Walker v. United States
| Decision Date | 18 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:20-CV-01392 |
| Parties | MAURICE WALKER, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) of Defendants United States of America, United States Department of Justice, and United States Drug Enforcement Administration ("Defendants"). (Doc. No. 8.) Plaintiff Maurice Walker filed a Brief in Opposition on December 3, 2020. (Doc. No. 10.) Defendants filed a Reply In Support of their Motion to Dismiss on December 30, 2020. (Doc. No. 12.) For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
At the time of the events of the Complaint, Plaintiff Maurice Walker ("Plaintiff" or "Walker") lived in suburban Cleveland with his girlfriend and dog. (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 7.) He was employed at a local company and was not involved in the illegal drug trade in any way. (Id. at ¶ 8.) However, on October 12, 2016, agents from the United States Drug Enforcement Agency ("the DEA") arrested Walker after a federal grand jury returned a multicount indictment on September 28, 2016 charging Walker and 19 others with multiple federal drug crimes. (Id. at ¶ 9.) On October 12, 2016, Walker appeared before a U.S. Magistrate Judge in the Northern District of Ohio. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Walker was detained, pending a hearing under the Bail Reform Act. (Id.) On November 4, 2016, Walker was detained without bond. (Id.)
Walker alleges that each of the DEA agents acted within the "course and scope of their duties as law enforcement officers at the time" they arrested Walker. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Walker alleges that he was falsely arrested and imprisoned as a pretrial detainee from October 12, 2016 through November 4, 2016. (Id. at ¶ 14.) He was further detained on house arrest from November 4, 2016 through November 10, 2016. (Id.) On November 20, 2016, the office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio moved to dismiss all charges against Walker without prejudice. (Id. at ¶ 15.) United States District Judge Solomon Oliver, Jr. dismissed the indictment against Walker "in its entirety, resolving all charges in his favor." (Id.)
Walker alleges that the DEA agents lacked probable cause that Walker had committed any alleged crimes. (Id. at ¶ 12.) He alleges that the agents lacked probable cause "most likely because—on information and belief—there was another individual with the same name" as Walker who the DEA sought in connection with the drug offenses. (Id.) Walker alleges that the DEA agents "failed to properly identify the correct party during the course of their investigation." (Id.) According to Walker, "[t]hese tortious actions caused an indictment to be issued" naming Walker as a defendant, a warrant to be issued for the wrong Maurice Walker, and for Walker to be unlawfully detained. (Id.)
On January 17, 2017, Walker sent notice of his claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act to the DEA and the United States Department of Justice ("the DOJ"). (Id. at ¶ 3.) On February 8, 2017, the DOJ notified Walker that it would be handling his claims. (Id.) Walker alleges that the DOJ sent letters to Walker and his counsel indicating that it continued to investigate the matter. (Id.) Walkeralleges that the DOJ sent its latest letter to Walker's counsel on February 6, 2020. (Id.) Thus, Walker alleges, he exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing this matter. (Id. at ¶ 4.)
Walker filed his Complaint on June 24, 2020. (Id.) In his Complaint, Walker alleges three causes of action. (Id. at ¶¶ 16-20.) In his First Cause of Action, Walker alleges that his detention by the DEA agents "constitutes false arrest, false imprisonment, negligence, unlawful search and unlawful invasion of privacy . . . and . . . intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress . . . under common law torts pursuant to the laws of the State of Ohio." (Id. at ¶ 16.) Walker alleges that under the FTCA, all Defendants are liable for the DEA agents' conduct because they acted within the scope of their employment as law enforcement officers for the United States of America and its Drug Enforcement Agency. (Id. at ¶ 17.)
In his Second Cause of Action, Walker alleges that his detention, as the result of the false indictment, was without probable cause and constitutes malicious prosecution under Ohio law. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Walker alleges the Defendants the United States of America, in particular the DOJ, through the U.S. Attorney and Assistant Attorneys from the Northern District of Ohio who were acting within the scope of their employment as prosecutors for the DOJ, are liable to him for damages suffered by him. (Id. at ¶ 19.)
In his Third Cause of Action, Walker alleges that the actions and conduct of Defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable detention, malicious prosecution, and illegal searches and seizures. (Id. at ¶ 20.)
Defendants move for dismissal of Walker's Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The standard of review of a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lackof subject matter jurisdiction depends on whether the defendant makes a facial or factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. Wayside Church v. Van Buren County, 847 F.3d 812, 816-17 (6th Cir. 2017). A facial attack "questions merely the sufficiency of the pleading" and requires the district court to "take[] the allegations in the complaint as true." Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007). To survive a facial attack, the complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the grounds for jurisdiction. See Rote v. Zel Custom Mfg. LLC, 816 F.3d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 2016); Ogle v. Ohio Civil Service Employees Ass'n, AFSCME, Local 11, 397 F. Supp. 3d 1076, 1081-82 (S.D. Ohio 2019).
A factual attack, on the other hand, "raises a factual controversy requiring the district court 'to weigh the conflicting evidence to arrive at the factual predicate that subject-matter does or does not exist.'" Wayside Church, 847 F.3d at 817 (quoting Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc., 491 F.3d at 330). The plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction when subject matter jurisdiction is challenged. Rogers v. Stratton Indus., 798 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1986). The court may allow "affidavits, documents and even a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts." Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990).
As an initial matter, Walker concedes that his Second Cause of Action against Defendants based upon the alleged malicious prosecution of him by the U.S. Attorney and Assistant United States Attorneys is barred under the intentional tort exception to the Federal Torts Claims Act. (Doc. No. 10, PageID# 70.) Walker also concedes that as to his Third Cause of Action against Defendants alleging violations of his Constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, theUnited States did not waive sovereign immunity. (Id.) Accordingly, Walker's Second Cause of Action and Third Cause of Action against Defendants are dismissed.
Further, although Walker alleges claims for unlawful search, unlawful invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress in his First Cause of Action, Walker presents no argument in his Opposition as to why these claims should not be dismissed. Accordingly, Defendants argue that these claims must be dismissed. (Doc. No. 12, PageID# 83.) The Court finds that Walker does not oppose Defendants' motion with respect to these claims. Lewis v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 1:12-cv-3003, 2013 WL 6199592, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 27, 2013) ; see also Garmou v. Kondaur Cap. Corp., No. 15-12161, 2016 WL 3549356 at *7 (E.D. Mich. June 30, 2016) (). Accordingly, Walker's claims for unlawful search, unlawful invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress set forth under Walker's First Cause of Action are also dismissed.
The Court will now address whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining claims in Walker's Complaint: his claims of false arrest and false imprisonment, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress based on the DEA's mistaken identification of Walker as a suspect in a drug investigation. The Court concludes that it does not.
Defendants contend that Walker's Complaint must be dismissed for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). They argue that Walker's claims are barred under thediscretionary function exception to the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), and, therefore, the FTCA does not confer subject matter jurisdiction upon this Court. (Doc. No. 8-1, PageID# 47.)
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