Wallace v. Town of Raleigh, No. 2001-CA-00455-SCT.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
• Citation: 815 So.2d 1203
• Docket Number: No. 2001-CA-00455-SCT.
• Parties: Roger WALLACE v. TOWN OF RALEIGH, Mississippi.
• Decision Date: 09 May 2002

815 So.2d 1203

Roger WALLACE
v.
TOWN OF RALEIGH, Mississippi

No. 2001-CA-00455-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 9, 2002.

815 So.2d 1205

Mark K. Tullos, Raleigh, attorney for appellant

L. Clark Hicks, Jr., John Michael Herke, Hattiesburg, attorneys for appellee.

Before PITTMAN, C.J., COBB and CARLSON, JJ.

CARLSON, J., for the Court.

¶ 1. The Town of Raleigh was granted summary judgment pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(m) (Supp.2001) which bars an inmate of a correctional facility from bringing suit against a governmental entity. Roger Wallace, an inmate of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, appeals the ruling of the circuit court citing numerous constitutional violations by the statute. Finding the Town of Raleigh's motion for summary judgment was properly granted, this Court affirms the judgment of the circuit court.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

¶ 2. On January 19, 1999, Roger Wallace, a participant in a work release program, was a passenger on a garbage truck owned and operated by the Town of Raleigh. The truck was struck on the passenger's side by a vehicle operated by Jones G. Moore. Wallace claims to have sustained serious personal injuries from the accident. On the date of the accident, Wallace was performing his duties as an inmate of the Mississippi Department of Corrections through the Simpson County Correctional Work Center.

¶ 3. Wallace sued the Town of Raleigh for damages in the Smith County Circuit Court. On July 24, 2000, the Town of Raleigh moved for summary judgment pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(m) which barred Wallace, as an inmate of a correctional facility, from bringing suit against the Town of Raleigh.

¶ 4. In response to the Town of Raleigh's Motion for Summary Judgment, Wallace argued Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(m) & (n) violate the Remedy Clause, the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Mississippi and United States Constitutions, and were, thus, unconstitutional as interpreted by the Town of Raleigh. Wallace also alleged that his injuries did not arise from the work he was performing, but rather the negligence of the Town of Raleigh's employee.

815 So.2d 1206

¶ 5. On February 6, 2001, the State of Mississippi intervened and joined the Town of Raleigh's Motion for Summary Judgment to defend the constitutionality of Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(m) & (n). See Miss. R. Civ. P. 24(d)

¶ 6. On February 9, 2001, a hearing on the motion for summary judgment was held before Circuit Judge Robert G. Evans. On February 20, 2001, the Town of Raleigh's Motion for Summary Judgment as to the issues involving Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(m) & (n) was granted. On March 16, 2001, the trial court entered an amended corrected order maintaining its grant of summary judgment and also entering a final judgment in favor of the Town of Raleigh to enable this appeal. On March 16, 2001, Wallace appealed to this Court from the trial court's order granting summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

I. WHETHER STRICT INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 11-46-9 OF THE TORT CLAIMS ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

¶ 7. Statutory interpretation is a matter of law which this Court reviews de novo. Donald v. Amoco Prod. Co., 735 So.2d 161, 165 (Miss.1999). This Court must presume a statute is constitutional unless the challenging party is able to prove unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Mississippi Power Co. v. Goudy, 459 So.2d 257, 263 (Miss.1984). "All doubts must be resolved in favor of the validity of a statute." Loden v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 279 So.2d 636, 640 (Miss.1973).

¶ 8. The Mississippi Torts Claims Act governs this suit. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-7 (Supp.2001). The statute at issue is Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9 (Supp.2001) which states in part as follows:

(1) A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim: ...

(m) Of any claimant who at the time the claim arises is an inmate of any detention center, jail, workhouse, penal farm, penitentiary or other such institution, regardless of whether such claimant is or is not an inmate of any detention center, jail, workhouse, penal farm, penitentiary or other such institution when the claim is filed; ...

(n) Arising out of any work performed by a person convicted of a crime when the work is performed pursuant to any sentence or order of any court or pursuant to laws of the State of Mississippi authorizing or requiring such work; ...

¶ 9. Wallace argues that a strict interpretation of the statute, as adopted by the Town of Raleigh, specifically of § 11-46-9(1)(m) & (n) would violate the Remedy Clause, Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection Clause of the Mississippi and United States Constitutions.

¶ 10. This Court has held that the remedy clause, Miss. Const. art. 3, § 24, does not conflict with sovereign immunity. Robinson v. Stewart, 655 So.2d 866, 868-69 (Miss.1995). The remedy clause does not require exceptions to sovereign immunity and does not grant an absolute guarantee of a trial. Robinson, 655 So.2d at 868-69 (citing Grimes v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 930 F.2d 441, 443-44 (5th Cir.1991)).

¶ 11. In Robinson, this Court also held sovereign immunity did not violate due process. 655 So.2d at 869. "A due process violation requires the infringement of a liberty or property right." Id. at 869 (citing Tucker v. Hinds County, 558 So.2d 869...