Walker v. Winn

• Decision Date: 09 February 1905
• Citation: 142 Ala. 560,39 So. 12
• Parties: WALKER v. WINN.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

39 So. 12

142 Ala. 560

WALKER v. WINN.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 9, 1905

Appeal from Circuit Court, Barbour County; A. A. McDonald, Judge.

Action by James J. Winn, Jr., administrator, of John E. Crews deceased, against David L. Walker. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Special pleas Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7, referred to in the opinion, set up the insanity of the payee of the note at the time he transferred the same to plaintiff's intestate. Special plea No. 8 is as follows: "(8) Defendant says that in the transfer of the note sued on the amount paid or the consideration paid for said note by plaintiff's intestate was grossly inadequate to the value of said note, and said transfer of said note was a fraud on the payee and transferror, and void, said payee and transferror being at the time of said transfer so weak mentally as to have been overreached by the plaintiff's intestate in procuring said transfer." To the eighth plea the plaintiff demurred upon the ground that, if there was fraud practiced upon the transferror by the plaintiff's intestate, it is not available to the defendant in this suit, and that said plea fails to show that plaintiff's intestate, or any one for him, practiced any fraud upon the transferror of the note. The demurrers to these several pleas were sustained. Upon the introduction of all the evidence, the court, at the request of the plaintiff, gave the general affirmative charge in his favor, to the giving of which charge the defendant duly excepted.

A. H Merrill and W. C. Swanson, for appellant.

Geo. W Peach and E. P. Thomas, for appellee.

DENSON J.

This is a suit upon a promissory note executed by defendant David L Walker and two other persons (who are not sued) to Zachariah Bush. The note was transferred by the payee to John E. Crews, who brought this suit. Crews died, and the cause was revived in the name of James J. Winn, Jr., as the administrator of his estate. The defendant filed a sworn plea denying that the plaintiff was the party really interested in the note sued on, and also attempted by other special pleas to defend the suit upon the ground that the payee, Bush, at the time he transferred the note to Crews, was insane. Demurrers were interposed to the pleas which set up the defense of insanity. The principal ground of demurrer to the pleas, the ones which presented the real question at issue, are that the contract of assignment of a note by an insane person is not void, but voidable, and that insanity is a personal plea, and not available to the defendant. The demurrers were sustained.

Whatever may be the rulings by the courts of other jurisdictions upon the question, this court is fully committed to the doctrine that the contract of an insane person is absolutely void. Dougherty v. Powe, 127 Ala. 577, 30 So. 524, and authorities there cited; Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 129 Ala. 279, 30 So. 578; Galloway v. Hendon, 131 Ala 280, 31 So. 603; Milligan v. Pollard, 112 Ala. 465, 20 So. 620. We fail to appreciate the distinction attempted to be made by counsel for appellee in their argument between deeds and other contracts made by an insane person, with reference to the application of the above-stated doctrine. That the principle upon which the deed of an insane person is declared void in the case of Dougherty v. Powe, supra, is applicable alike to all contracts of such person is obvious. It is stated by the court in that case that "one of the essential elements to the validity of a contract is the concurring assent of two minds. If one of the parties to a contract is insane at the time of its execution, this essential element is wanting. The principle is the same whether the contract rests in parol or be by a deed." If, then, the contract of an insane person is void, it would seem to logically follow that a party contracting with him could not take any benefit under such contract--would get no title to property obtained from such a one. We have no precedent by our court directly upon...