Waller v. The Habilitation Grp.
| Decision Date | 22 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:21-CV-00519-CCW |
| Parties | TAMIKA WALLER, Plaintiff, v. THE HABILITATION GROUP, LLC, JEAN MCCANNA, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Before the Court are cross-motions for partial summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Tamika Waller, ECF No. 47, and Defendants The Habilitation Group and Jean McCanna (together “Defendants”), ECF No. 48.
The thrusts of Ms. Waller's claims are that Ms. McCanna and Ms. McCanna's company The Habilitation Group improperly classified Ms. Waller as an independent contractor as opposed to an employee and failed to pay Ms. Waller overtime, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and several Pennsylvania state laws, and that Defendants also retaliated against Ms. Waller in violation of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law by terminating her. See generally ECF No. 21. Following the close of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. ECF Nos. 47 & 48. Ms. Waller seeks summary judgment in her favor on her FLSA claim in Count II. Defendants seek summary judgment on Count I (joint and several liability under state law participation theory), Count V (retaliation under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law), and Count VI (unjust enrichment).[1] For the following reasons, the Court will deny Ms. Waller's Motion for Summary Judgment, grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Count I, and deny Defendants' Motion with respect to Count V.[2]
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
The Habilitation Group is a limited liability company that provides caregiving services to people with intellectual disabilities. ECF No. 68 ¶ 1; ECF No. 64 ¶ 18. The business is funded entirely through Medicaid funds with its owner and founder, Ms. McCanna, acting as the sole operator of the business. ECF No. 64 ¶¶ 4, 17, 63; ECF 65-2 ¶ 2; ECF No. 68 ¶¶ 2, 3. Ms. Waller was a caregiver who performed work for The Habilitation Group from September 26, 2014 to May 1, 2020. ECF No. 64 ¶ 17.
The Habilitation Group requires each caregiver to sign independent contractor agreements before performing work for the company. ECF No. 68 ¶ 5; ECF No. 65-2 ¶¶ 2, 9; see generally ECF No. 57-3. The caregivers must have a high school degree or GED, but specialized accreditation is not required. ECF No. 64 ¶ 56. The caregivers are paid at a fixed hourly rate set by Ms. McCanna. ECF No. 64 ¶ 82. As part of their job, they are required to follow a list of daily tasks, known as individual service plans, that are unique to each client. ECF No. 64 ¶¶ 57-60; ECF 65-2 ¶ 29; ECF 57-1 at 47:24-48:24. The parties dispute the consequences for failing to complete these tasks. Ms. Waller contends that a failure to complete these tasks could result in termination. ECF No. 64 ¶ 61. By contrast, Defendants refer to completing these tasks as a “general obligation” but emphasize that Ms. McCanna has never actually disciplined anyone in connection with how these tasks are performed. ECF No. 64 ¶ 101-05. Defendants note that, with the exception of these daily tasks, the caregivers are free to participate in any activity with their client without input from Ms. McCanna. ECF No. 65-2 ¶ 26-28; ECF No. 64 ¶ 93, 101-03.
Ms. McCanna carries general commercial liability insurance that covers any damages caused by the caregivers and does not require any of the caregivers to take out their own commercial insurance. ECF No. 64 ¶¶ 67, 70, 71. However, Ms. McCanna does not cover travel expenses, supplies, or activity costs with a client that a caregiver may incur. ECF No. 64 ¶¶ 81-82.
The parties dispute certain aspects of how caregivers scheduled appointments and received assignments. Defendants contend that the caregivers had the choice to accept or decline any client. ECF No. 64 ¶¶ 62, 86, 96; ECF No. 65-2 ¶ 21. According to Defendants, the caregivers could exercise complete discretion in whether they provided services to a particular client. ECF No. 64 ¶¶ 64, 97; ECF 57-2 at 34:6-12; ECF No. 65-2 ¶¶ 21-24. By contrast, Ms. Waller notes that if caregivers wanted to take assignments, they still needed approval from Defendants. ECF No. 68 ¶¶ 9, 14; see, e.g., ECF No. 21-2 at 14; see also ECF No. 57-1 at 112:18-113:21. Defendants dispute this characterization and continue to stress that Ms. Waller had absolute discretion to accept or decline any assignment. ECF No. 64 ¶¶ 64, 97.
Ms. Waller first joined The Habilitation Group in 2014 and, at that time, signed an independent contractor agreement. ECF No. 64 ¶ 77; ECF No. 68 ¶ 5; see generally ECF No. 57-3. For the next almost six years, Ms. Waller worked only for The Habilitation Group. ECF No. 64 ¶ 17; ECF No. 63 at 13. During this time, she provided caregiving services to clients with intellectual disabilities as a Community Participation Support (“CPS”) member, often in excess of forty hours per week. ECF No. 64 ¶ 55. Despite working overtime, she was only paid her base hourly rate. ECF No. 57-1 at 119:12-120:2.
Starting in March of 2020, Ms. McCanna did not send any more assignments to Ms. Waller due to the pandemic. ECF No. 57-2 at 56:12-20; ECF No. 64 ¶ 22. Ms. Waller continued to reach out to Ms. McCanna asking for work. ECF No. 64 ¶ 23.
On April 6, 2020, Ms. Waller sent Ms. McCanna guidance from the Pennsylvania Office of Developmental Program (“ODP”) that Ms. Waller contends indicates she would have been able to return to work based on ODP disbursement of pandemic relief to CPS workers. ECF No. 61-7 at 3; ECF No. 21-1 at 3.[3] Defendants dispute that this announcement would have enabled Ms. Waller to return to work. ECF No. 64 ¶ 40.
On April 30, 2022, Ms. Waller again reached out to Ms. McCanna about returning to work, using such funds. ECF No. 61-6 at 3. Ms. McCanna responded, Id. at 2. This same date, Ms. Waller also informed Ms. McCanna that Ms. Waller had been denied unemployment. ECF No. 68 ¶ 9; ECF No. 61-7 at 5. When Ms. McCanna asked why Ms. Waller was denied unemployment, Ms. Waller responded that the “employer didn't report any wages between the dates of October 2018 til [sic] September 2019.” ECF No. 61-7 at 6. Ms. Waller elaborated that she worked this period consistently and filed taxes for this period, so she does not understand why these records are missing. Id. Ms. McCanna responded, “I didn't report your income because [you] didn't ask me to.” Id. Ms. Waller claims that she was denied unemployment because Ms. McCanna failed to report her earnings accurately. ECF No. 68 ¶ 8. By contrast, Ms. McCanna claims that Ms. Waller was not eligible for unemployment because she was an independent contractor. ECF No. 68 ¶ 12.
It is undisputed that in response to Ms. Waller asking to return to work, Ms. McCanna emailed her:
I think you have forgotten that I am your boss and I can communicate with you at my discretion. I keep you employed at my discretion. If you quit now, or if I were to let you go, you would not be qualified for unemployment so keeping that in mind we can continue from there.
ECF No. 64 ¶ 50; ECF No. 54 at 19; ECF No. 61-6 at 2.
A few weeks later, Ms. Waller asked again to be paid with the ODP funds for CPS workers. ECF No. 61-6 at 3. Ms. McCanna told her that that was not the purpose of the funds. Id. at 4; ECF 64 ¶ 53. On May 1, 2020, Ms. Waller emailed Ms. McCanna, “Thanks for clarifying that the CPS funds you received from ODP are not for your CPS workers.” ECF No. 61-6 at 4. A few hours later, Ms. McCanna responded, “I think I'm pretty much done with you, so it is probably in your best interest to start looking for work elsewhere.” Id.; ECF No. 64 ¶ 54. The parties agree that this exchange terminated their working relationship. ECF No. 68 ¶ 9.
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Mann v. Palmerton Area Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). “A factual dispute is ‘genuine' if the ‘evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “A factual dispute is ‘material' if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
The burden to establish that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact “remains with ‘the moving party regardless of which party would have the burden of persuasion at trial.'” Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 896 (3d Cir. 1987)). That said, “[i]f the non-moving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, ‘the moving party may meet its burden on summary judgment by showing that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to carry that burden.'” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Wetzel v. Tucker, 139 F.3d 380, 383 n.2 (3d Cir. 1998)).
Once the moving party has carried its initial burden, the party opposing summary judgment ...
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