Wallace v. State, CR

• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MAYS
• Citation: Wallace v. State, 270 Ark. 17, 603 S.W.2d 399 (Ark. 1980)
• Decision Date: 25 August 1980
• Docket Number: No. CR,CR
• Parties: Charles Lewis WALLACE, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 79-199.

Page 399

603 S.W.2d 399

270 Ark. 17

Charles Lewis WALLACE, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR 79-199.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Aug. 25, 1980.

John W. Achor, Public Defender by Dewey Fitzhugh, Deputy Public Defender, Little Rock, and Charles Lewis Wallace, pro se, for appellant.

Steve Clark, Atty. Gen. by Jack W. Dickerson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

MAYS, Justice.

Appellant, Charles Lewis Wallace, was found guilty by a jury of kidnapping and capital murder and sentenced to fifteen years and life imprisonment without parole. Several points for reversal are argued, none of which we find to have merit.

On September 4, 1977, appellant and three co-defendants, two of whom testified against him at trial, accosted Calvin Smith on the parking lot of a Little Rock restaurant and forcefully removed him to the bank of the Arkansas River where he was drowned. Appellant was arrested seven days later on September 11, 1977, and remained in jail until he was tried on April 30, 1979.

Since more than 191/2 months elapsed between appellant's arrest and his trial, appellant first contends for reversal that he was denied a right to a speedy trial. Our Rules of Criminal Procedure provide a bar against prosecution only if a defendant is not brought to trial before the expiration of three full terms of court, excluding the term in which the arrest occurs and all periods of necessary delay. Arkansas Criminal Procedure Rules 28.1 and 30.1 (1976); Matthews v. State, 268 Ark. 484, 598 S.W.2d 58 (1980), State v. Knight, 259 Ark. 107, 533 S.W.2d 488 (1976). In the Pulaski County Circuit Court where the appellant was tried, no such speedy trial right violation can occur before the expiration of 18 months since the court has only two six month terms a year. Since appellant concedes that at least 31/2 and possibly 81/2 months of his 191/2 month trial delay may be properly excluded, he obviously was brought to trial within the time limitation established by our Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although appellant may have been entitled to pre-trial release under our rules at the end of nine months, as opposed to absolute discharge, such entitlement does not affect his convictions.

Second, appellant argues that the trial court improperly excluded evidence of bad character of the victim's brother. We discern no relevance in such evidence and hold that it was properly excluded.

Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give...