Wall v. Cherrydale Farms, Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-CV-70796-DT.,97-CV-70796-DT.
• Citation: 9 F.Supp.2d 784
• Parties: Ronnie B. and David M. WALL, Plaintiffs, v. CHERRYDALE FARMS, INC. and Conveyor Handling Company, Inc., Defendants. and CONVEYOR HANDLING COMPANY, INC., Cross-Plaintiff, v. ROACH MANUFACTURING CORPORATION C/O Gay Roach, Sr., Cross-Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

Page 784

9 F.Supp.2d 784

Ronnie B. and David M. WALL, Plaintiffs, v. CHERRYDALE FARMS, INC. and Conveyor Handling Company, Inc., Defendants. and CONVEYOR HANDLING COMPANY, INC., Cross-Plaintiff, v. ROACH MANUFACTURING CORPORATION C/O Gay Roach, Sr., Cross-Defendant.

No. 97-CV-70796-DT.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

June 8, 1998.

Stuart J. Goldberg, Eastman and Smith, Toledo, OH, for Ronnie B. and David M. Wall.

Dennis M. Goebel, Harvey, Kruse, Westen & Milan, P.C., Oakland, MI, for Conveyor Handling Co., Inc.

Daniel C. Symonds, Blake, Kirchner, Symonds, Macfarlane, Larson & Smith, Detroit, MI, for Roach Manufacturing Corp.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CONVEYOR HANDLING COMPANY LEAVE TO NAME CHERRYDALE FARMS, INC. AS A NON-PARTY AT FAULT

KOMIVES, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Background

This matter is before the Court on defendant Conveyor Handling Company's motion for leave to name Cherrydale Farms, Inc. as a non-party at fault. Plaintiff Ronnie B. Wall ("plaintiff")¹ was injured while an employee of Cherrydale Farms, Inc. ("Cherry-dale"). Plaintiff alleges that she was injured while using a conveyor belt system manufactured by Roach Manufacturing Company ("Roach") and sold by Conveyor Handling Company ("Conveyor Handling"). She claims that the conveyor belt system was defectively designed and manufactured and not reasonably safe, and that the alleged defects caused her injuries. Cherrydale was originally named as a defendant in this action, but plaintiff stipulated to its dismissal. Conveyor Handling was not a party to that stipulation.

Conveyor Handling claims that discovery in this action has revealed that Cherrydale (1) failed to instruct and properly train plaintiff on the safe operation and use of the conveyor system which is the subject of this dispute, (2) failed to instruct plaintiff concerning safety rules and procedures, (3) failed to insure that only properly trained personnel could operate and/or use the conveyor system, and (4) failed to enforce safety rules. Thus, Conveyor Handling claims that Cherrydale may be wholly or partially at fault for plaintiffs alleged injuries, and that it has the right to have Cherrydale's percentage of fault assessed by the jury. Therefore, Conveyor Handling seeks leave to identify Cherrydale as a non-party at fault under M.C.L. § 600.2957(1).

Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion. She argues that the "empty chair" provision of M.C.L. § 600.2957 is unconstitutional, because it denies her equal protection of the law, denies her due process, and arbitrarily impedes her right to prosecute her suit. Moreover, plaintiff argues that the denial of these rights is most apparent where, as here, the non-party is the plaintiff's employer and immune from suit due to the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Disability Compensation Act, M.C.L. § 418.131.

Plaintiff asserts that the "empty chair" provision fails the rational basis test. She points out that the statute permits a party defendant to identify a non-party, permits that defendant to present evidence regarding that non-party's fault, and permits the court to instruct the jury to allocate fault to that non-party. Plaintiff complains that the non-party does not actively participate in the discovery process or trial, and is not represented by counsel at either the discovery or trial stage. Therefore, she argues, M.C.L. § 600.2957 as applied gives a party defendant a tremendous procedural advantage in diminishing the allocation of fault against it, and allocating fault to non-parties who are not represented in the action and who have no risk of exposure. She claims that the statute places an almost impossible burden on her to assert her claim, and that it does not bear a fair relationship to the purpose of allocating fault among all potential tortfeasors and is therefore violative of the equal protection clause. Further, plaintiff claims that by allowing fault to be attributed against a non-party employer, which reduces the potential recovery of an injured plaintiff without adequate procedural safeguards, the statute infringes upon the plaintiffs right to due process of the law.

Plaintiff contends that the statute's unconstitutionality is most egregious in cases where the "at fault non-party" is or was plaintiff's employer, immune from suit by plaintiff. She argues that M.C.L. § 600.2957 allows an at-fault employer to "escape" liability altogether for any fault attributed to such employer by the jury, while allowing the employer, at the expense of the injured plaintiff, to be reimbursed for workers compensation expenses. Plaintiff contends that, if the statute's legitimate purpose is to develop a fair result for all the parties, its provisions are not rationally related to that purpose.

On May 11, 1998, a telephonic hearing was held. At the conclusion of that hearing, the matter was taken under advisement and Conveyor Handling was given until May 22, 1998, to file a brief in reply to plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to its motion, in order to address plaintiffs constitutional arguments.

Conveyor Handling filed its reply brief on May 22, 1998. In it. Conveyor Handling argues that statutes carry a presumption of constitutionality, and the burden is on plaintiff to show that the statute violates the due process and/or equal protection clauses. Further, it asserts that the constitution does not create a fundamental right to pursue specific tort actions, and that states may create immunities that effectively eliminate causes of action, subject only to the requirement that their actions not be arbitrary or irrational. Conveyor Handling contends that both equal protection and due process challenges to a state's abolition of a previously created cause of action in tort are subject to a rational relationship analysis. Moreover, it argues that the Michigan statute has certain procedural safeguards: (1) it allows plaintiff to file a cause of action against the allegedly responsible non-party, (2) it provides that the assessment of the non-party's fault does not establish liability against the non-party and cannot be used as evidence of liability in any subsequent proceeding, and (3) it places the burden of proof on the defendant to prove the non-party's fault.

Conveyor Handling points out that before tort reform, when a plaintiff's damages were caused in part by an immune entity such as the government or the plaintiff's employer, the party defendants bore the burden of paying damages for the immune party's negligence. Conveyor Handling asserts that the non-party fault rule simply represents the legislature's determination that the plaintiff should bear the burden of the employer's fault rather than the defendant, and that this is consistent with the purpose of the Workers' Disability Compensation Act² and ensures that injured workers recover damages caused solely by third parties.

Further, Conveyor Handling points out that employers who pay workers' compensation benefits retain a lien against the proceeds of third party lawsuits and may intervene as a party plaintiff in such actions, and that if Cherrydale is necessary as a plaintiff and refuses to intervene, it can be made an involuntary plaintiff under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a).

II. Analysis

Michigan law after tort reform allows defendants to have the trier of fact apportion fault among all responsible persons, including those who are not parties to the action, to determine the named parties' liability. M.C.L. § 600.2957(1) states:

Sec. 2957. (1) In an action based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, the liability of each person shall be allocated under this section by the trier of fact and, subject to section 6304, in direct proportion to the person's percentage of fault. In assessing percentages of fault under this subsection, the trier of fact shall consider the fault of each person, regardless of whether the person is, or could have been, named as a party to the action.

Plaintiff challenges this statute as violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the U.S. Constitution and Michigan Constitution.³ State legislatures are presumed by federal courts to have acted constitutionally in making laws. Hartford Fire Ins. v. Lawrence, Dykes, Goodenberger, Bower & Clancy, 740 F.2d 1362, 1366 (6th Cir.1984) (citing McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802, 809, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 1408, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969)); Wilson v. Robinson, 668 F.2d 380, 383 (8th Cir.1981); Alabama State Federation of Teachers v. James, 656 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir.1981).

1. Due Process

Plaintiff alleges that her due process rights will be violated if the Court grants Conveyor Handling leave to name Cherrydale as a non-party at fault. Procedural due process questions are examined in two steps. First, the Court must determine whether a protected liberty or property interest exists which was interfered with by the state. Second, the Court must decide whether the deprivation of that interest was in accordance with due process. Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989) (citations omitted): Tony L. v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182, 1185 (6th Cir.1995).

Plaintiff was injured after the effective date of the statute,⁴ and she is not claiming that she had a vested right to a remedy which was abolished retroactively. She merely argues that it is a violation of due process for her to be prohibited from recovering damages from party defendants which she is unable to recover from an alleged non-party at fault, her employer, as she would have been able to do if she would have been injured before the enactment of the new law.

"Property interests are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created, and their dimensions are defined, by existing rules or understandings that...