Walker v. True, 02-22.
| Decision Date | 06 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-22.,02-22. |
| Parties | DARICK DEMORRIS WALKER, <I>Petitioner-Appellant,</I> v. PAGE TRUE, Warden, Sussex I State Prison, <I>Respondent-Appellee.</I> |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Chief District Judge. (CA-01-1196-A)
ARGUED: Michele Jill Brace, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Robert Quentin Harris, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Barbara L. Hartung, Richmond, Virginia; Lara A. Englund, Peter B. Rutledge, Samuel Broderick-Sokol, Anne Harkavy, Eric J. Hougen, Mason Kalfus, WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING, Washington D.C.; David P. Donovan, WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING, Tysons Corner, Virginia, for Appellant. Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General of Virginia, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Darick Demorris Walker was convicted by a Virginia state court jury of capital murder for the killings of Stanley Beale and Clarence Threat, use of firearm in the commission of a felony, and two counts of burglary. He was sentenced to death on the capital murder count and to prison terms on the other counts. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Walker's conviction and death sentence on direct appeal and denied Walker's petition for state habeas relief. The district court dismissed Walker's federal habeas petition and declined to grant a Certificate of Appealability (COA).
Walker now seeks a COA to bring an appeal of the district court's dismissal. Specifically, he asserts that he has made the required substantial showing that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated at the guilt phase of his trial when his counsel failed to challenge his single trial for two murders, that his due process rights were violated when the Commonwealth failed to timely disclose Brady materials, and that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated at the sentencing phase of his trial when his counsel failed to investigate and present compelling mitigating evidence. Because reasonable jurists could debate the district court's assessment of the first two of these claims (the right to counsel at the guilt phase of trial claim and the Brady claim) we grant a COA as to these claims; however, upon review of their merits, we affirm the district court's dismissal. Because reasonable jurists could not debate the district court's assessment of the right to counsel at the sentencing phase of his trial claim, we deny a COA as to this claim and dismiss.
Stanley Beale lived with Catherine Taylor and their children, Monique, Bianca, and Sidney, in the University Terrace Apartments.1 On November 22, 1996, Taylor was in the bedroom with Sidney, an infant, when she heard "a boom like noise" coming from the living room. As she entered the living room to investigate, she saw a man, whom she identified as Walker, kick in the locked front door. Walker was holding a gun and began yelling, "Where is he?" Walker then asked Beale, who was standing in the doorway of the kitchen, "What you keep coming up to my door, what you look for me for?" Beale responded that he did not know Walker and did not know where he lived. Bianca, who was 13 years old at the time, began to shout at Walker, telling him that her father did not know him. When Walker began shooting at Beale, Taylor took Bianca and Monique into the bathroom to hide. Beale was shot three times and died. Bianca testified that she knew Walker as "Todd" and that she identified Walker in a photospread as the person who killed her father.
On the night of Beale's murder, Tameria Patterson, a fourteen-year-old girl, was visiting a friend who lived in the University Terrace Apartments. Patterson testified that she saw a man she knew as "Todd" enter her friend's apartment that night and say, "I shot him." Patterson identified Walker in a photospread as the person who had entered the apartment and made the statement.
Approximately seven months later, on the night of June 18, 1997, Clarence Threat and Andrea Noble were sleeping in their bedroom. They were awakened by a "pop" coming from the screen door, which was followed by a knock at the door. Noble went to the door and looked outside through a small window in the door, but did not see anyone. Twice more she heard someone knocking but did not see anyone when she looked out the window. Sometime after the third knock, the door was "kicked open." Noble went to the living room to find a person she knew as "Paul" standing there with a gun. "Paul" pointed the gun at Noble, who backed into the bedroom. When they reached the bedroom, "Paul" hit Noble with the back of the gun and then shot Threat in the leg. "Paul" and Threat "exchanged words" and then "Paul" shot Threat six more times. Threat died from a gunshot wound to the chest. "Paul" warned Noble that if she told anyone "he would come back and kill [her] and [her] kids." At trial, Noble identified Walker as the person she knew as "Paul."
Walker was indicted on one count of capital murder for the killings of Beale and Threat within a three-year period in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31.1(8) (Michie 1996), on four counts of the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-53.1 (Michie 1996), and on two counts of burglary in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-90 (Michie 1996). On August 31 and September 1, 1998, Walker was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond and found guilty of all charges. He was sentenced to death for the capital murder conviction, life imprisonment for each of the burglaries, and a total of 18 years imprisonment for the firearms offenses.
On June 11, 1999, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Walker's conviction and death sentence. Walker v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 565 (Va. 1999). The Supreme Court of the United States denied Walker's petition for a writ of certiorari on January 18, 2000. Walker v. Virginia, 528 U.S. 1125. On March 23, 2001, the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed Walker's state petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court of the United States denied Walker's petition for a writ of certiorari on October 29, 2001. Walker v. True, 534 U.S. 1003.
On February 1, 2002, Walker filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The district court dismissed Walker's petition on July 26, 2002. On September 4, 2002, the district court denied Walker's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and declined to grant a Certificate of Appealability (COA). Walker now seeks to appeal.
To appeal the denial of habeas relief in the district court, a prisoner must first obtain a COA. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(1) (West Supp. 2002). The first opportunity to obtain a COA is in the district court. When "an applicant files a notice of appeal, the district judge who rendered the judgment must either issue a certificate of appealability or state why a certificate should not issue." Fed. R. App. Pro. 22(b)(1). In the present case, the district court denied Walker a COA. Because the requirement for a COA is jurisdictional, we may not consider the merits of Walker's claims unless Walker has made the threshold showing required to obtain a COA. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. __, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1039 ( ). Thus our COA determination requires an overview of Walker's claims and a general assessment of their merits.2
To obtain a COA, a petitioner must make a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(2). "Under the controlling standard, a petitioner must `sho[w] that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were "adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further."'" Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1039 (). Id. at 1040 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "We look to the District Court's application of AEDPA to petitioner's constitutional claims and ask whether that resolution was debatable amongst jurists of reason." Id. at 1039. "Where a district court has rejected [a petitioner's] constitutional claims on the merits, . . . [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong" to obtain a COA. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Further, "[w]hen the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Id.
In his application for a COA, Walker raises three issues that were addressed by the district court. First, Walker argues that the state court's conclusion that his trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to challenge his single trial for two murders was an objectively unreasonable application of federal law. He argues that the district...
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Walker v. Kelly, 06-23.
...motion for authorization to file a successive habeas corpus petition, we granted Walker authorization. See Walker v. True, 67 Fed. Appx. 758, 770-71 (4th Cir.) ("Walker v. True I"), vacated on other grounds, 540 U.S. 1013, 124 S.Ct. 567, 157 L.Ed.2d 426 (2003). Walker then filed his second ......