Wallace v. Warden, Warren Corr. Inst.

• Decision Date: 17 August 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:19-cv-429
• Parties: PIANTE WALLACE, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, Warren Correctional Institution, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

PIANTE WALLACE, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, Warren Correctional Institution, Respondent.

Case No. 1:19-cv-429

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI

August 17, 2020

District Judge Douglas R. Cole

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This habeas corpus case, brought pro se by Petitioner Piante Wallace, is before the Court for decision on the merits on the Petition (ECF No. 1), the State Court Record (ECF No. 7), and the Return of Writ (ECF No. 8).

Magistrate Judge Litkovitz, in her Order for Answer, set a deadline for Petitioner's reply of twenty-one days after the Return was filed (ECF No. 3, PageID 23). Since the Return was filed and served by mail on August 29, 2019, Petitioner's reply was due September 23, 2019, but no reply has been filed.

Litigation History

Wallace was indicted July 7, 2014, on counts of aggravated murder in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2903.01(B); murder in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2903.02(B), and aggravated robbery in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2911.01(A)(1). Each count included a firearm specification (Indictment, State Court Record, ECF No. 7, Ex. 1). At a jury trial almost two years after the Indictment, Wallace testified in his own defense but was convicted of murder and aggravated robbery, both with firearm specifications, but acquitted on the aggravated murder charge. The trial court sentenced him to eighteen years to life in prison.

Represented by new counsel, Wallace appealed to the Ohio First District Court of Appeals, raising the following assignments of error:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: The trial court erred as a matter of law by overruling Appellant's motion to strike the State's Certification under Crim. R. 16.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: The trial court erred as a matter of law by allowing hearsay evidence to be admitted in violation of Appellant's right to a fair and impartial trial.

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: The trial court erred as a matter of law by permitting other acts testimony into evidence thus prejudicing Appellant's right to a fair trial.

FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: The trial court erred as a matter of law by permitting the State to impeach its own witness in violation of Appellant's right to a fair trial.

FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: The trial court erred as a matter of law by permitting the prosecutor to make improper remarks to the jury and to introduce improper evidence thus prejudicing Appellant's rights to a fair trial.

SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: The evidence was insufficient as a matter of law and/or against the manifest weight of the evidence to sustain Appellant's convictions.

(Appellant's Brief, State Court Record, ECF No. 7, Ex. 18). The First District overruled all the Assignments of Error and affirmed the conviction. State v. Wallace, 2017-Ohio-9187 (Ohio App. 1^st Dist. Dec. 22, 2017).

Represented by new counsel, Wallace appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio raising onlyone proposition of law:

PROPOSITION OF LAW NO. I:

Under Crim. R. 16(D) a court is supposed to require the State to set forth in any motion for certification, case-specific reasoning for granting certification. The statute does not permit the Prosecution to widely and freely invoke this rule as a basis for strategic preparation and when the State only is able to offer general assertions in a certification hearing, it is insufficient to meet the requirements under Crim. R. 16(D).

(Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction, State Court Record, ECF No. 7, Exhibit 22). The Supreme Court of Ohio declined to exercise appellate jurisdiction. State v. Wallace, 2018-Ohio-1795 (2018). Wallace then filed his pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court on May 23, 2019¹, pleading the following grounds for relief:

Ground One: The trial court erred as a matter of law by overruling Appellant's motion to strike the State's Certification under Crim. R. 16.

Factual Support: The trial court prejudiced Defendant by violating his Constitutional right to trial by overruling our motion to strike State's Certification under Crim. R. 16 infringing on his rights to a discovery.

Ground Two: The trial court erred as a matter of law by allowing hearsay evidence to be admitted in violation of Appellant's right to a fair and impartial trial.

Ground Three: The trial court erred as a matter of law by permitting other acts testimony into evidence thus prejudicing Appellant's rights to a fair trial.

Ground Four: The trial court erred as a matter of law by permitting the State to impeach its own witness in violation of Appellant's right to a fair trial.

(Petition, ECF No. 1, PageID 8, 10, 11, and 13).

Analysis

In each of his four Grounds for Relief, Wallace asserts that some error of the trial court deprived him of his federal constitutional right to a fair trial. That right is protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Federal habeas corpus relief is available only to remedy violations of the federal constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1 (2010); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983). "In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); see also Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 160 (1825)(Marshall C. J.); Bickham v. Winn, 888 F.3d 248 (6^th Cir. Apr. 23, 2018)(Thapar, J. concurring).

This basic principle has several implications for this case. "[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law questions." Estelle, supra. That means we do not sit as an appeals court on questions of Ohio law. We cannot grant habeas corpus relief even if we find that the Ohio courts erred in applying Ohio law.

Nor does every violation of state procedural rules in a criminal case rise to the level of denial of due process or a fair trial. Failure to abide by state law is not itself a constitutional violation. Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720 (6^th Cir. 1985). Violation by a State of its own procedural rules does not necessarily constitute a violation of due process. Bates v. Sponberg, 547F.2d 325 (6^th Cir. 1976); Ryan v. Aurora City Bd. of Educ., 540 F.2d 222, 228 (6^th Cir. 1976). "A state cannot be said to have a federal due process obligation to follow all of its procedures; such a system would result in the constitutionalizing of every state rule, and would not be administrable." Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d 1506, 1515 (6^th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 907 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995).

A second general principle applicable here is the requirement that a habeas petitioner exhaust available state court remedies for asserted federal constitutional violations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). Exhaustion requires that the federal claim be "fairly presented" to the state forum. To preserve a federal constitutional claim for presentation in habeas corpus, the claim must be "fairly presented" to the state courts in a way which provides them with an opportunity to remedy the asserted constitutional violation, including presenting both the legal and factual basis of the claim. Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 806 (6^th Cir. 2006); Levine, supra; Riggins v. McMackin, 935 F.2d 790, 792 (6^th Cir. 1991). The claim must be fairly presented at every stage of the state appellate process. Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 418 (6^th Cir. 2009).

If a habeas petitioner has used a state court procedure in which he could have fairly presented a federal constitutional claim, but failed to do so, he has procedurally defaulted on that claim and it also cannot be heard in habeas corpus. The procedural default doctrine in habeas corpus is described by the Supreme Court as follows:

In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an adequate and independent state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause of the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law; or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); see also Simpson v. Jones, 238 F.3d 399, 406 (6^th Cir. 2000). That is, a petitioner may not raise on federal habeas a federal constitutional rights claim he could not raise in state court because of procedural default. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 110 (1982). "Absent cause and prejudice, 'a federal habeas petitioner who fails to comply with a State's rules of procedure waives his right to federal habeas corpus review.'" Boyle v. Million, 201 F.3d 711, 716 (6^th Cir. 2000), quoting Gravley v. Mills, 87 F.3d 779, 784-85 (6^th Cir. 1996); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986); Engle, 456 U.S. at 110; Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87.

[A] federal court may not review federal claims that were procedurally defaulted in state court—that is, claims that the state court denied based on an adequate and independent state procedural rule. E.g., Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 55, 130 S.Ct. 612, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009). This is an important "corollary" to the exhaustion requirement. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392, 124 S.Ct. 1847, 158 L.Ed. d 659 (2004). "Just as in those cases in which a state prisoner fails to exhaust state remedies, a habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the State's procedural requirements for presenting his federal claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address" the merits of "those claims in the first instance." Coleman [v. Thompson], 501 U.S. [722,] 731-732, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 [(1991)]. The

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