Walker v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't
| Decision Date | 03 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:20-cv-01462-CDS-DJA |
| Parties | David Leroy Walker, Plaintiff v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and Kalif Jamel Summers, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS, DENYING MOTION FOR RULE 54(B) CERTIFICATION, AND CLOSING CASE [ECF NOS. 51 53]
Plaintiff David Leroy Walker sues the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and one of its detectives, Kalif Jamel Summers alleging that Summers wrongfully charged Walker with thirteen felony counts for thefts that Walker could not have committed because he was incarcerated when they were carried out. Walker brings nearly ten claims against both defendants including a § 1983 claim for the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, a Monell claim, and various tort claims. LVMPD moves to dismiss Walker's complaint in its entirety under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Walker opposes LVMPD's motion but voluntarily withdraws two of his claims. Summers was never served in this case, so he has not appeared. Because I find that Walker has failed to sufficiently plead any of his claims-despite opportunity to amend his complaint-I grant LVMPD's motion to dismiss. I also sua sponte dismiss Summers from the case because he was never served. Finally, I deny as moot the motion of two since-terminated defendants for FRCP 54(b) certification. With no claims or defendants remaining, I order the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.
Walker alleges that he was in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) and the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC) beginning in November 2017. FirstAm. Compl., ECF No. 50 at ¶ 14. A LVMPD detective, Summers, investigated a series of thefts that occurred at retail stores between May and July of 2019, and he determined that Walker was responsible for all of them-while Walker was still incarcerated. Id. at ¶¶ 15-19. Walker alleges that Summers knew of the underlying conviction from 2018 that led to Walker's incarceration and thus should have consulted with the NDOC to determine whether Walker was still in custody at the time of the 2019 thefts-which he was. Id. at ¶ 21. Walker was charged with 13 felony counts for the thefts. Id. at ¶ 20.
He contends that because of these “bogus” felony charges, he was denied his request for minimum custody and was denied placement in a work camp, meaning he lost the opportunity to earn good-time credits-ultimately extending his sentence. Id. at ¶¶ 24-27. He also argues that he was denied furlough to visit his sick grandmother, who died in January 2020, just a few weeks before all 13 felony charges were dropped against him based on the impossibility of him committing the crimes while incarcerated. Id. at ¶¶ 25, 28-29. Last year, the Honorable United States District Judge Richard Boulware dismissed all but two of the defendants and granted Walker leave to file an amended complaint curing the initial complaint's deficiencies. ECF No. 49. During that hearing, Judge Boulware told Walker that this was the last time he would have leave to amend. Id. Walker timely filed an amended complaint, bringing claims against LVMPD and Summers. ECF No. 50. LVMPD now moves to dismiss all of Walker's claims, and Summers-who has not been served in this case-has not appeared and therefore does not respond to Walker's first-amended complaint.[2]
The FRCP require a plaintiff to plead “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) when a pleader fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A pleading must give fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests, and although a court must take all factual allegations as true, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, Rule 12(b)(6) requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
If the court grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be granted unless it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). Under Rule 15(a), a court should “freely” give leave to amend “when justice so requires,” and in the absence of a reason such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive of the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962).
LVMPD moves to dismiss Walker's § 1983 claim, arguing that “the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against municipalities.” ECF No. 51 at 7 (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478 (1986) (internal citation omitted)). Walker disagrees, arguing that “municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances.” Response, ECF No. 54 at 5 (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 478). The only two remaining defendants are LVMPD-a municipal entity-and Summers-a LVMPD officer. As explained infra, I dismiss all claims against Summers because he has not been served in this case. That leaves Walker's § 1983 claim against LVMPD only. ECF No. 50 at ¶¶ 31-32. Walker alleges that LVMPD and Summers violated § 1983 “by depriving [him] . . . of the following clearly established and well-settled constitutional rights protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” Id. at ¶ 32. His allegations for this claim end there. As LVMPD correctly points out, § 1983 claims cannot be brought against municipal entities unless they are brought as Monell claims: “[M]unicipalities, including counties and their sheriff's departments, can only be liable under § 1983 if an unconstitutional action ‘implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers.'” Rivera v. County of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 384, 389 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). Because Walker brings a separate Monell claim (addressed infra), this claim for a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under § 1983 is duplicative and not permitted by law because municipalities can only be sued under Monell. I therefore dismiss Walker's § 1983 claim.
LVMPD also moves to dismiss Walker's Monell claim, arguing that his complaint relies on “conclusory allegations with no factual support” and that Walker has not identified “a policy, that when enforced, caused the alleged constitutional violations” nor has he alleged “a widespread practice within [LVMPD] of officers failing to adequately investigate crimes.” ECF No. 51 at 7. Walker responds that he has “allege[d] a policy that [LVMPD] failed to check his incarceration records prior to issuing an [a]rrest [w]arrant even though Detective Summers knew him to be an incarcerated person.” ECF No. 54 at 5.
To sufficiently plead a Monell claim, a plaintiff must “(1) identify the challenged policy or custom; (2) explain how the policy or custom is deficient; (3) explain how the policy or custom caused the plaintiff harm; and (4) reflect how the policy or custom amounted to deliberate indifference.” Harvey v. City of S. Lake Tahoe, 2012 WL 1232420, at *3 (E.D. Cal. April 12, 2012) (citing Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2009)). Walker does not identify any express policy that LVMPD has of instructing its officers to ignore incarceration records. He makes broad allegations that LVMPD had policies “[t]o tolerate the failure to adequately investigate criminal allegations” and “[t]o fail to use appropriate and generally accepted law enforcement procedures in handling criminal investigations.” ECF No. 50 at ¶ 34. But without more, this claim cannot survive dismissal. See Waggy v. Spokane Cnty. Wash., 594 F.3d 707, 713 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment in defendant's favor because, as with here, the plaintiff “failed to allege any facts supporting his claim”). I therefore grant LVMPD's motion to dismiss Walker's Monell claim.
LVMPD argues that Walker's false-arrest claim cannot survive dismissal because he fails to allege that an arrest occurred or that a LVMPD officer falsely imprisoned him. ECF No. 51 at 8. Walker responds that he “was restrained in his ability to obtain a minimum level of custody, and he was denied his ability to obtain [g]ood [t]ime credit due to this increased...
To continue reading
Request your trial