Wallace v. Adams

• Decision Date: 21 February 1906
• Docket Number: 2,313.
• Citation: 143 F. 716
• Parties: WALLACE et al. v. ADAMS et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

143 F. 716

WALLACE et al. v. ADAMS et al.

No. 2,313.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

February 21, 1906

(Syllabus by the Court.)

The power conferred upon the Dawes Commission and the United States courts in the Indian Territory by Act June 10, 1896 c. 398, 19 Stat. 339, 340, and upon the Supreme Court by Act July 1, 1898, c. 545, 30 Stat. 591, to determine who were citizens of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, was legislative, and not judicial, and judgments thereunder were subject to any subsequent legislation of the United States respecting the question of citizenship, which was enacted before allotments of lands were made to successful litigants.

Claimants of citizenship who secured judgments in their favor, which were final under these acts when they were rendered, and took possession of, and demanded suitable lands as their allotments, before their judgments were made reviewable acquired no vested rights therein against subsequent legislation enacted before the lands were alloted to them.

The judgments of citizenship rendered by the courts were conclusive upon the parties in the absence of subsequent legislation, but, though final when rendered, were voidable and reviewable by subsequent acts of Congress enacted before allotments of land were made under them.

The Act July 1, 1902, c 1362, 32 Stat. 641, whereby a citizenship court was created and empowered to review the final judgments of the courts of the United States under Act June 10, 1896 c. 398, 29 Stat. 339, which had been affirmed by the Supreme Court, was constitutional and valid against successful litigants who had not procured allotments before its passage.

The United States courts in the territories and the Supreme Court in reviewing their decisions do not exercise the judicial power granted by the legislative department of the government by virtue of the sovereignty of the nation and the authority granted to Congress by section 3, art. 4, of the Constitution, to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States.

The United courts in the Indian Territory have jurisdiction of an action of ejectment brought by an Indian allottee against one in possession of his allotment.

The United States courts in the Indian Territory have jurisdiction in equity to charge the legal title to land evidenced by a certificate of allotment issued by the Dawes Commission under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, with a trust in favor of the rightful claimant, either on account of an error of the commission in the construction of the law or its misapprehension of the facts induced through fraud or gross mistake.

The jurisdiction of the Dawes Commission, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and the effect of their action in the allotment of lands of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, are the same as the jurisdiction and the effect of the action of the Land Department of the United States in the disposition by patent of the public lands within within its control.

The recital in a judgment or decree that a required notice was 'given to the defendants in conformity of law: raises the presumption of due service and of jurisdiction of the persons, in the absence of any inconsistent record or evidence.

A. C. Cruce (W. I. Cruce and W. R. Bleakmore, on the brief), for plaintiffs in error.

Thomas Norman and H. H. Brown, for defendants in error.

George A. Mansfield, J. F. McMurray, and Melven Cornish, in behalf of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations as amici curiae.

Before SANBORN, HOOK, and ADAMS, Circuit Judges.

SANBORN Circuit Judge.

This case is presented to test the validity of the decree of the Choctaw and Chickasaw citizenship court of December 17, 1902, which by its terms annulled all the judgments and decisions of the United States courts in the Indian Territory which had admitted persons to citizenship under the act of June 10, 1896, in either the Choctaw of Chickasaw Nation of Indians. These nations were the owners of a large and valuable tract of land in common, so that each and every member of each tribe had an equal undivided interest in the whole. Treaty with the Choctaw Nation of September 17, 1830, article 2, 7 Stat. 333; Treaty with the Choctaws and Chickasaws of June 22, 1855, articles 1, 2, and 3, 11 Stat. 611, 612. By the act of March 3, 1893, the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes, generally known as the 'Dawes Commission,' was created and empowered to negotiate an extinguishment of the tribal title to these lands and an allotment thereof to the members of the tribes in severalty. 27 Stat. 645, c. 209, § 16. As soon as the allotment of these lands to the members of the tribes in severalty became imminent, citizenship therein became desirable. Many sought membership in the tribes whose claims to that relation were not conceded by the nations, and it became necessary to determine in some way who were the lawful citizens of these Indian tribes. Each nation had a roll of its acknowledged citizens and each denied the right of many applicants to membership. In this state of the case the United States, by Act June 10, 1896, 29 Stat. 339, 340, c. 398 (1) confirmed the rolls of citizenship of the tribes as they then existed, (2) authorized and required the Dawes Commission to hear the application and to determine the right of each applicant for citizenship in either of these tribes, (3) granted an appeal to the United States District Court in the Indian Territory to each party aggrieved by a decision of the commission upon this issue of citizenship, (4) declared that the judgment of that court should be final, and (5) required the commission to make a complete roll of the citizens of each of the tribes and to include therein the names those whose rights of citizenship should be sustained by the courts. of those whose rights of citizenship should be sustained by the courts. Hill, one of the defendants below in this action, and the only one whose rights it is necessary to consider because all the other defendants claim under him, was not enrolled or acknowledged by the Choctaw Nation as one of its citizens, but was, in fact, a member of the tribe by blood and entitled to all the rights of a citizen therein. He applied to the Dawes Commission to be admitted to membership. The commission denied his application. He appealed to the United States Court for the Southern District of the Indian Territory, and on March 8, 1898, that court adjudged that he was a member of the Choctaw Tribe by blood and that he should be admitted thereto as a citizen. Immediately thereafter, and during that month, he took possession of the land which is the subject of this action. This land is a tract not more valuable or extensive than he would be entitled to receive as his allotment if he were enrolled as a citizen of the Choctaw Nation. Before June, 1898, he placed improvements of the value of at least $1,000 upon this land, and has ever since retained the possession thereof with the intent to secure the same as his allotment.

On June 18, 1898, and while he was thus in possession of the land Congress passed an act whereby it consented to the Atoka agreement with the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations of April 23, 1897, empowered the Dawes Commission to allot the lands of these tribes to their members in severalty and provided that any member should be entitled to receive his allotment out of the lands in his possession if he chose to do so. 30 Stat. 495, 498, c. 517. Hill made his choice. On July 1, 1898, Congress granted to the tribes an appeal to the Supreme Court from the judgment of March 8, 1898, in favor of Hill, and from all other judgments in the United States Courts in the Indian Territory in citizenship cases which involved the constitutionality or validity of any legislation affecting citizenship of the allotment of Indian lands. 30 Stat. 591, c. 545. The Choctaw Nation appealed from the judgment in favor of Hill, and his judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court on May 15, 1899. Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 19 Sup.Ct. 722, 43 L.Ed. 1041. In the proceedings which resulted in judgments of admission to citizenship in either the Choctaw or the Chickasaw Nation in the United States Courts notice had been given to only one of these nations and the courts had tried the actions upon the appeals de novo. The Indian Nations insisted that these proceedings were erroneous, and that the judgments were therefore unjust. On March 21, 1902, an agreement was made between the United States and the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, which was confirmed by Act Cong. July 1, 1902, c. 1362, 32 Stat. 641. This agreement and act were to the effect that the Choctaw and Chickasaw citizenship court, to be composed of three judges to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, should be created, that this court, upon the institution of a suit in equity therein by either or both of these tribes against 10 persons who had been admitted to citizenship or enrollment by the Indian Territory, as representatives of all persons similarly situated, should inquire and determine (1) whether or not notice to each of the two nations was indispensable to the proceedings and judgments of admission to citizenship in those courts, (2) whether the proceedings of those courts should have been confined to a review of the action of the Dawes Commission upon the papers and evidence submitted to it or should have extended to a trial of the actions de novo, and (3) whether or not the judgments of the United States courts should be annulled on account of either or both of these alleged irregularities. The act and agreement also provided that, in case the citizenship court should decide...