Defendant, theCourt Ordered Plaintiff to complete a questionnaire. ECF No. 15. Plaintiff filed his completed questionnaire on October 24, 2016. ECF No. 16.
Rule 12 (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may move for dismissal of an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion requests the court to dismiss claims when the complaint fails to assert facts that give rise to the legal liability of the defendant. Id. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that each claim include "a short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Importantly, each claim must include factual allegations sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). The court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal established a two-step approach for assessing the sufficiency of a complaint being scrutinized under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). First, the Court identifies any conclusory allegations and disregards them, for they are "not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 664. "Second, the Court 'consider[s] the factual allegations in [the complaint] to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.'" Id. "'[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements' cannot establish facial plausibility". Snow Ingredients, Inc. v. SnoWizard, Inc., 833 F.3d 512, 520 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Particular to a pro se plaintiff's complaint, courts are to liberally construe the pleadings, taking all well-pleaded allegations as true. Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993). In addition to accepting the well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint as true, the court must also view the pleaded facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190,196 (5th Cir. 1996). "[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Steele v. Grubbs, No. 3:16-CV-1117-M-BK, 2016 WL 3029935, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 3, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:16-CV-1117-M-BK, 2016 WL 3030174 (N.D. Tex. May 25, 2016) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). But "even a liberally-construed pro se . . . complaint must set forth facts giving rise to a claim on which relief may be granted." Levitt v. Univ. of Texas at El Paso, 847 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977)). Thus, a court inquires "whether within the universe of theoretically provable facts there exists a set which can support a cause of action under [the plaintiff's] complaint, indulgently read." Covington v. Cole, 528 F.2d 1365, 1370 (5th Cir. 1976). Notably, when ruling on a motion to dismiss a pro se complaint, the court is "required to look beyond the [plaintiff's] formal complaint and to consider as amendments to the complaint those materials subsequently filed." Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing McGruder v. Phelps, 608 F.2d 1023, 1025 (5th Cir. 1979)). Lovelace v. Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (5th Cir. 1996).
In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges a violation of Public Law 97-451, the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982, which was codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq., and later amended by Public Law 104-185, the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Simplification and Fairness Act of 1996. ECF No. 12. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint also alleges a violation of 30 U.S.C. § 1732, which authorizes any state or Indian tribe to enter cooperativeagreements with the Secretary of Interior. As argued in Defendant's Motion, these statutes apply exclusively to oil and gas leases on federal lands, Indian lands, and the Outer Continental Shelf. 30 U.S.C. § 1701; ECF No. 22 at 7. In attempting to invoke these statutes, Plaintiff merely describes the property in his Second Amended Complaint as consisting of "106.17 acres of Timberland Tract in Quitman[,] Louisiana." ECF No. 12 at 2. Defendant argues, and the Court agrees, that the Second Amended Complaint fails to provide any factual support to show that the property in question is either federal land, Indian land, or part of the Outer Continental Shelf. Because Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint fails to set forth facts giving rise to a claim under both 30 U.S.C. §§ 1701 and 1732, the undersigned recommends that these claims be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Similarly, Plaintiff's claims under Title 42 U.S.C. for civil rights violations fail as a matter of law. "To establish a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must allege facts in support of the following elements: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) an intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) the discrimination concerns one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute." Felton v. Polles, 315 F.3d 470, 483 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Green v. State Bar, 27 F.3d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994)). In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states he is "of African ancestry" and is being deprived of property "without due process and equal protection." ECF No. 12 at 2-3. However, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts in his complaint demonstrating discrimination or the intent to discriminate on the basis of race, and further fails to allege facts showing racial discrimination concerning a specific activity. Plaintiff's bare assertions of violations of his due process and equal protection rights, along with the fact that he is of African ancestry, are insufficient pleadings and facts to support a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C.§ 1981. Givs v. City of Eunice, 512 F. Supp. 2d 522, 542-43 (W.D. La. 2007), aff'd, 268 F. App'x 305 (5th Cir. 2008); Whitehurst v. Showtime Networks, Inc., No. CIV.A 1:08-CV-47, 2009 WL 3052663, at *14 (E.D. Tex. 2009)....
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