Wall Twp. Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. of the Wall Twp. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 14 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. A-4885-17T1 |
| Parties | WALL TOWNSHIP EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, KATHLEEN F. DORAN, a resident, taxpayer, and voter of Wall Township and a parent of Wall Township Schools students, GAIL MAHER, a member of the Wall Township Education Association, EUGENE DeLUTIO, a member of the Wall Township Education Association KATHLEEN SAYERS, a member of the Wall Township Education Association, ROBERT LEACH II, a member of the Wall Township Education Association, JAIMIELYNN CAMPBELL, a member of the Wall Township Education Association, and KRISTY ANSBACH, a member of the Wall Township Education Association, Petitioners-Appellants, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE WALL TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT, MONMOUTH COUNTY and CHERYL DYER, Superintendent of Schools for the Wall Township School District, Respondents-Respondents. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Before Judges Sumners and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from the Commissioner of Education, Docket No. 252-10/17.
Flavio L. Komuves argued the cause for appellants (Zazzali, Fagella, Nowak, Kleinbaum & Friedman, attorneys; Flavio L. Komuves, of counsel and on the brief; Raymond M. Baldino, on the briefs).
Michael J. Gross argued the cause for respondent Wall Township Board of Education (Kenney, Gross, Kovats & Parton, attorneys; Michael J. Gross, of counsel; Daniel R. Roberts, on the brief).
Andrew Babiak argued the cause for respondent Cheryl Dyer (Andrew Babiak, of counsel and on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Commissioner of Education (Caroline G. Jones, Deputy Attorney General, on the statement in lieu of brief).
This appeal from a final agency decision by the Commissioner of Education (the Commissioner) concerns whether the Wall Township Board of Education (the Board) and Superintendent Cheryl Dyer (collectively respondents) may mutually agree to "rescind" her employment contract prior toits expiration date and enter into a new contract without triggering the public notice and public hearing requirements of N.J.S.A. 18A:11-11. The Commissioner held that the plain language of the statute does not specifically cover a "rescission" and the subsequent replacement of the superintendent's contract and, thus, respondents did not have to comply with the statute. Even though we strive to give substantial deference to the Commissioner's interpretation of a statute he has the authority to enforce, we reverse because under our rules of statutory interpretation, the plain language of N.J.S.A. 18A:11-11 cannot be applied to create an absurd result that effectively circumvents, if not avoids, public notice and a public hearing regarding Dyer's new employment contract under the circumstances presented in this matter.
The record reveals the following facts. In September 2014, in accordance with an employment contract, Dyer was appointed Superintendent of Schools for the Wall Township School District, for a five-year term beginning September 23, 2014, and ending June 30, 2019. The contract contained an escalator clause that allowed Dyer to negotiate a salary increase with the Board in the event salary caps for school superintendents imposed by the Department of Education (the Department) were lifted. See N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-1.2.
In May 2017, new salary caps were put into effect by the Department. In response, Monmouth County Executive County Superintendent, Dr. Lester W. Richens, sent a countywide email to all superintendents advising that they could begin negotiating salary increases with their respective school boards. He further counseled that, if their current employment contract was amended, "there must be an advertised public hearing on [their] contract amendment[s]," but "[i]f [they] rescind [their] old contract[s] and a new contract is negotiated that replaces any existing contract, then there is no public hearing[,]" under N.J.S.A. 18A:11-11.
Dyer and the Board, subsequently agreed in principle to "rescind" her original contract and enter into a new five-year contract ending at the conclusion of the 2021-2022 school year, with, among other things, a higher salary and increased vacation time. Complying with N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-3.1, Dyer submitted her proposed contract to Dr. Richens on September 1 for his review and approval, which he approved the same day. Fourteen days later, the Board put Dyer's proposed employment contract on its agenda for approval at its September 19 public meeting.
A few days prior to the meeting, Dyer, apparently sensing dissent among the Board members over the length of the proposed employment contract,advised Dr. Richens that the contract would be reduced to a three-year term ending at the conclusion of the 2019-2020 school year. Dr. Richens, on the day of the Board meeting, approved the contract with the shorter term. An hour before the meeting, Dyer notified the Board of the contract changes and Dr. Richens' approval. With neither public notice nor a public hearing, the Board approved Dyer's new employment contract that evening.
A little over a month later, Wall Township Education Association and its members Gail Maher, Eugene Delutio, Kathleen Sayers, Robert Leach II, Jaimielynn Campbell, Kristy Ansbach, and Kathleen F. Doran, a resident and parent of Wall Township schools' students (collectively petitioners), appealed the Commissioner to rescind the Board's decision. They alleged the Board violated N.J.S.A. 18A:11-11 by altering Dyer's employment contract without thirty-day public notice and a public hearing. The Commissioner transferred the case as a contested hearing to the Office of Administrative Law.
Following consideration of the parties' respective motions for summary disposition, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued his initial decision recommending that the petition be dismissed. The ALJ determined the legislative intent of N.J.S.A. 18A:11-11 and contract law did not suggest that mutual "rescission" of Dyer's employment contract and entering into a newcontract in its place, was forbidden. The ALJ determined the Legislature, for whatever reason, elected to omit the term "rescind" from the statute, thus "it must be presumed [the Legislature] was familiar with the various legal terms relevant to contracts and their meaning," and because a "rescission" involves termination of a contract rather than "a 'going-back' to re-open and reformulate the existing terms" of the contract, there was no amendment, extension or alteration to the terms to trigger the statute's public notice requirement.
Additionally, the ALJ determined there was no merit to petitioners' arguments that N.J.S.A. 18A:11-11 was intended to promote openness and transparency, and that respondents' actions were a "lawyer's trick" to undermine the statute's overall goal. He noted petitioners' interpretation of the Governor's Signing Statement regarding the statute, was misleading and the actual wording "does not indicate the literal wording of the statute does not reflect the legislative intention." Examining N.J.A.C. 6A:23-3.1(c)(1), the ALJ explained the regulation does not require any advance public notice or a mandatory public hearing when a new superintendent contract replaces an expired contract, and, thus "demonstrates that the Legislature . . . has not seen fit to extend these 'transparency' or 'public input' provisions to all situations where a board [of education] decides" to approve a superintendent's employment contract.
The Commissioner, after considering exceptions to the initial decision, issued his final agency decision adopting the ALJ's recommendation, and denied petitioner's motions and granted summary disposition to respondents.
Before us, petitioners raise the same arguments that were rejected by the Commissioner. They contend the Commissioner failed to apply the proper canons of statutory construction to his interpretation of N.J.S.A. 18A:11-11, leading to an unjust result that prevented the public from receiving notice of and having a public hearing concerning the Board's agenda item to approve a new employment contract for Dyer. Contending the statute is remedial because it furthers our state's interest in promoting government transparency, similar to the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA), N.J.S.A. 10:4-6 to -21, and Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, petitioners maintain the substance of Dyer's proposed new contract should be considered over its form to require public notice and a public hearing. Petitioners further assert the Commissioner's interpretation creates an absurd result because he and respondents refer to the new contract negotiations as a literal "rescission" and replacement of the then existing contract. But in reality, petitioners maintain respondents merely amended their relationship - without interruption of Dyer'semployment and alteration of her contractual responsibilities or authority as superintendent - in order to provide Dyer an extended term of employment, a higher salary and increased vacation time.
We begin with the principles that guide our review of an agency's decision to grant a summary disposition. Our review of a motion for summary decision before an administrative agency is largely the same as the standard for granting motions for summary judgment under Rule 4:46-2. Contini v. Bd. of Educ., 286 N.J. Super. 106, 121 (App. Div. 1995). However, our review of an agency's summary decision differs slightly from our de novo review of a court's grant of summary judgment. Busciglio v. DellaFave, 366 N.J. Super. 135, 139 (App. Div. 2004). Although we employ a de novo standard of review to an agency's determination that there are no genuine issues of material fact, we...
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