Wallace v. Magnolia Family Servs., L.L.C.
| Decision Date | 24 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-4703 DIVISION "3" |
| Parties | ANDERSON WALLACE, JR. v. MAGNOLIA FAMILY SERVICES, L.L.C. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is the Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to FRCP 60(b) [Doc. #127] filed by plaintiff Anderson Wallace, Jr. Having reviewed the motion, the opposition, and the case law, the Court rules as follows.
Pro se plaintiff, Anderson Wallace, Jr., filed this complaint against his employer Magnolia Family Services, L.L.C. ("Magnolia" or "defendant"), in which Terrebonne Parish School Board is an alleged stakeholder. Wallace works as a counselor for children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Wallace is a recovering user of narcotics who has been drug-free for many years. Wallace alleges that Magnolia has an employment practice or policy that operates to exclude African-Americans with criminal backgrounds from continued employment with it. Wallace maintains that Magnolia wrongfully discharged him after he was charged in a domestic-violence incident that was subsequently refused by the Thirty-Second Judicial District Attorney's Office.
Wallace now sues defendant for race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (a disparate-impact claim). Wallace also sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") because Magnolia allegedly factored his past drug use into his discharge. He also sued under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315. Magistrate Judge Wilkinson dismissed these last two claims for failure to exhaust and failure to amend, respectively.1 Thus, the only claim that remained at the time of the motion for summary judgment was Wallace's disparate-impact claim.
On December 29, 2014, this Court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied Wallace's cross-motion. [Doc. #121]. On January 8, 2015, this Court denied Wallace's motion for reconsideration. [Doc. #125]. Wallace now moves for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Specifically, Wallace seeks relief under Subsections (b)(1), (b)(3) and (b)(4), and (b)(6).
A Rule 60(b) motion calls into question the correctness of a judgment. Under Rule 60(b), the Court may "relieve a party from a final judgment" for one of six enumerated reasons:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(6). Rule 60(b) relief will be afforded only in "unique circumstances." Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 769 F.2d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Wilson v. Atwood Group, 725 F.2d 255, 257, 258 (5th Cir. 1984)). The party seeking relief from a judgment or order bears the burden of demonstrating that the prerequisites for such relief are satisfied. See Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 561 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2009). The Court enjoys broad discretion in assessing whether any of these reasons are present in a given case. Teal v. Eagle Fleet, Inc., 933 F.2d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 1991). All Rule 60(b) motions must be brought within a "reasonable time" after judgment, and motions brought pursuant Rule 60(b)(1), (2), and (3) must be brought within one year of the judgment or order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c); see also Steverson v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., 508 F.3d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 2007). Wallace has filed his Rule 60(b) motion timely, and the Court thus proceeds to the merits of his arguments.
Under Rule 60 (b)(1), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:
Rule 60(b)(1) . . . allow[s] relief from final judgments on account of "mistake," and, in this circuit, the rule may be invoked for the correction of judicial error, but only to rectify an obvious error of law, apparent on the record. Thus, it may be employed when the judgment obviously conflicts with a clear statutory mandate or when the judicial error involves a fundamental misconception of the law.
Hill v. McDermott, Inc., 827 F.2d 1040, 1043 (5th Cir. 1987). The extraordinary relief afforded by Rule 60(b) requires that the moving party make a showing of unusual or unique circumstances justifying such relief. Pryor, 769 F.2d at 286.
Wallace first argues that the Court's ruling was factually incorrect because there was no need for statistical evidence. Wallace relies on Garcia v. Woman's Hospital of Texas, 97 F.3d 810 (5th Cir. 1996), to support his position. However, Wallace's reliance on Garcia is misplaced. What Wallace has failed to realize is that he filed a disparate-impact claim, and a disparate-impact claim only. Wallace did not file a disparate-treatment claim that was at issue before the District Court in Garcia. See id. at 812. In addition, in Garcia, the pregnant plaintiff was challenging her dismissal as a result of a mandatory job duty of lifting 150 pounds. See id. at 813. In discussing the potential for a disparate-impact claim, the court noted:
[S]he must show that pregnant women as a group would be subject to this medical restriction. If all or substantially all pregnant women would be advised by their obstetrician not to lift 150 pounds, then they would certainly be disproportionately affected by this supposedly mandatory job requirement for LVN's at the Hospital. Statistical evidence would be unnecessary if Garcia could establish this point.
Id. (emphasis added). In other words, the italicized statement would require Wallace to establish that all or substantially all African Americans have criminal backgrounds that would render them subject to the alleged employment practice and thus would disproportionately affect them. This, the Court is unwilling to assume, and, in any event, Wallace has put forth no competent summary-judgment evidence to establish such a fact. Simply put, there has been no mistake here.
Wallace's rambling allegations are largely incoherent. Wallace appears to allege that the clerk of court made some mistake in filing his evidence in the wrong docket. However, Wallace did not state what this evidence was, and this Court does not understand his allegations. Wallace filed 72 pages of exhibits with his motion for summary judgment, and a similar 75 pages of exhibits with his opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment. There was thus evidence attached tohis pleadings that the Court considered on the motions for summary judgment.
Further, Wallace states that this evidence was attached to his reply memorandum in support of his motion to proffer and his reply memorandum to his motion for summary judgment. There was no evidence attached to Wallace's reply to defendant's opposition to his motion for summary judgment. The evidence was evidently presented to the Court by Wallace with his motion for summary judgment and his corresponding opposition, and therefore there is no prejudice to Wallace. Wallace's statement that "the defendant obtained the order and judgment through mistake and misconduct" is not supported by any facts or evidence.
Under Rule 60(b)(3), a party who asserts that an adverse party has obtained a verdict through fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct has the burden of proving the assertion by clear and convincing evidence. Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1339 (5th Cir. 1978). The conduct complained of must be such as prevented the losing party from fully and fairly presenting his case or defense. Id. Although Rule 60(b)(3) applies to misconduct in withholding information called for by discovery, it does not require that the information withheld to be of such a nature as to alter the result in the case. Id. This subsection of the Rule is aimed at judgments that were unfairly obtained, not at those that are factually incorrect. Id. As described below, Wallace can not show any of the above at all, much less prove it by clear and convincing evidence.
A judgment is considered void for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) if the Court acted "outside its legal powers." Tercero-Aranda v. Morales, No. Civ. A. C-06-196, 2006 WL 1852172 (S.D. Tex. June 30, 2006). "A judgment is void only if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of thesubject matter, or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law." Id. (citations and quotations omitted). However, a judgment is not void merely because it was erroneous. Id. Relief under Rule 60(b)(4) is an extraordinary remedy, and accordingly, "[i]n the interests of finality, the concept of void judgments is narrowly construed." Id. (citations and quotations omitted). Wallace has not, and can not, show that this Court acted outside of its legal powers.
As to these two subsections, Wallace appears to take issue with the consent to proceed before this Court executed on his behalf by his original attorney Deborah Dugas. [Doc. #22]. "Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he serves." 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). The Constitution requires consent of all parties for a magistrate judge to preside in a case in place of an Article III judge. See Carter v. Sea Land Servs., Inc., 816 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1987) ().
Wallace argues that "the document is not dated by the signature of Anderson Wallace,...
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