Wallace v. Performance Contractors Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:19-CV-00649 |
| Parties | MAGAN WALLACE v. PERFORMANCE CONTRACTORS INC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. 21] filed by defendant Performance Contractors, Inc. in response to the employment discrimination suit brought by Magan Wallace. Wallace opposes the motion. Doc. 30.
This suit arises from Wallace's employment with Performance from December 2016 to September 2017. Wallace was originally hired as a Support Craft Firewatch at the Westlake facility in Sulphur, Louisiana, at a pay rate of $20/hour. Doc. 21, att. 3, pp. 2-3, 14. The position is an entry-level one. Doc. 30, att. 4, p. 6. Wallace was laid off in April 2017 pursuant to a reduction in force but rehired later that month as a Craftsman Helper Ironworker at the Sasol facility in Sulphur, in the Ethylene Oxide and Ethylene Glycol pipe rack area, at a pay rate of $22/hour. Doc. 21, att. 3, pp. 3, 16; doc. 30, att. 11. This position was considered a promotion and could sometimes involve light mechanical duties. Doc. 30, att. 4, pp. 7, 10-11. Wallace, however, states that her duties chiefly involved housekeeping tasks such as collecting water coolers, sweeping, and keeping work areas organized and free of hazards. Doc. 30, att. 2, p. 10. She further maintains that she was denied opportunities for on-site training that would help her advance her career. See id. at 38. By Wallace's account, she also suffered pervasive sexual harassment at the Sasol site in the form of sexual comments from supervisors as well as an incident of one coworker rubbing her shoulders and a supervisor sending her a picture of his genitals. Id. at 15-21.
Wallace reported incidents involving one coworker to her supervisors in June 2017, and Human Resources began an investigation. Doc. 30, att. 4, pp. 16-17. Before the investigation was complete, however, the subject employee quit. Id. Meanwhile, Wallace was suspended without pay for three days on August 16, 2017, for failing to call in before missing work. Doc. 30, att. 14. Her fiancé and coworker, Chris Tapley, was fired for absenteeism at the same time but had his termination reversed after he called the company's Human Resources office. Doc. 30, att. 3, pp. 5-6. Wallace also attempted to contact Human Resources but testified that she received no response. Doc. 30, att. 2, pp. 25-26. She then mailed a letter of resignation to the company on August 23, 2017, and was formally terminated on September 13, 2017, for "no call/no show." Id. at 70; doc. 30, att. 12.
Wallace filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, complaining of sex discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. Doc. 1, att. 3. The EEOC made a no-cause determination and issued a dismissal and notice of suit rights. Id. Wallace then timely filed the instant suit, raising claims of sex discrimination, sexual harassment/hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. Performance now moves for summary judgment on all of Wallace's claims. Doc. 20.
Under Rule 56(a), "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The moving party is initially responsible for identifying portions of pleadings and discovery that show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). He may meet his burden by pointing out "the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case." Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 404 (5th Cir. 2003). The non-moving party is then required to go beyond the pleadings and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To this end he must submit "significant probative evidence" in support of his claim. State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted).
A court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The court is also required to view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Clift v. Clift, 210 F.3d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 2000). Under this standard, a genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable trier of fact could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008).
A plaintiff may prove intentional retaliation or discrimination under Title VII using either direct or circumstantial evidence. When circumstantial evidence is involved, the court uses the framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) to analyze the claim. Under that framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing, in the case of a discrimination claim, that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was discharged or otherwise suffered adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated less favorably than members outside of her protected class or was replaced by a member outside of that class. Bryan v. McKinsey & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 358, 363 (5th Cir. 2004). If the plaintiff makes this showing, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory motive for its action. McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2007). At the final stage, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to show that the employer's explanation is not true and is instead a pretext for the real discriminatory and/or retaliatory purpose. Id.
Wallace first claims that she was discriminated against on the basis of sex when Performance denied her work and training opportunities that were available to her male colleagues. In support of her claim, she alleges that she was "prohibited by management officials . . . from performing any duties other than sweeping and refilling the water coolers, which are predominantly [lower-ranking] Laborer duties." Doc. 30, pp. 5-7. Specifically,she alleges that general foreman Charles Casey prohibited her from performing helper tasks on the "rack" that would allow her to hone her skills because, according to Casey, she had "tits and an ass" and therefore could not wear the required harness. Id. at 6-7. She also asserts that it was "common knowledge across . . . the site that the way to advance within the company was to work in the field, learn new things, practice them, and present yourself doing those things to management." Id. at 5 (internal quotations omitted). Finally, based on Casey's comments, she maintains that this is a case of direct evidence of discrimination and therefore not subject to McDonnell-Douglas's burden-shifting framework. Performance asserts that this claim is limited to circumstantial evidence, which does not support any discriminatory motive in light of plaintiff's own testimony that she believed Casey was joking, and that plaintiff cannot meet her burden because there was no adverse employment action.
Regardless of whether this claim is governed by McDonnell-Douglas, plaintiff can only prevail on her claim of discrimination if she shows an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., LP, 427 F.3d 987, 992 (5th Cir. 2005) () Here that action is the alleged limitation Performance placed on Wallace's opportunities to train and advance within her position because of her sex.
Title VII was designed to address only "ultimate employment decisions, [rather than] every decision made by employers that arguably might have some tangential effectupon those decisions." Thompson v. City of Waco, 764 F.3d 500, 503-04 (5th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original). A denial of training is only actionable under Title VII if the plaintiff produces "significant evidence" showing that it would tend to affect her employment status or benefits. Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1999). In this context, the Fifth Circuit has consistently rejected "failure to train" claims where there is "only tangential evidence of a potential effect on compensation." Brooks v. Firestone Polymers, LLC, 640 F. App'x 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases).
Here Wallace cites only her own testimony that the way to advance at Performance was to learn and practice new skills. Doc. 30, att. 2, p. 36. She provides no basis for this information other than "common knowledge" at the site and no evidence relating to specific comparators who advanced as a result of their wider range of skills or desired promotions that she was denied.1 Her evidence amounts to nothing more than speculation that any limitations on her duties impacted her compensation or job title. Accordingly, these allegations do not give rise to a claim under Title VII.
Sexual harassment is a form of illegal employment discrimination. Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2012). Sexual harassment under Title VII generally falls into two categories: (1) a "quid pro quo" claim and (2) allegations that a supervisor's sexual harassment created a "hostile work environment." See, e.g., ...
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