Wallace v. Brice

• Decision Date: 21 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 1248,1248
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
• Parties: RAYMOND WALLACE v. CHRISTINE P. BRICE, et vir

RAYMOND WALLACE v. CHRISTINE P. BRICE, et vir

No. 1248

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2014

October 21, 2015

UNREPORTED

Eyler, Deborah S., Woodward, Berger, JJ.

Opinion by Woodward, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority.Md. Rule 1-104.

On April 7, 2014, appellant, Raymond Wallace, filed suit against appellees, Christine P. Brice("Christine") and R. David Brice, in the Circuit Court for Kent County, claiming entitlement to a life estate in property owned by appellees.Appellant's amended complaint sought relief in three separate counts.Count One requested the imposition of a constructive trust on the property for the benefit of appellant.Count Two asked the court to establish an equitable lien on the property for appellant.Count Three sought restitution for unjust enrichment in the amount of $150,000.Counts One and Two sought relief based on an alleged agreement between appellant and Christine for a life estate.Count Three was based on appellant's building of a house on the property in reliance on that agreement.The court granted appellees' motion to dismiss the amended complaint.In its order, the court concluded that all counts of the amended complaint were barred by the Statute of Frauds.

On appeal, appellant presents two questions for our review, which we have rephrased:¹

1.Did the trial court err by dismissing Counts One and Two of the amended complaint on the basis of the Statute of Frauds?

2.Did the trial court err by dismissing Count Three of the amended complaint on the basis of the Statute of Frauds?

For the reasons stated herein, we shall affirm the circuit court's dismissal of Counts One and Two, but will vacate the dismissal of Count Three.

BACKGROUND

On September 24, 1990, appellant and his wife, Delores Wallace, purchased a 2.001-acre parcel of land ("the Property") located in Kent County, Maryland.Appellant constructed a house on the Property in which he and his wife resided.On August 20, 2004, Mrs. Wallace conveyed her entire interest in the Property to appellant.On October 18, 2007, appellant sold the Property to Christine for $300,000.Christine is Mrs. Wallace's daughter and appellant's step-daughter.By the terms of the deed conveying the property, Christine was granted the Property "as sole owner, in fee simple."No life estate was reserved to appellant in the deed.After the sale, appellant and his wife continued to reside on the Property, along with Christine and two of her children.

On January 13, 2009, Christine, with the assistance of appellant, purchased an acre of land adjoining the Property for the sum of $1,000.The new land was administratively combined with the original 2.001-acre parcel.Appellant then spent $123,000 building a house on the new land, in which he and his wife proceeded to live.

Mrs. Wallace died in November 2011.On February 22, 2013, Christine conveyed the now 3.001-acre Property to her husband, R. David Brice, and herself, as tenants bythe entirety.In March 2014, appellees informed appellant that they intended to sell the Property and that he would need to remove himself from the Property.

On April 7, 2014, appellant filed a Complaint for Establishment of Constructive Trust against appellees in the circuit court.In his complaint, appellant asserted his claim to a life estate in the Property and sought relief in the form of a constructive trust on the Property.On May 15, 2014, appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the Statute of Frauds was a complete bar to appellant's claim, and that appellant had failed to join a necessary party.On June 3, 2014, appellant filed a response to the motion to dismiss.On the same day, appellant also filed an Amended Complaint for Establishment of Constructive Trust and Related Relief.Appellant's amended complaint added CNB, a bank and Maryland corporation, as an additional defendant.Appellant's amended complaint sought relief in three counts: One, a constructive trust, Two, an equitable lien, and Three, unjust enrichment.Counts One and Two were based on the alleged agreement between appellant and Christine for a life estate in the Property.Count Three was based on appellant's building of the new residence on the Property.On June 18, 2014, appellees filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, again asserting the Statute of Frauds as a defense to all counts of the amended complaint.²

On August 12, 2014, the circuit court held a hearing on appellees' motion to dismiss the amended complaint.At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated: "I think it's that somewhat preordained result that causes the law to say that the statute of frauds says that there must be something, some memorandum, some writing.In short, the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss and with regret, I might say, that I do so."In an order issued that same day, the court dismissed the entire case with prejudice, finding that "this action is barred by the Statute of Frauds."This timely appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The proper standard for reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss is whether the trial court was legally correct.In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, we must determine whether the complaint, on its face, discloses a legally sufficient cause of action.In reviewing the complaint, we must presume the truth of all well-pleaded facts in the complaint, along with any reasonable inferences derived therefrom.Dismissal is proper only if the facts and allegations, so viewed, would nevertheless fail to afford plaintiff relief if proven.

Higginbotham v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 171 Md. App. 254, 264(2006)(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

I.Part Performance

The Statute of Frauds is codified in Section 5-104 of the Real PropertyArticle:

No action may be brought on any contract for the sale or disposition of land or of any interest in or concerning land unless the contract on which the action is brought, or some memorandum or note of it, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged or some other person lawfully authorized by him.

Md. Code(1974, 2010 Repl.Vol.), § 5-104 of the Real PropertyArticle("RP").For a contract to be enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, the required memorandum must be:

(1) a writing (formal or informal);

(2) signed by the party to be charged or by his agent;

(3) naming each party to the contract with sufficient definiteness to identify him or his agent;

(4) describing the land or other property to which the contract relates; and

(5) setting forth the terms and conditions of all the promises constituting the contract made between the parties.

Beall v. Beall, 291 Md. 224, 228-29(1981).

Appellant does not claim that there is any writing to evidence the alleged agreement between appellant and Christine that grants him a life estate.Instead, appellant argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in dismissing Counts One and Two of his amended complaint, because his part performance of the agreement removes the bar of the Statute of Frauds.Appellant asserts that his sale of the Property to Christine on October 18, 2007, was made with the understanding that appellant and his wife had a right to live on the Property for the duration of their lives.Appellant claims that in furtherance of such understanding, he facilitated the purchase of the additional acre of land at a discounted price, spent $123,000 constructing a residence on the new acre for himself and his wife, and continued to live on the Property from the sale to Christinethrough the initiation of this case in April 2014.Appellant asserts that, but for the understanding that he had a life estate in the Property, he never would have conveyed the Property to Christine, helped expand the size of the Property, or spent money building a new home on the Property.Appellant contends that his actions following the October 2007 conveyance to Christine "make sense only in the context of the alleged oral agreement securing him and his now deceased wife a place to live during their respective lifetimes."Appellant concludes that, if this Court assumes the truth of his well-pled allegations, they"show partial performance of an oral contract granting [a]ppellant a life estate in the property."

Appellees counter that "the Statute of Frauds precludes any action based upon an unwritten contract to impose a life estate."According to appellees, it is "undisputed that there is not, nor has there ever been, any writing of any kind to evidence an agreement among the parties that [appellant] ever had a life estate in the [P]roperty or that he would be compensated for improvements."Appellees contend that "[p]art performance will not make an oral contract enforceable unless it is such as to be directly referable to that contract."Appellees claim that the part performance "must furnish evidence of the identity of the contract" and "relate to and be unequivocal evidence of the terms of a particular agreement."Appellees conclude that, because appellant's "conduct is not specifically referable to any particular agreement," it "does not amount to part performance and will not prevent imposition of the Statute of Frauds."

"This Court has stated that part performance is adequate to remove the bar of the statute of frauds when there is 'full and satisfactory evidence' of the terms of the agreement and the acts constituting part performance."Beall, 291 Md. at 230(quotingHall v. Hall, 1 Gill 383, 393(1843))."'The act relied on as part performance must, in itself furnish evidence of the identity of the contract; and it is not enough that it is evidence of some agreement, but it must relate to and be unequivocal evidence of the particular agreement charged in the bill.'"Campbell v. Welsh, 54...