Wall v. Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, 2003 UT App 447 (Utah App. 12/26/2003)
| Decision Date | 26 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20030674-CA. |
| Citation | 2003 UT App 447 |
| Parties | John Wall and Nancy Wall, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, a Utah corporation, Defendant and Appellee. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley.
John Wall and Nancy Wall, North Salt Lake City, Appellants Pro Se.
Joseph J. Joyce and James D. Franckowiak, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Davis.
John and Nancy Wall (Walls) appeal a summary judgment dismissing their complaint against Bear River Mutual Insurance Company (Bear River). This case is before the court on Bear River's motion for summary affirmance.
The tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings "consists [of] instituting or maintaining civil proceedings for an improper purpose and without a justifiable basis." Gilbert v. Ince, 1999 UT 65,¶19, 981 P.2d 841. In order to prevail, a plaintiff must prove the defendant acted "without probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the . . . claim." Id. at ¶20. The person initiating, continuing, or procuring civil proceedings "has probable cause for doing so if he [or she] reasonably believes in the existence of the facts upon which the claim is based, and . . . correctly or reasonably believes that under those facts the claim may be valid under the applicable law." Id. at ¶19.
Nancy Wall was injured in an automobile accident, after which she recovered PIP benefits from Bear River, her no-fault insurer. The Walls later reached a settlement with the other driver, who was determined to be at fault, and with that driver's insurer. Bear River filed a declaratory judgment action, relying upon Jones v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979), to determine its responsibility to pay further PIP benefits after the settlement. The district court ruled that Bear River must continue to pay PIP benefits. This court affirmed in a 2-1 decision. See Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 937 P.2d 1282 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the majority decision, concluding that Jones had been implicitly overruled by Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980). See Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, 978 P.2d 460. The Walls then filed a complaint claiming that Bear River wrongfully prosecuted the declaratory judgment action and subsequent appellate proceedings.
Before Bear River filed its declaratory judgment action, the Utah Supreme Court had issued two opinions, within a year of each other, reaching apparently conflicting decisions on a no-fault insurer's obligation to pay PIP benefits to its insured after the insured had settled with a tortfeasor. Bear River relied upon Jones, in which "the Utah Supreme Court held that a no-fault insured was precluded, based on subrogation principles, from asserting a claim against his no-fault insurer for further PIP payments after the insured settled with the tortfeasor." Wall, 937 P.2d at 1284. In contrast, the Walls relied upon Ivie, in which "the court concluded that a no-fault insurer that has paid PIP benefits to its insured is not entitled, by way of subrogation, to reimbursement of those funds from a later recovery by its insured against a tortfeasor or the tortfeasor's insurer." Id. This court's majority opinion concluded that "the holding and underlying principles of Jones have been overruled sub silentio by Ivie and later supreme court cases." Id. at 1291. Accordingly, we held that Bear River's obligation to pay PIP benefits was not extinguished by the Walls' settlement with the tortfeasor. Id. at 1292. The dissent did not read Ivie as overruling Jones because Jones specifically applied to further payments after settlement, while Ivie considered whether a no-fault insurer could obtain reimbursed for past PIP benefits from settlement proceeds. Id. at 1292-93 (Bench, J., dissenting). The dissent opined that "[b]ecause it is possible to read the two cases to be in harmony with one another, this court should hold that the settlement cut off any further claims by the Walls for additional PIP benefits." Id. at 1293.
On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court considered the sole issue whether Jones was overruled by Ivie, and concluded Ivie did overrule "Jones's application of subrogation to PIP payments." Wall, 1999 UT 33 at ¶21. Noting that the Walls' case was factually closer to Jones because it concerned the "continuing obligation to pay PIP benefits," the court nevertheless concluded that "as to the responsibilities of tort victims, tortfeasors, PIP insurers, and liability insurers, Ivie implicitly rejected Jones." Id. at ¶11. The court conceded that the factual similarity of Ivie with later cases applying it "may suggest that Ivie did not overrule Jones but merely stated a different rule under facts different from Jones." Id. at ¶15. In sum, we note that the opinion acknowledged that (1) Jones might have been read as applying a different rule to different facts; (2) Ivie did not expressly overrule Jones; and (3) the intent to overrule Jones was implicit in Iv...
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