Waller v. City of Middletown

• Decision Date: 24 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. 3:11–CV–01322 CSH.,3:11–CV–01322 CSH.
• Citation: Waller v. City of Middletown, 89 F.Supp.3d 279 (D. Conn. 2015)
• Parties: Jayrado WALLER, Marcia Waller, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MIDDLETOWN, Mark Del Mauro, Nicholas Puorro, William Hertler, Douglas Clark, Frank Scirpo, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

89 F.Supp.3d 279

Jayrado WALLER, Marcia Waller, Plaintiffs

v.CITY OF MIDDLETOWN, Mark Del Mauro, Nicholas Puorro, William Hertler, Douglas Clark, Frank Scirpo, Defendants.

No. 3:11–CV–01322 CSH.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed Feb. 24, 2015.

John Louis Cordani, Jr, Maureen Danehy Cox, Carmody Torrance Sandak & Hennessey, LLP, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiffs.

Allison L. Pannozzo, Melinda A. Powell, Rose Kallor LLP, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

HAIGHT, Senior District Judge:

Defendants have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment, dated September 29, 2014. Doc. [119]. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' motion for reconsideration is granted in part, and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts relevant to this lawsuit were set forth in the Court's September 29 Ruling, reported at 50 F.Supp.3d 171, familiarity with which is assumed. Plaintiffs are Jayrado and Marcia Waller.¹ Defendants are the City of Middletown (“City”) and Middletown Police Officers Mark Del Mauro, Nicholas Puorro, Douglas Clark, William Hertler and Frank Scirpo. The lawsuit stems from the Officers' entry and search of Jayrado's apartment while attempting to apprehend the suspect of a violent crime named in an arrest warrant who they thought (incorrectly) was present and residing in Jayrado's home.

As set forth in the Court's September 29 Ruling, Plaintiffs charge the Officers, in Count One of the amended complaint (“complaint”), and the City, in Count Two, with deprivation of Jayrado's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count Three, Plaintiffs charge the Officers with deprivation of Jayrado's parallel rights to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures under Article First, § 7 of the Connecticut Constitution. In Counts Four and Five, Plaintiffs charge the Officers with trespass and intentional infliction of emotional distress, respectively. Finally, in Count Six, Plaintiffs charge both the Officers and the City with negligent infliction of emotional distress. Doc. [48]. The Court's September 29 Ruling resolved Defendants' motion for summary judgment on those claims as follows:

• Count One (against Officers): Denied as to Officers Clark, Del Mauro, and Puorro; Granted as to Officers Hertler and Scirpo.

• Count Two (against City): Denied.

• Count Three (against Officers): Denied as to Officers Clark, Del Mauro, and Puorro; Granted as to Officers Hertler and Scirpo.

• Count Four (against Officers): Denied as to Officers Clark, Del Mauro, and Puorro; Granted as to Officers Hertler and Scirpo.

• Count Five (against Officers): Denied.

• Count Six (against City and Officers): Granted.

Defendants filed the instant motion for reconsideration, objecting to the Court's Ruling denying their motion for summary judgment with respect to counts one through five of the complaint.

II. DISCUSSION

A

Motions for reconsideration require the moving party to set “forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which [the movant] believes the Court overlooked in the initial decision or order.” D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(c)(1). “The major grounds justifying reconsideration are an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). The standard is “strict and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decision or data that the court overlooked.” Shrader v. CSX Trans., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.1995). If “the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided,” the court should deny the motion for reconsideration and adhere to its prior decision. Id.

Defendants' objections to the Court's decision denying the Officers' motions for summary judgment on Counts One, Three, Four and Five of the complaint, principally reiterate arguments made on the lost motion. Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration will be denied as to Counts One, Three, Four, and Five. The Court concludes, however, that reconsideration of its Ruling denying the City's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim against the City (asserted in Count Two) is necessary in order to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.

In its prior Ruling, the Court concluded, with respect to Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims against Clark, Del Mauro, and Puorro, there are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether their “protective sweep” of Jayrado's apartment—which allegedly resulted in damage to some of his personal effects—was reasonable and without malice. Waller v. City of Middletown, 50 F.Supp.3d 171, 184, 2014 WL 4843681, at *9 (D.Conn.2014). Because that claim survived against those officers, the Court went on to consider Plaintiffs' Monell claim against the City asserted in Count Two of the complaint. The Court concluded that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Officers were trained on the constitutional limitations of protective sweeps, and denied the City's motion for summary judgment as to Count Two. 50 F.Supp.3d at 187–90, 2014 WL 4843681, at *12–14.

The City objects to the Court's ruling on Count Two, arguing that the Court erred in the following principle respects: by concluding that the complaint states a valid Monell claim; by concluding that the complaint alleges a viable theory of municipal liability; and by concluding that there is no colorable evidence in the record establishing that the Officers were trained on the constitutional limitations of protective sweeps. As discussed seriatim, infra, none of the arguments raised by the City warrant reconsideration of the Court's prior Ruling. However, based on a reassessment of the record evidence and review of controlling authority not fully considered at summary judgment, the Court concludes that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to sustain Plaintiffs' Monell claim.

B

The City's first objection to the Court's September 29 Ruling denying its motion for summary judgment as to Count Two is based on an error it perceives in the Ruling's concurrent disposition of the City's motions to dismiss Count Two and for summary judgment on that count. Noting that the Court's discussion in the prior Ruling focused almost exclusively on whether Count Two survives the City's motion for summary judgment, the City claims that the Court erred in failing to conclude that Count Two does not state a Monell claim. That criticism is not well-founded.

In support of their Monell claim, Plaintiffs allege that the Officers “conducted a search of Waller's apartment,” “overturned Waller's mattress and searched through various drawers and containers within the apartment,” id. at ¶ 23, “damaged several items of Waller's personal property and damaged the apartment, for which Waller was billed by the landlord,” id. at ¶ 24, “destroyed Waller's Xbox 360 videogame system, accessories and games, which was valued at more than $500,” id. at ¶ 31, and “made no offer to pay for the extensive damages they had caused,” id. at ¶ 28. Plaintiffs allege that the City is liable for the Officers' conduct because it, inter alia, “failed to train its Officers to understand that entry into a private home to execute an arrest warrant, but without a search warrant and without exigent circumstances, is illegal per se. ” Doc. [48] at ¶ 48.b.

Viewed out of context, Plaintiffs' allegation related to the City's failure to train reveals a misstatement of law—entry into a private home to execute an arrest warrant (even without a search warrant or exigent circumstances) is not always illegal; rather, is lawful under certain circumstances, including, as here, where the Officers' belief that the suspect named in the arrest warrant was residing and within the residence was reasonable. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 221, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981) ; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). However, construing that allegation in Plaintiffs' favor, the Court liberally interprets the complaint as alleging that the City failed to train its Officers to understand that entry into a private home to execute an arrest warrant was illegal in the context of the particular circumstances alleged here. Moreover, although the complaint alleges that the City failed to train the Officers with respect to entries into private homes, the Court understands Plaintiffs as also averring that the City did not train the Officers with respect to the constitutional limitations of the search that invariably follows the entry. See Prevost v. City of New York, No. 13cv3760 (VEC), 2014 WL 6907560, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2014) (affording liberal construction to plaintiff's Monell claim based on a theory of failure to train). The Court turns to whether the complaint, construed in that fashion, states a Monell claim.

Local governments are only responsible for their own illegal acts and are not vicariously liable for their employees' actions under a theory of respondent superior. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) (citing Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) ). But “[a] municipality or other local government may be liable under [Section 1983 ] if the government body itself ‘subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes' a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” Id. (citing Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 692, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ). Therefore, to state a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff is required to plead a violation of a federally protected right that was caused by the municipality's...