Waller v. Mayfield

• Decision Date: 08 June 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-456,87-456
• Parties: WALLER, Appellee, v. MAYFIELD, Admr.; E.F. Hauserman Company, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 118

37 Ohio St.3d 118

524 N.E.2d 458

WALLER, Appellee, v. MAYFIELD, Admr.; E.F. Hauserman Company, Appellant.

No. 87-456.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Jan. 20, 1988.

Decided June 8, 1988.

Syllabus by the Court

1. When a court of appeals is reviewing the propriety of a directed verdict granted to a defendant at the close of the plaintiff's case pursuant to Civ.R. 50(A), it may not enter final judgment in favor of the plaintiff upon reversal of the directed verdict.

2. In worker's compensation cases involving an unexplained fall, the claimant has the burden of eliminating idiopathic causes.

3. In a workers' compensation case where idiopathic causes for an unexplained fall have been eliminated, an inference arises that the fall is traceable to some ordinary risk, albeit unidentified, to which the employee was exposed on the employment premises.

Appellee, Rolando B. Waller, fell while he was descending stairs at his place of employment. Appellee had been in the restroom and was reporting to a work assignment on a lower floor at the time of the fall. Appellee claimed injuries as a result of the fall and filed an application for workers' compensation benefits.

A district hearing officer allowed the claim for "acute strain of low back superimposed upon prior low back problems." This determination was affirmed by the regional board of review. Appellant-employer, E.F. Hauserman Company, appealed this order to the Industrial Commission. The commission vacated the finding and order of the board of review and appellee's claim was disallowed in its entirety.

Appellee then appealed that order to the court of common pleas pursuant to R.C. 4123.519. The case proceeded to trial before a jury. At the conclusion of the presentation of appellee's evidence, appellant filed a motion for a directed verdict. The trial court granted this motion. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and reinstated the decision of the regional board of review which had allowed the claim.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Bruce D. Taubman, Cleveland, for appellee.

Calfee, Halter & Griswold and William L.S. Ross, Cleveland, for appellant.

LOCHER, Justice.

The issues presented in this action are (1) whether a court of appeals, when reviewing a directed verdict granted to the defendant at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case pursuant to Civ.R. 50(A), may enter final judgment in favor of the plaintiff upon reversal of the directed verdict; and (2) whether the trial court properly granted the appellant-employer's motion for a directed verdict. We hold in the negative on both issues and, accordingly, reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause for a new trial.

I

Appellant initially contends that the court of appeals erred in entering final judgment for appellee before appellant had an opportunity to present its evidence at trial. We agree. The cause sub judice was decided by the trial court on appellant's motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of appellee's case. Appellant had not yet had an opportunity to offer evidence to the jury when appellee brought his appeal to the appellate court. Appellee maintains that the decision of the court of appeals was in accord with App.R. 12(B) and this court's holding in Houk v. Ross (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 77, 63 O.O.2d 119, 296 N.E.2d 266. ¹

App.R. 12(B) provides in pertinent part:

" * * * When the court of appeals determines that the trial court committed error prejudicial to the appellant and that the appellant is entitled to have judgment or final order rendered in his favor as a matter of law, the court of appeals shall reverse the judgment or final order of the trial court and render the judgment or final order that the trial court should have rendered, or remand the cause to the court with instructions to render such judgment or final order." (Emphasis added.) " * * * [T]he phrase 'should have rendered' cannot be interpreted to extend authority to the Court of Appeals beyond that granted the trial court." Houk, supra, at 80, 63 O.O.2d at 121, 296 N.E.2d at 269.

Assuming the trial court had denied appellant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of appellee's evidence, it could not have rendered a proper judgment for appellee at that time. Civ.R. 50(A)(2) ² provides:

"A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdict." (Emphasis added.)

Pre-Civil Rules cases also recognized the right of the defendant to proceed with his case if his motion was denied. "But where only the defendant moves for a directed verdict, there is no waiver of a jury. Certainly the plaintiff does not waive a jury, and if the motion is overruled the defendant may go forward and submit his case to the jury. * * * Such a situation does not constitute a waiver of a jury or a trial to the court." Bauer v. Cleveland Ry. Co. (1943), 141 Ohio St. 197, 202, 25 O.O. 297, 300, 47 N.E.2d 225, 228, citing as authority Michigan-Ohio-Indiana Coal Assn. v. Nigh (1936), 131 Ohio St. 405, 6 O.O. 111, 3 N.E.2d 355.

The final judgment entered by the court of appeals, in effect, denied appellant's motion for a directed verdict and foreclosed appellant's right to offer evidence to the jury. Appellant had no opportunity to defend itself at trial. This is in direct contravention of Civ.R. 50(A)(2). The trial court could not have rendered such a judgment at that point in the trial. Accordingly, we hold that when a court of appeals is reviewing the propriety of a directed verdict granted to a defendant at the close of the plaintiff's case pursuant to Civ.R. 50(A), it may not enter final judgment in favor of the plaintiff upon reversal of the directed verdict. Therefore, it was error for the court of appeals to enter final judgment for appellee in the case at bar.

II

The next issue to be addressed is whether the trial court properly granted the appellant's motion for a directed verdict.

Civ.R. 50(A)(4) provides the standard for a decision on a motion for directed verdict: "When a motion for a directed verdict has been properly made, and the trial court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion and direct a verdict for the moving party as to that issue."

" * * * [I]t is uncontestably the duty of a trial court to submit an essential issue to the jury when there is sufficient evidence, if believed, relating to that issue to permit reasonable minds to reach different conclusions on that issue. * * * [Citations omitted.] Conversely, it is also the duty of a trial court to withhold an essential issue from the jury when there is not sufficient evidence relating to that issue to permit reasonable minds to reach different conclusions on that issue. In other words, if all the evidence relating to an essential issue is sufficient to permit only a conclusion by reasonable minds against a party, after construing the evidence most favorably to that party, it is the duty of the trial court to instruct a finding or direct a verdict on that issue against that party. Naturally, if the finding on that one issue disposes of the whole case, a duty arises to grant judgment upon the whole case. [Citation omitted.]" (Emphasis sic.) O'Day v. Webb (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 215, 220, 58 O.O.2d 424, 427, 280 N.E.2d 896, 899-900.

The evidence before the trial court at the time appellant moved for a directed verdict showed that appellee fell while descending stairs at his place of employment in an effort to report to a work assignment on a lower floor. The crucial issue before the court in determining whether appellee's injury was compensable was whether appellee's injury did, in fact, "arise out of" his employment.

An injury sustained by an employee that is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act "includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01(C). It is undisputed that appellee sustained his injury while in the course of his employment.

Appellant contends that appellee's injury did not "arise out of" his employment because appellee did not demonstrate that his injury occurred as a result of some hazard or risk pertaining to his employment. Appellant places great reliance on the dissenting opinion in the court of appeals and infers that appellee's injury must have been sustained from an idiopathic ³ fall because there was no evidence of water, oil, or any other foreign substance on the stairs. Appellant's argument appears to require that appellee show fault on the part of his employer before he may be eligible for benefits.

As described in the recent case of Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 110, 522 N.E.2d 489, 498-499:

" * * * [T]he Ohio General Assembly, in 1911 (102 Ohio Laws 524), enacted the first law pertaining to compensation for industrial injuries. This law was enacted without a specific constitutional genesis. However, the Act was followed by the adoption in 1912 of Section 35, Article II. It specifically empowered the General Assembly to provide for the compensation of injuries or occupational diseases 'occasioned in the course of such workmen's employment.' It also authorized the General Assembly to enact legislation...