Walker v. Woods

• Decision Date: 05 July 2011
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION No. 10-4267
• Parties: ARONA T. WALKER v. RICKEY J. WOODS, ET AL.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

ARONA T. WALKER

v.RICKEY J. WOODS, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION No. 10-4267

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA SECTION I

DATED: July 5, 2011

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are motions¹ to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by defendants, United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") - New Orleans, HUD - Fort Worth, HUD - Washington D.C.,² and the Housing Authority of New Orleans ("HANO"). In the alternative, HANO moves for summary judgment. Plaintiff, Arona T. Walker, opposes³ the motions. For the following reasons, defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED; plaintiff's claims against HUD and HANO are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and plaintiff's claim against Rickey J. Woods is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a dispute between plaintiff and defendant, Rickey J. Woods ("Woods"), over the entitlement to Section 8 rental proceeds,⁴ remitted by HANO, with respect to real property located at 927-929 Bordeaux Street, New Orleans, Louisiana.⁵ Plaintiff allegesthat she is and was the sole owner of the property at all pertinent times.⁶ Plaintiff further alleges that on June 9, 2006, Woods submitted false and fraudulent documents to HANO for the purpose of obtaining funds to which he was not entitled.⁷ Plaintiff claims that HANO, relying upon Woods's false assertions of complete ownership rights to the property, forwarded HUD Section 8 proceeds to Woods during the period beginning August 26, 2005, through June 30, 2007.⁸ Plaintiff also claims that HANO continued to forward rent subsidy checks to Woods after plaintiff informed HANO of her claimed complete ownership rights in the property.⁹ Plaintiff‘s only allegation pertaining to HUD is her assertion that HANO is a federal agency under the authority of HUD.

HUD moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claim on the ground of sovereign immunity. HANO moves to dismiss plaintiff's claim on the ground that 42 U.S.C. § 1437f does not grant plaintiff a private cause of action.

LAW

I. Rule 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "allow[s] a party to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case." Ramming v. U.S., 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). The party asserting jurisdiction carries the burden of proof. Id. The district court may base its determination as to its subject matter jurisdiction on: "(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Id.

II. Rule 12(b)(6)

A district court may dismiss a complaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if the plaintiff has not set forth a factual allegation in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007). As the Fifth Circuit explained in Gonzalez v. Kay:

"Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The Supreme Court recently expounded upon the Twombly standard, explaining that "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, —U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. It follows that "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not 'show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to relief.' " Id. at 1950 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009).

This Court will not look beyond the factual allegations in the pleadings to determine whether relief should be granted. See Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). In assessing the complaint, a court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and liberally construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Spivey, 197 F.3d at 774; Lowrey v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997). "Dismissal is appropriate when the complaint 'on its face show[s] a bar to relief.' " Cutrer v. McMillan, 308 Fed. Appx. 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir. 1986)).

As plaintiff is appearing pro se, the Court is permitted to examine his complaint with "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, (1972). Plaintiff's pleading is to be construed liberally. U.S. v. Riascos, 76 F.3d 93, 94 (5th Cir. 1996).

ANALYSIS

I. Claim Against HUD

Federal courts may exercise jurisdiction only to the extent that it is granted to them under the Constitution and by Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). "The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued." U.S. v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). This immunity deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction. Chapa v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 339 F.3d 388, 389 (5th Cir. 2003). Lawsuits against the agencies of the United States are considered to be suits against the United States. Kentucky v. Gordon, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).

HUD contends that plaintiff's claim against it should be dismissed based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction because HUD, as an agency of the United States, is entitled to sovereign immunity. "Because sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature, Congress's waiver of it must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text and will not be implied." Freeman v. U.S., 556 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The issue before the Court is whether plaintiff has satisfied her burden of showing Congress's unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. at 334.

Plaintiff has not identified, and the Court has not found, any waiver of sovereign immunity applicable to plaintiff's claim against HUD. 42 U.S.C. § 1404a permits the Secretary of HUD to "sue and be sued only with respect to its functions under the United States HousingAct of 1937...." 42 U.S.C. § 1404a. Section 1404a is inapplicable to this case since plaintiff has not sued the Secretary of HUD in this lawsuit. However, even if plaintiff had sued the Secretary of HUD instead of just HUD, plaintiff's claim would not fall within § 1404a as she alleges wrongdoing by HANO,¹⁰ an entity separate from HUD.¹¹

Plaintiff cites Anderson v. Donovan, 2011 WL 1337085, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2011) and argues that HUD has waived its sovereign immunity in this case. However, plaintiff overlooks the fact that subject matter jurisdiction in Anderson was derived from the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 702, which waives federal agencies' sovereign immunity in lawsuits for relief other than money damages. See Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 359 (5th Cir. 2009). The APA does not waive HUD's sovereign immunity in this case because plaintiff is seeking money damages.

In the absence of a waiver of sovereign immunity, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim against HUD will be dismissed with prejudice.¹²

II. Claim Against HANO

Plaintiff claims that by forwarding Section 8 rental payments to Woods, who was not the owner of the property, HANO violated § 1437f and she is entitled to recovery from HANO. Considering the fact that plaintiff is not a party contemplated in the statute, the issue before the Court is whether plaintiff has a private cause of action pursuant to § 1437f.

The tenant living at 927-929 Bordeaux Street participated in the Housing Choice Voucher Program, which is tenant-based (as opposed to project-based) rental assistance authorized pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. See generally, Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson Parish, 442 F.3d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 2006). The program assists families meeting the statute's low-income standard in renting housing in the private market. Id. Section 1437f authorizes HUD to enter into contracts with a public housing agency ("PHA"), in this case, HANO, which permits the PHA to obtain federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1); 24 C.F.R. § 982.151. The PHA, in turn, enters into a housing assistance payment contract ("HAP contract") with the owner of the dwelling selected by the participant and the PHA issues vouchers that are payable directly to a participant's landlord. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1); 24 C.F.R. § 982.456; see also Johnson, 442 F.3d at 358.

Essentially, plaintiff's claim is that Woods induced HANO into signing a HAP contract with him by fraudulently representing that he was the rightful owner of the property. Plaintiff now seeks the Section 8 rental proceeds that Woods received from HANO. However, plaintiff, herself, was not a party to Woods's HAP contract with HANO.¹³ In light of this fact, plaintiff has failed to indicate how the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f, provides her with an avenue of relief. Furthermore, by HUD regulation, 24 C.F.R. § 982.456, the HAPcontract between a PHA and a property owner does not create any third-party rights: "[t]he HAP contract shall not be construed as creating any right of the family or other third party (other than HUD) to enforce any provision of the HAP contract, or to assert any claim against HUD, the PHA or...