Walker v. Witt
| Decision Date | 25 October 1954 |
| Docket Number | No. 33241,33241 |
| Citation | 4 Ill.2d 16,122 N.E.2d 175 |
| Parties | Rassie E. WALKER et al., Appellees, v. Ambrose WITT, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Jenkins, Olsen & Cantrill, Springfield, (Harold M. Olsen, Springfield, of counsel), for appellant.
Redmon, Smith & Hull, Decatur, and Brown, Hay & Stephens, Springfield (Marvin D. Jorgensen, Urbana, and Paul W. Gordon, Jr., Springfield, of counsel), for appellees.
This is an appeal from two judgment orders of the circuit court of Sangamon County. The first order, entered on July 9, 1953, pursuant to plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings, found the defendant, Ambrose Witt, guilty of trespass on the lands and crops of the plaintiffs and ordered that a jury be impaneled for the purpose of determining damages. The second order, entered on January 29, 1954, after a jury had been waived, awarded the plaintiffs actual damages in the amount of $34 and exemplary damages in the amount of $315.
The dispute which occasioned the suit concerned the use made by the defendant of a fifteen-foot strip of land belonging to the plaintiffs as a means of ingress and egress for the purpose of cultivating and farming an adjacent tract of land owned by the defendant. The existence of an easement being in issue, a freehold is involved and this court has jurisdiction on direct appeal.
Since the first order was entered pursuant to plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings, we shall state and consider only those allegations of the plaintiffs which were admitted by the defendant, the affirmative allegations of the defendant, and certain admissions of facts elicited as a result of plaintiffs' request for admission of facts filed in accordance with Rule 18 of this court. For both parties agree that judgment on the pleadings is only proper in those cases where the pleadings admit of no other conclusion, irrespective of what evidence may be introduced.
The plaintiffs own a tract of farm land in Sangamon County, containing 20 acres and described as follows: the N 1/2 of the NW 1/4 of the SW 1/4 of Section 23, Twp. 17 North, Range 2 West of the Third P.m. Along the west side of this land, which we refer to as tract A, runs a public road.
The defendant owns 80 acres of land which adjoins the plaintiffs' said land on the east and is described as follows: the E 1/2 of the SW 1/4 of Section 23, Twp. 17 North, Range 2 West of the Third P.M. This land, which will be referred to as tract B, is completely landlocked, it not being adjacent to any public road. However, the defendant claims an easement by implication over the north fifteen feet of tract A in order to have an ingress and egress to tract B.
In 1942 the United States of America acquired title to all of section 23, which included both of said tracts. On January 3, 1946, the United States conveyed tract A to the plaintiffs' predecessors in title, and on that date the United States still owned other land in section 23 which was adjacent to and bordered by public highways on two different sides of said section. Eleven days later, on January 14, 1946, the United States conveyed tract B to defendant's predecessor in title, still owning other land in said section which bordered upon two public highways.
On June 20, 1952, and on other occasions prior thereto, the defendant drove a farm tractor and other farm machinery over said fifteen-foot strip on tract A for the purpose of getting to and from tract B, destroying crops of the plaintiffs planted in said strip and for which the plaintiffs brought this instant suit for damages. The plaintiffs claimed said acts constituted trespasses, and the trial court sustained their position. The defendant contends he was not trespassing but had an easement by implication over said land. In support thereof he alleges the following: that at the time the government of the United States acquired title to tract B, and for more than forty years prior thereto, the owner or owners of said tract used said fifteen-foot strip of land as a means of ingress and egress to tract B; that at all times prior to the time the United States acquired title and during the time the United States held title to tract B, the said fifteen-foot strip of land was a permanent, open, visible, and apparent means of ingress and egress to tract B; that at the time the defendant purchased tract B no other lane or roadway was then used or available as a means of ingress and egress to said tract, and said lane or roadway over the fifteen-foot strip was then and is now necessary to the enjoyment and use of said tract; that no other means of ingress or egress is presently available to tract B; that said lane or roadway has at all times mentioned been used as a permanent, open, visible and apparent means of ingress and egress and that such a means of ingress and egress is essential and necessary for the use and enjoyment of tract B; that at the time the defendant purchased tract B the seller informed him that the said lane or roadway over tract A was used as a means of ingress and egress in the use and enjoyment of tract B; that at the time of said purchase said lane or roadway was then visible, apparent and open, and by reason thereof and with the expectation that said lane or roadway would continue to be available to him as a means of ingress and egress, he purchased tract B; that subsequent to said purchase by the defendant, one of the plaintiffs took possession of tract B as tenant of the defendant, and during all of said tenancy the said plaintiff used said fifteen-foot strip of land as a means of ingress and egress to tract B; that the defendant now has no other means of ingress and egress available to him in the enjoyment and use of tract B; that he has no means of establishing on lands of his own ingress and egress to tract B; that it would be necessary for him, in order...
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