Walker v. Wolverine Fabricating & Mfg. Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 August 1986
• Docket Number: Docket No. 75335
• Citation: 391 N.W.2d 296,425 Mich. 586
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: William WALKER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WOLVERINE FABRICATING & MFG. CO., INC., Defendant-Appellant. 425 Mich. 586, 391 N.W.2d 296

Page 296

391 N.W.2d 296

William WALKER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WOLVERINE FABRICATING & MFG. CO., INC. Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 75335.

425 Mich. 586, 391 N.W.2d 296

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Nov. 13, 1985.

Decided Aug. 5, 1986.

Law Offices of Philip Green by Philip Green, Ann Arbor, for plaintiff-appellee.

Dahlberg, Mallender & Gawne by David M. Gaskin, Birmingham, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Lansing, Felix E. League, Asst. Atty. Gen., Martin J. Vittands, Asst. Atty. Gen., Civil Rights Div., Detroit, Michael J. Moquin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Executive Div., Lansing, for amicus curiae Atty. Gen.

WILLIAMS, Chief Justice.

The issue in this case is whether the provision in Const. 1963, art. 5, Sec. 29, that appeals from final decisions of the Civil Rights Commission shall be "tried de novo" requires the reviewing circuit court to conduct an entirely new evidentiary hearing or whether it may conduct a hearing on the record below. This inquiry necessitates a review of 1) the common understanding of the phrase "appeals ... tried de novo," 2) the language and construction of the Fair Employment Practices Act, which was the model for the constitutional provision, 3) the background and purpose of the provision, as demonstrated in the Constitutional Convention debates, and 4) the language and construction of the Civil Rights Act, which demonstrates present legislative intent regarding the scope of judicial review of decisions of the Civil Rights Commission.

Our review discloses that 1) there is no common understanding of the kind of review given in an appeal to be tried de novo; 2) the overall purpose of the delegates was to establish a Civil Rights Commission beyond legislative ability to disestablish it, and to provide the same kind of review as existed in the FEPA; 3) while three individual delegates spoke in favor of full-scale review with new evidence, a fourth admitted confusion about the meaning of "appeals ... tried de novo;" and 4) both contemporary judicial interpretation of the phrase "appeals ... tried de novo" in the FEPA and subsequent legislative interpretation in the Civil Rights Act support the narrower on the record meaning for that phrase.

While the background and language of this constitutional provision do not lend clear guidance to the interpretation to be given the phrase "appeal ... tried de novo," we hold that the underlying intent of the framers would best be effected by requiring circuit courts to review final decisions of the CRC de novo by taking a fresh look at the evidence and testimony in the record produced before the agency, and by determining whether the CRC's factual findings and legal conclusions are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence. ¹ We also hold that the proper party to defend against a claim that the CRC wrongly refused to issue a charge is the respondent before the CRC, and not the CRC itself.

I. FACTS

On April 23, 1980, William Walker filed a charge of discrimination with the Department of Civil Rights against Wolverine Fabricating & Mfg. Co., Inc. Walker alleged that Wolverine had discriminated against him by failing to recall him from layoff because of his age. The Civil Rights Commission investigated the charge, and, on October 17, 1980, issued a summary of findings and order of dismissal, finding insufficient grounds on which to issue a charge. ² (Appellant's Appendix p. 3a) The CRC reopened the complaint after Walker requested reconsideration of this dismissal. However, on July 16, 1981, the CRC again dismissed the complaint, finding that its prior dismissal was appropriate. (Appellants Appendix, p. 4a) Walker's second request for reconsideration was denied on March 21, 1983. At some time prior to this denial, the statute of limitations on Walker's separate action under the Civil Rights Act expired.

Walker appealed the final decision of the CRC to the Wayne Circuit Court on April 6, 1983. On September 8, 1983, Walker wrote to the court alerting it to constitutional language requiring appeals from final orders of the CRC to be "tried de novo." The following week, Wolverine contested Walker's statements by advising the court that it was limited to determining whether the CRC's refusal to issue a complaint was authorized by law. Wolverine also argued that the appropriate appellee was the CRC itself. On September 23, 1983, the court wrote both counsel stating that the issue on appeal would be whether the CRC's action was "clearly erroneous," and that the CRC was the proper appellee. (Appellant's Appendix, p. 9a) The court allowed Walker twenty days to make the CRC a party to the appeal.

On October 20, 1983, after the time for serving the CRC had expired, Walker informed the court that he did not intend to add the CRC as a party or to brief the question whether the CRC's dismissal of his complaint was clearly erroneous. Walker contended that he was entitled to a new trial of "all matters reasonably growing out of the investigation of [the administrative] complaint at the Commission level." (Appellant's Appendix, p. 10a)

On October 21, 1983, the court dismissed Walker's appeal. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Walker was entitled to a new trial of his underlying discrimination claim before the circuit court, and that the proper party defendant in the suit was Wolverine, the respondent named in the administrative complaint. Walker v. Wolverine Fabricating & Mfg. Co., 138 Mich.App. 660, 667, 360 N.W.2d 264 (1984). The Court of Appeals also certified a conflict between its decision in Walker and that in Burrell v. Annapolis Hospital, 36 Mich.App. 537, 193 N.W.2d 900 (1971), under Administrative Order No. 1984-2. On April 5, 1985, we granted leave to appeal. 422 Mich. 858.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE

Const. 1963, art. 5, Sec. 29 provides:

"There is hereby established a civil rights commission which shall consist of eight persons, not more than four of whom shall be members of the same political party, who shall be appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, for four-year terms not more than two of which shall expire in the same year. It shall be the duty of the commission in a manner which may be prescribed by law to investigate alleged discrimination against any person because of religion, race, color or national origin in the enjoyment of the civil rights guaranteed by law and by this constitution, and to secure the equal protection of such civil rights without such discrimination. The legislature shall provide an annual appropriation for the effective operation of the commission.

"The commission shall have power, in accordance with the provisions of this constitution and of general laws governing administrative agencies, to promulgate rules and regulations for its own procedures, to hold hearings, administer oaths, through court authorization to require the attendance of witnesses and the submission of records, to take testimony, and to issue appropriate orders. The commission shall have other powers provided by law to carry out its purposes. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to diminish the right of any party to direct and immediate legal or equitable remedies in the courts of this state.

"Appeals from final orders of the commission, including cease and desist orders and refusals to issue complaints, shall be tried de novo before the circuit court having jurisdiction provided by law." (Emphasis added.)

The constitution also includes elsewhere a provision regarding the kind of review to be given to final decisions of most administrative agencies, including those created in the constitution:

"All final decisions, findings, rulings and orders of any administrative officer or agency existing under the constitution or by law, which are judicial or quasi-judicial and affect private rights or licenses, shall be subject to direct review by the courts as provided by law. This review shall include, as a minimum, the determination whether such final decisions, findings, rulings and orders are authorized by law; and, in cases in which a hearing is required, whether the same are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. Findings of fact in workmen's compensation proceedings shall be conclusive in the absence of fraud unless otherwise provided by law." Const. 1963, art. 6, Sec. 28 (emphasis added).

While the specific language of art. 5, Sec. 29, controls the general language of art. 6, Sec. 28, Advisory Opinion on 1978 P.A. 426, 403 Mich. 631, 639, 272 N.W.2d 495 (1978), other canons of constitutional construction must be examined and applied in order to determine the meaning of "appeals ... shall be tried de novo."

III. OVERVIEW OF ANALYSIS

Our brief overview as well as our more detailed analysis can be epitomized as follows. First, there is no discernible common understanding of "appeals ... tried de novo," because the phrase is not a part of the common vocabulary, because the legal community is of two minds as to what the phrase means, and because the Constitutional Convention's Address to the People merely paraphrases "tried de novo" without defining whether the convention had chosen an on the record or a new evidence meaning. Second, the overall purpose of the convention with respect to the Civil Rights Commission was to establish it beyond legislative ability to disestablish it and to provide the same kind of review as existed for the Fair Employment Practices Commission. Third, there were three delegates who spoke for full-scale review by new evidence, but a fourth confessed confusion as to the meaning of "appeals ... tried de novo." Fourth, reference to contemporary judicial interpretation of the phrase "tried de novo" in the FEPA as well as to subsequent legislative interpretation in the Civil Rights Act shows that both adopted the...