Wall v. Kholi

• Decision Date: 07 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–868.,09–868.
• Citation: 179 L.Ed.2d 252,562 U.S. 545,131 S.Ct. 1278
• Parties: Ashbel T. WALL, II, Director, Rhode Island Department of Corrections, Petitioner, v. Khalil KHOLI.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

562 U.S. 545

131 S.Ct. 1278

179 L.Ed.2d 252

Ashbel T. WALL, II, Director, Rhode Island Department of Corrections, Petitioner,

v.Khalil KHOLI.

No. 09–868.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Nov. 29, 2010.

Decided March 7, 2011.

Aaron L. Weisman, Providence, RI, for petitioner.

Judith H. Mizner, Boston, MA, appointed by this Court, for respondent.

Patrick C. Lynch, Rhode Island Attorney General, Gerald Coyne, Deputy Attorney General, Stacey Pires Veroni, Chief Criminal Division, Aaron L. Weisman, Assistant Attorney General, Counsel of Record, Chief Criminal Appeals Unit, Christopher R. Bush, Special Assistant Attorney General, Rhode Island Department of Attorney General, Providence, Rhode Island for petitioner A.T Wall.

Judith H. Mizner, Counsel of Record, Federal Defender Office, Boston, MA, for respondent Khalil Kholi.

Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), "a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim" tolls the 1–year limitation period for filing a federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The question in this case is whether a motion to reduce sentence under Rhode Island law tolls the limitation period, thereby rendering respondent Khalil Kholi's federal habeas petition timely.

We hold that the phrase "collateral review" in § 2244(d)(2) means judicial review of a judgment in a proceeding that is not part of direct review. Because the parties agree that a motion to reduce sentence under Rhode Island law is not part of the direct review process, we hold that respondent's motion tolled the AEDPA limitationperiod and that his federal habeas petition was therefore timely.

I

A

In 1993, respondent was convicted in Rhode Island Superior Court on 10 counts of first-degree sexual assault, and he was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment. Respondent raised various challenges to his conviction on direct appeal, but the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed his conviction. See State v. Kholi, 672 A.2d 429, 431 (1996). The parties agree that respondent's conviction became final on direct review when his time expired for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court. Brief for Petitioner 7, n. 4; Brief for Respondent 3, n. 1; 582 F.3d 147, 150 (C.A.1 2009) ; see generally Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, ––––, 129 S.Ct. 681, 685, 172 L.Ed.2d 475 (2009). That date was May 29, 1996. See this Court's Rules 13.1, 13.3, 30.1.

In addition to taking a direct appeal, respondent filed two state motions that are relevant to our decision. The first, filed on May 16, 1996, was a motion to reduce sentence under Rule 35 of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.¹ App. 8. In that motion, respondent asked the trial court to "reconsider its prior determination" and "order that his life sentences run concurrently." State v. Kholi, 706 A.2d 1326 (R.I.1998) (order). Concluding that "the sentence imposed was appropriate," the hearing justice denied the Rule 35 motion. Ibid. On January 16, 1998, the State Supreme Court affirmed and observed that the facts clearly justified the sentence. Id., at 1326–1327.

On May 23, 1997, while the Rule 35 motion was pending, respondent also filed an application for state post-conviction relief, see R.I. Gen. Laws 10–9.1–1 et seq. (Lexis 1997) (titled "Post Conviction Remedy"), which challenged his conviction. The trial court denied this motion as well, and the State Supreme Court affirmed that decision on December 14, 2006. See Kholi v. Wall, 911 A.2d 262, 263–264 (R.I.2006).

B

Respondent filed a federal habeas petition in the District of Rhode Island on September 5, 2007. App. 3. By that time, his conviction had been final for over 11 years. AEDPA generally requires a federal habeas petition to be filed within one year of the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). But the 1–year limitation period is tolled during the pendency of "a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim." § 2244(d)(2).

There is no dispute that respondent's application for post-conviction relief tolled the limitation period for over nine years—from May 23, 1997, through December 14, 2006. 582 F.3d, at 151. Even after subtracting that stretch of time from the 11–year period, however, the period between the conclusion of direct review and the filing of the federal habeas petition still exceeds one year. Thus, in order for respondent's petition to be timely, the Rule 35 motion to reduce sentence must also trigger the tolling provision.

Respondent's federal habeas petition was referred to a Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation, and the Magistrate Judge concluded that the Rule 35 motion was not a " ‘properly filed application for post-conviction or other collateral review’ " under § 2244(d)(2) because it was " a ‘plea of leniency,’ and not a motion challenging the legal sufficiency of his sentence." No. CA 07–346S, 2008 WL 60194, *4 (R. I., Jan. 3, 2008). The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation and therefore dismissed the federal habeas petition as untimely. See id., at *1. On appeal, the First Circuit reversed. 582 F.3d 147.

The Courts of Appeals are divided over the question whether a motion to reduce sentence tolls the period of limitation under § 2244(d)(2).² We granted certiorari to answer this question with respect to a motion to reduce sentence under Rhode Island law. 560 U.S. 903, 130 S.Ct. 3274, 176 L.Ed.2d 1181 (2010).

II

A

AEDPA establishes a 1–year period of limitation for a state prisoner to file a federal application for a writ of habeas corpus. § 2244(d)(1). This period runs "from the latest of" four specified dates, including "the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." § 2244(d)(1)(A) ; see also Jimenez, supra, at 1282 – 1283, 129 S.Ct., at 685 (explaining when "the conclusion of direct review occurs"). The limitation period is tolled, however, during the pendency of "a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim." § 2244(d)(2). The question in this case is whether a motion for reduction of sentence under Rhode Island's Rule 35 is an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral review."

The parties agree that the answer to this question turns on the meaning of the phrase "collateral review," see Brief for Petitioner 19; Brief for Respondent 12–13, but they disagree about the definition of that term. Rhode Island argues that "collateral review" includes only "legal" challenges to a conviction or sentence and thus excludes motions seeking a discretionary sentence reduction. Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that "collateral review" is "review other than review of a judgment in the direct appeal process" and thus includes motions to reduce sentence. Brief for Respondent 17. We agree with respondent's understanding of "collateral review."

B

"Collateral review" is not defined in AEDPA, and we have never provided a comprehensive definition of that term. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 175–178, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001). We therefore begin by considering the ordinary understanding of the phrase "collateral review." See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) ("We give the words of a statute their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning, absent an indication Congress intended them to bear some different import" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002) (considering the ordinary meaning of the word "pending" in § 2244(d)(2) ).

The term "collateral," in its "customary and preferred sense," Williams, supra, at 431, 120 S.Ct. 1479, means "[l]ying aside from the main subject, line of action, issue, purpose, etc.; ... subordinate, indirect," 3 Oxford English Dictionary 473 (2d ed.1989) (hereinafter OED); see also Webster's Third New International Dictionary 444 (1993) (hereinafter Webster's) ("accompanying as ... secondary," "indirect," or "ancillary"). By definition, something that is "collateral" is "indirect," not direct. 3 OED 473. This suggests that "collateral" review is review that is "[l]ying aside from the main" review, i.e., that is not part of direct review. See ibid.

The definition of the related phrase "collateral attack" points in the same direction. A "collateral attack" is "[a]n attack on a judgment in a proceeding other than a direct appeal ." Black's Law Dictionary 298 (9th ed.2009) (emphasis added); cf. Wash. Rev.Code § 10.73.090(2) (2008) (defining "collateral attack" as "any form of post-conviction relief other than a direct appeal"). This usage buttresses the conclusion that "collateral review" means a form of review that is not part of the direct appeal process.

C

Our prior usage of the term "collateral" also supports this understanding. We have previously described a variety of proceedings as "collateral," and all of these proceedings share the characteristic that we have identified, i.e., they stand apart from the process of direct review.

For example, our cases make it clear that habeas corpus is a form of collateral review. We have used the terms habeas corpus and "collateral review" interchangeably, see, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 482–483, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986), and it is well accepted that state petitions for habeas corpus toll the limitation period, e.g., Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 272, 125 S.Ct. 1528, 161 L.Ed.2d 440 (2005) ("[T]he 1–year statute of limitations ... was tolled while Rhines' state habeas corpus petition was pending").

We have also described...